You guys are hillarious....

Guys this has gone far enough and should stop.

I second that....

LOL dude, get a megaphone and shout louder but it wont work. Leishman cant understand your language(Im done arguing with her). BTW Isnt there a separate forum for pictures?

This topic had make her to act this way....she just wanna show this topic is not relevant to discuss.just compare to current situation as eye seen.
That's a great gap between China & India.

Oh, hindoos ,,Don't abuse Me only ..Look you said that before!

You are impudence Hindoos,aha....you Don't camouflage in polite
Sorry I show your Picture of Dirty in here... Now I hope you Happyyyyyyy....

but still this is not the way to act on defecnce forums if you dont like some topic. this is a defence and strategy related forum and not some insult and bashing forum against some country.... you come, read the topic and if you have something to contribute, then do it or just forget it....if according to leishman it was not worth discussing then he could have simply ingnored this.....what leishman trying to prove by posting such images and using racist words against Indians and that to everytime??

A Psychopath out of control.......................

leishman u are halaroius where on earth did u find that picture from?!! you have competely destroyed these guys single handedly!

Next poster to flame will be suspended. Leishman take note.

Bhangees started flaming here not lieshman, otherwise thread was going on topic, she is just replying them when they diverted the thread.

This has nothing to do with the topic.

leishman .... dude you are absolutely hilarious .... man i couldn't stop laughing ... you actually made me roll of my seat in laughter! priceless .... fu©kin 'A' .... tummy aching stuff ..... leishman for president!!!!!!!! U da maann leishman!!!!!!

Buddy you made my day!!!!

I don't need a megaphone, I can get my message across.

Stop flaming other people and countries, or I will start (along with the other mature people on this forum) and when you 'catch of fire' from the flaming, don't come crying to me.

(The second part is for everyone)

Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh, Sunday September 30, 2007: The Indian Air Force (IAF) has significantly enhanced its strategic reach against China by making fully operational a squadron of frontline Sukhoi Su-30MKI fighters at this sprawling airbase in northern India.

Over the next one year, another Su-30MKI squadron will also be made fully operational, along with a similar deployment of the combat jets at Tezpur in Assam. Maintenance facilities are being created both in Bareilly and Tezpur.

What is significant is not just the deployment of the aircraft. The "buddy-refuelling" will enable them stay in the air for up to a staggering 10 hours at a stretch, an IAF officer told a group of visiting journalists.

While the IAF flies the Il-78 midair refuelling tanker, this aircraft can only operate in Indian airspace. Buddy-refuelling, a Su-30 tanking up another, "gives us the tactical advantage of refuelling in enemy territory", the officer explained.

This apart, the MKI variant of the Su-30 comes with a sophisticated array of electronic warfare and surveillance equipment that will fill gaps created by the retirement last year of the IAF's MIG-25 spy planes, the officer pointed out.

And the arrival later this year of the first of three Il-78s equipped with the Israeli Phalcon airborne warning and control system (AWACS) will serve as a powerful force multiplier, giving the Su-30 a cutting edge advantage that few fighter jets anywhere in the world can boast of.

Explaining the maintenance facilities being created here, the chief engineering officer of the base, Group Captain Rajiv Gandotra, said these would comprise a hanger for eight aircraft that would be the IAF's largest, an avionics lab and an engine bay.

The avionics lab and the engine bay are fully operational, while work on the hangar, spread over an area of 110x90 metres, began two years ago and is likely to be completed by next March.

Set up at a cost of Rs.60 million, the two facilities are a vital piece of infrastructure and enables IAF technicians perform three of the four levels of maintenance an aircraft undergoes.

"We can't conduct overhauls but can effect major repairs for which the engines previously had to be sent to Russia. Short of an overhaul, no matter what the fault, the aircraft is ready to fly the very next day," Gandotra pointed.

Engine overhauls, the fourth level of maintenance, will continue to be carried at the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) facility at Koraput in Orissa.

India had signed a deal with Russia in the early 1990s for the purchase of 40 Su-30s but there were of the K variety. All of them have now been upgraded to the MKI variant.

Another 140 aircraft will be built by HAL, but slippages in this prompted the IAF to ink another deal earlier this year for the purchase of 40 more fighters.

This deal has now become embroiled in a cost-escalation row that is likely to be resolved only when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh travels to Moscow in November for his annual summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

KT

Washington, Wednesday October 03, 2007: The Indian Express also reported that the Indian air force was getting a squadron of Su-30MKI aircraft fitted with Israeli reconnaissance systems that will enable India to look deep inside China without crossing the border.

The aircraft are a replacement for MiG-25s phased out by the IAF last year.

A team from Israel Aerospace Industries will integrate the Elta Reconnaissance System on the fighters at the Bareilly airbase and also set up a ground-receiving station for live images taken by the aircraft, the newspaper quoted an unnamed senior IAF officer as saying.

The air force plans to deploy the aircraft at the Tezpur base next year once Russia supplies the planes.

Israel is India’s No. 2 supplier of defense equipment. It trails Russia, which is No. 1.

UPI

Saeed, I spent a little time on the thread. Just look at the topic you almost make everyone laugh. Contain what? US had military and economic power around 20 times over China which spent decades found it could not hurt China. India in the best case is 1/3 or 1/5 of China in GDP will contain China? You must in wrong drugs.

Look at the map, India’s left is Pakistan, north is China, right is Myanmar. China also increase influence on Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. IF China wants, just tighten it a little, a good container is around India. Around China, which country is more close to India than China(who is willing to fight against China)? None! You may argue Myanmar also has economic relations with India. But it is nothing when compare to China. 70% of trade, most investment, and 70+% of military hardware of Myanmar are from China. China used total 5 times UN veto power in the history, 2 of them are within 5 years to protect Myanmar. What can India do for Myanmar?

Containing is cold war. After is a real war. For the entire country, India has less than handful of missiles can target Beijing the capital of China. Where China from Tibet has tens of thousand missiles can hit India capital New Delhi. See the difference? They are not in the same level.

Tuesday October 09, 2007: Yet another "useful and positive" round of Sino-Indian boundary negotiations was held on September 24-26 against the backdrop of a general consensus in both capitals that no breakthrough to the territorial dispute could be achieved for a long period of time. Talks for a settlement have now gone on for more than a quarter of a century (since 1981, to be precise) -- with a "big push" given to them by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, the second one by Atal Bihari Vajpayee's sojourn in Beijing in 2003 and a third one by Manmohan Singh's talks with Premier Wen Jiabao in 2005 and President Hu Jintao in 2006 -- yet all were in vain.

As a result, the 4,056-kilometer (2,520 miles) frontier between India and China, one of the longest inter-state borders in the world, remains the only one of China's land borders not defined, let alone demarcated, on maps or delineated on the ground. While Indians doubt China's sincerity in border negotiations, Chinese question India's leaders' will and capacity to settle the dispute in a "give-and-take" spirit.

Up until 2005, there was a great deal of optimism about a possible breakthrough. Evidence of this came during Prime Minister Vajpayee's China visit in June 2003 when New Delhi's readiness to address Chinese concerns on Tibet was matched by Beijing's willingness to resolve the Sikkim issue by recognizing the trade route through the Nathu La Pass on the China-Sikkim frontier with India and later showing Sikkim as part of India in its maps.

For its part, New Delhi reiterated its stance on the Tibetan Autonomous Region as part of China. This visit also paved the way for border talks to be held through special representatives of the leaders to find an early "political solution" to the boundary question, rather than going only by the legal and historical claims of the two sides. India indicated its willingness to settle for the territorial status quo by giving up claims to the Aksai Chin in Ladakh and hoped China would give up its claims to Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector and recognize the McMahon Line just as Beijing had accepted Tibet's British-drawn boundaries with Afghanistan and Myanmar (formerly known as Burma).

In order to give a new thrust to the ongoing border negotiations, an "Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary Question" was signed during Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's visit to India in April 2005. The joint statement issued at the end of the visit talked of a "Strategic and Cooperative Partnership" between India and China.

No Movement:

Since then, however, Beijing has upped the ante by demanding major territorial concessions in populated areas of Arunachal Pradesh on terms that many in New Delhi see as "humiliating and non-negotiable." Tawang, in particular, has emerged as a sticking point since the Chinese claim it to be central to Tibetan Buddhism given that the sixth Dalai Lama was born there.

Ties between China and India were strained even further in May 2007 when the Chinese government refused a visa to an Indian official from disputed Arunachal Pradesh to visit China, and the Indian government's invitation soon thereafter to Taiwan's opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party presidential candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, to visit India in June 2007 to hold talks with senior Indian officials. China voiced its opposition to Ma's visit and called on India to abide by the "One China policy."

Thereafter came media reports of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) encroachments across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and Chinese small arms supplies to insurgents in India's volatile northeast via Bangladesh and Myanmar. Then, in August 2007, Beijing demanded the removal of two old Indian Army bunkers near the tri-junction of Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, claiming that these were located on their territory. This move raised questions about China's declared policy of treating Sikkim as part of Indian territory. Not surprisingly, China's increasing assertiveness over the disputed borders has led to a rapid meltdown in the Sino-Indian border talks and a "mini-Cold War" has quietly taken hold at the diplomatic level during the past two years, despite public protestations of amity.

Some observers argue that Hu Jintao's desire to control the choice of the next Dalai Lama has led to pressuring India to concede access to the Tawang Monastery, which is crucial to this choice. The deterioration in Sino-Indian relations under Hu, however, should not have come as a surprise given his reputation as a hardliner over Tibet. (After all, Deng Xiaoping had groomed him for the Chinese Communist Party leadership because of his prominent role in the successful suppression of the Tibetan revolt in 1988.) In this context, the rapid pace development of road, rail and military infrastructure in Tibet close to its borders with India and Nepal is seen as preempting any possible destabilization of Tibet post-Dalai Lama.

Others, however, do not see any sinister designs in western China's development. Instead, they attribute the recent downturn in Sino-Indian relations more to domestic power struggles within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) than to the Dalai Lama succession issue or to Chinese concerns about India's growing tilt toward the United States.

While there may be an element of truth in all these arguments, there are other more fundamental reasons behind the recent chill in Sino-Indian relations. Apparently, the strategic consequences of India's economic resurgence coupled with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's offer in March 2005 to "help make India a major world power in the 21st century" have greatly bothered the Chinese. This offer, and the long-term India-U.S. defense cooperation framework and the July 2005 US-India nuclear energy deal that followed soon after, have been compared by Chinese strategic analysts to "the strategic tilt" toward China executed by former US President Richard Nixon in 1971 to contain the common Soviet threat. Claiming that these developments have "destabilizing" and "negative implications" for their country's future, China's India-watchers have started warning their government that Beijing "should not take India lightly any longer."

Chinese leaders were led to believe that China's growing economic and military might would eventually enable Beijing to re-establish the Sino-centric hierarchy of Asia's past as the US saps its energies in fighting small wars in the Islamic world, Japan shrinks economically and demographically while India remains subdued by virtue of Beijing's "special relationships" with its South Asian neighbors. However, a number of "negative developments," from Beijing's perspective, since early 2005 -- the Indian and Japanese bids for permanent seats on the UN Security Council, the formation of the East Asia Summit that includes India, Australia and New Zealand, the Indo-US nuclear deal, India's ability to sustain a high economic growth rate of eight to nine percent and the strategic implications of India's "Look East" policy -- have apparently upset Chinese calculations.

Therefore, after a hiatus of a few years, Chinese media commentaries have resumed their criticism of Washington's "hegemonic ideas" and for drawing "India in as a tool for its global strategic pattern." Some Chinese analysts express serious reservations about US efforts to draw "India in as a tool for its global strategic pattern," arguing that "India's DNA doesn't allow itself to become an ally subordinate to the US, like Japan or Britain." Nonetheless, most see India as a "future strategic competitor" that would be an active member of an anti-China grouping due to the structural power shifts in the international system and advocate putting together a comprehensive "contain India" strategy based on both economic tools (aid, trade, infrastructural development) and enhanced military cooperation with "pro-China" countries.

India-wary China:

An internal study on India undertaken in mid-2005 (with inputs from China's South Asia watchers such as Cheng Ruisheng, Ma Jiali, Sun Shihai, Rong Ying, Shen Dingli, among others) at the behest of the Chinese leadership's "Foreign Affairs Cell" recommended that Beijing take all measures to maintain its current strategic leverage (in terms of territory, membership of the exclusive Permanent Five and Nuclear Five clubs); diplomatic advantages (special relationships, membership of regional and international organizations); and economic lead over India. Although the evidence is inconclusive, the most plausible deduction is that this internal re-assessment of India lies behind the recent hardening of China's stance on the territorial dispute and a whole range of other issues in China-India relations.

The Chinese are concerned that the U.S.-India nuclear deal and related agreements would bring about a major shift in the power balance in South Asia that is currently tilted in China's favor. The recent strengthening of China's strategic presence in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar and overtures to the Maldives should, therefore, be seen against this backdrop. Despite protestations to the contrary from India and the United States that New Delhi is unwilling and unlikely to play the role of a closely aligned US surrogate such as Japan or Britain, China's Asia strategy is based upon the premise that maritime powers such as the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India would eventually form an informal quadrilateral alliance to countervail continental China.

As a commentary in Huanqiu Shibao noted: "The fact is that Japan, Australia, and India are respectively located at China's northeast, southeast, and southwest, and all are Asian powers, while US power in the Pacific is still unchallengeable. Hence, should the "alliance of values" concentrating military and ideological flavors in one body take shape, it will have a very great impact on China's security environment."

From Beijing's perspective, the responsibility for this "negative development" lies solely at New Delhi's door. In their writings, Chinese analysts seem upset over their southern neighbor's all-consuming passion to become "a big power," and see the nuclear deal as its key to unlocking the door leading to the big league in world politics.

As a Renmin Ribao commentary noted in August:

The US-Indian nuclear agreement has strong symbolic significance for India in achieving its dream of a powerful nation…In recent years, it introduced and implemented a 'Look-East' policy and joined most regional organizations in the East Asian region…In fact, the purpose of the United States to sign a civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement with India is to enclose India into its global partners' camp, so as to balance the forces of Asia (read, China). This fits in exactly with India's wishes.

Once the nuclear deal crosses all the "big four hurdles" (opposition from pro-Chinese Communist parties in India; negotiations on IAEA safeguards; approval by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); and its passage by the US Congress), Beijing believes that it would end the nuclear symmetry between New Delhi and Islamabad (or, de-hyphenate the sub-continental rivals) and put India on par with nuclear China (re-hyphenate China with India).

This, from Beijing's perspective, is quite disconcerting because a major objective of China's South Asia policy has been to perpetuate parity between India and Pakistan. Add to this India's military exercises with the US, Japan and Australia, support for the concept of "concert of democracies," and attempts to establish strategic ties with countries that fall within China's sphere of influence (Mongolia, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Myanmar) -- all of these reinforce Beijing's fears about its containment. However, despite its strong disapproval of a pact that would narrow the power gap between India and China, Beijing would not want to take a stance that pushes India further into Washington's camp. Most likely, Beijing would use its NSG membership to further its own and its allies' interests by:

Using the "double standards" argument to question Washington's commitment to non-proliferation goals in light of its decision to back India's nuclear industry while opposing the right to nuclear energy for Iran and Pakistan;

Insisting that any changes to the NSG guidelines to accommodate the deal must not be "country [i.e., India]-specific" but "universal criteria-based" so that "all countries (read, Pakistan) can benefit from the peaceful use of atomic energy under the IAEA safeguards." This formulation, outlined by Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, would pave the way for the Chinese construction of the Chashma III and IV nuclear reactors in Pakistan;

Using the deal to extract major concessions from Washington, including an end to the arms embargo and the lifting of bans on high-tech dual-use technology exports to China;

Seeking new assurances that US-India ties are not related to any "contain China" strategy.

The fact of the matter is that China and India are locked in a classic security dilemma: one country sees its own actions as self-defensive, but the same actions appear aggressive to the other. India feels the need to take counter-balancing measures and launch certain initiatives to stay independent of China -- such as the "Look East" policy -- which are perceived as challenging and threatening in China. Like China, India is actively seeking to reintegrate its periphery with the framework of regional economic cooperation. Like China, India seeks greater international status and influence commensurate with its growing economic power.

However, like any other established status quo great power, China wants to ensure that its position remains strong vis-à-vis challenger India for strategic, economic and geopolitical reasons. Through closer strategic ties with India's neighboring countries, China is warning India not to take any counter-measures to balance Beijing's growing might.

Tibet is the Key:

Tibet remains the key to China's policymaking on the India-China boundary dispute. The Chinese still suspect that India prefers an independent Tibet and covertly supports Tibetan separatists. Unless and until Tibet is totally pacified and completely Sinicized as Inner Mongolia has been, Beijing would not want to give up the "bargaining chip" that an unsettled boundary vis-à-vis India provides it with. An unsettled border provides China the strategic leverage to keep India uncertain about its intentions, and nervous about its capabilities, while exposing India's vulnerabilities and weaknesses, and ensuring New Delhi's "good behavior" on issues of vital concern to China.

Several recent commentaries in Chinese language sources confirm a shift toward a tougher Chinese stance on the territorial dispute with India. Articles on "Future Directions of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute" published in Guogji Zhanlue in November 2006, Liu Silu's "Beijing Should Not Lose Patience in Chinese-Indian Border Talks" in Wen Wei Po on June 1, 2007, and Professor Wang Yiwei's interview "Helping U.S. May Derail Border Talks" with the Asian Age on July 25, 2007 are broadly representative of the official thinking in China's national security establishment on this subject. The key arguments and major themes presented in these and other writings are summarized below.

First, since India controls 90,000 square kilometers of the richest part of Tibet and the Himalayan region, equivalent to two and a half Taiwans and as large as Jiangsu Province, "the Chinese government will not easily give up its territory." Wen Wei Po commentator Liu Silu contends that as "it is equally difficult to get India to spit out the fatty meat it is chewing…Beijing had better be patient at the negotiation table (because) time is on China's side." Apparently, many Chinese strategic thinkers believe that China's comprehensive national power vis-à-vis India is likely to increase over time, and that would enable Beijing to drive a better bargain on the boundary question in the future.

Second, as Professor Wang Yiwei puts it, "China showed 'greatness' once, after the 1962 Indo-China war, when it gave up the land it controlled (in Arunachal Pradesh) and it could not be expected to show magnanimity again…India 'lost an opportunity' to settle the boundary question when Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong were alive. President Hu Jintao is not Deng or Mao. He is strong but cannot be compared with them." In other words, the ball is in India's court. If New Delhi wants a settlement, it must hand over a large chunk of territory in Arunachal Pradesh to China.

Third, the Sino-Indian border issue is linked with sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the respective status of the two countries in the global hierarchy. Hence, a Guogji Zhanlue commentary advises that Beijing "should not adopt any hasty step or make big compromises on principles" because this issue, "if approached in a hurry, could impact the respective rise of the two nuclear powers." One Chinese concern is that a border settlement, without major Indian territorial concessions, could potentially augment India's power position and thus impact negatively China's rise. An unsettled boundary suits Chinese interests for the present because China's claims in the western sector are complicated by the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, Pakistan's interests in the Sino-Indian territorial dispute, and Beijing's interest in keeping India under strategic pressure on two fronts.

Fourth, a "fair and reasonable settlement" implies that "India will need to give up something to get something." Ideally speaking, Wen Wei Po argues that China should "recover the entire area. But it is negotiable for the disputed territory to be split equally between China and India, as was the case of Heixiazi (Bolshoy Ussuriysky) Island in the northeast (on the Russian border). A third option would be for Beijing to recover at least the 2,000 square kilometers covering Tawang and Takpa Shiri. It is believed that this is Beijing's last resort and it will not accept any deal worse than this." Having wrested substantial territorial concessions from Russia, Vietnam, and Tajikistan in their land border disputes with China, Beijing is now expecting the same from India.

Fifth, China should economically harmonize/integrate Tibet, Nepal and the border regions with India into China's economic sphere through increased economic links and infrastructure projects, such as the Qinghai-Tibet railway, before proceeding for a boundary settlement with India. Underlying this is the belief that economic interdependence would soften India's position, leading to a settlement on China's terms.

Last, if negotiations, coercive diplomacy and economic harmonization (a carrot and stick policy) fail to produce the desired outcome, the use of force at an appropriate time in the future to recover "China's Southern Tibet" (a new Chinese term for Arunachal Pradesh) is not ruled out. Many Chinese analysts believe that the military balance has shifted in their favor with the completion of the 1,118-kilometer (695 miles) Qinghai-Tibet railway and other military infrastructure projects in Tibet and that negates the need for any territorial concession to India in the eastern sector.

These views and arguments clearly:

a) advocate a "constraining India" strategy;

b) foretell a long and torturous course of future border negotiations; and

c) indicate an uncertain and unpredictable future for India's relations with China.

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi's statement to his Indian counterpart Pranab Mukherjee made in June 2007 that the "mere presence of populated areas in Arunachal Pradesh would not affect Chinese claims on the boundary" should then be seen against this background. However, in Indian policy circles, this statement is seen as repudiating Article VII of the "Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles" signed during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's India visit in April 2005, which states: "In reaching a border settlement, the two sides shall safeguard populations in border areas."

The inclusion of the phrase "settled population in the border areas" was then interpreted as a diplomatic concession that India had extracted from China as it protected India's interests against Chinese claims to Tawang and other areas in Arunachal Pradesh. India reportedly conveyed to China in June 2007 that it could not be pushed beyond a point on the boundary dispute. Describing the Chinese move as "a serious retrograde step," Mukherjee publicly rebuffed Beijing, saying that New Delhi would not part with populated portions of the state of Arunachal Pradesh: "Any elected government of India is not permitted by the constitution to part with any part of our land that sends representatives to the Indian Parliament."

Sending a clear signal against any Chinese designs over Arunachal Pradesh, he added: "The days of Hitler are over. After the Second World War, no country captures land of another country in the present global context. That is why there is a civilized mechanism of discussions and dialogue to sort out border disputes. We sit around the table and discuss disputes to resolve them."

The Indian government has also responded by unveiling plans for economic development and major infrastructure projects (the building of 72 roads, three airstrips and numerous bridges) in the border areas along the undefined LAC that would enable the Indian military to "swiftly move forces into the region and sustain them logistically in the event of any untoward trouble or emergency." Indian Defense Minister AK Antony told the Combined Commanders' Conference in July 2007 that "China has been building a lot of infrastructure -- railways, airports and roads (along the Indian border). We are also doing the same thing."

Reacting to recent reports of some military skirmishes, Antony acknowledged that "there may have been an odd instance," but he ruled out "chances of any confrontation." Indian Chief of Army Staff General JJ Singh has done the same, assuring the country that "a 1962-like situation will not be repeated. We are fully prepared to defend our borders." In response to the establishment of four new airbases in Tibet and three in southern China, the Indian Air Force is reportedly beefing up its presence by deploying two squadrons of Sukhoi-30MKIs near the Chinese border.

Although the probability of an all-out conflict is extremely low, the prospect that some of India's road building projects in disputed areas could lead to tensions, clashes and skirmishes with Chinese border patrols cannot be completely ruled out. Should a conflict break out, the PLA's contingency plans emphasize a "short and swift localized" conflict (confined to the Tawang region, along the lines of the 1999 Kargil conflict) with the following objectives in mind: capture the Tawang tract; give India's military a bloody nose; and deliver a knockout punch that punctures India's ambitions to be China's equal or peer competitor once and for all.

The ultra-modern civilian and military infrastructure in Tibet is expected to enable Beijing to exercise the military option to achieve the above-mentioned objectives should that become necessary at some stage in the future.

Present Imperfect, Future Tense:

In short, there is little or no sign of an early resolution to the conflicting claims, despite continuing negotiations and the recent upswing in diplomatic, political, commercial and even military ties between the world's two most populous countries. The border disputes have simmered in the background for more than 50 years, threatening to disrupt relations between Asia's two giants.

With China insisting on the return of Tawang on religious, cultural, and historical grounds, Indians have a more powerful case for the return of the sacred Mount Kailash-Mansarovar in Tibet, since it is a sacred religious place associated with the Hindu religion. Additionally, there is the contentious issue of the Shaksgam Valley that Pakistan handed over to China in 1963, which China's Foreign Ministry spokespersons now claim is a non-issue.

Negotiating these issues will not be easy and will test diplomatic skills on both sides. It is worth noting that historically China has negotiated border disputes with neighbors in their moment of national weakness (Pakistan, Myanmar in the 1960s, and the Central Asian republics in the 1990s) or only after the overall balance of power had shifted decisively in China's favor and/or after they had ceased to be a major threat (land border settlements with Russia and Vietnam in the 1990s). It has not, however, negotiated with those who are perceived as present rivals and future threats (India, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Taiwan).

In the meantime, both sides will have to learn to live without an early resolution to the dispute. Even if the territorial dispute were somehow resolved, India and China would still compete over energy resources, markets and for geostrategic reasons. A new potentially divisive issue for the future appears to be the ecological impact on the Indian subcontinent of Chinese plans to divert the rivers of Tibet for irrigation purposes in China. With China controlling the Tibetan plateau -- the source of Asia's major rivers -- there looms a potential conflict over depleting water reserves. Water is increasingly becoming a divisive issue in India's bilateral relations with China.

Simmering tensions over territory, Tibet, energy resources and rival alliance relationships ensure that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's assertion that "there is enough (geopolitical) space for the two countries to develop together" will remain more a "hope" than a conviction. The relationship between the two rising Asian giants with overlapping spheres of influence and disputed frontiers will be characterized more by competition and rivalry than cooperation. Indeed, the possibility of confrontation cannot be ruled out completely.

PINR

New Delhi, Tuesday October 09, 2007: The latest diplomatic bugbear from Beijing to New Delhi is China’s incursions into Bhutan, a country whose foreign policy is by and large run by India. China-watchers in the Government of India are red-faced by the latest incident of Chinese troops’ incursion into India as the development is a reminder to both the countries — India and Bhutan — that they have to expeditiously resolve the boundary dispute with China.

India has already discussed the subject with Thimpu and will be taking up the matter with Beijing as well.

New Delhi finds itself faced with yet another provocation from China - this time over the issue of Indian bunkers in the Indian northeastern state of Sikkim. China recently upped its ante and demanded that India remove the two bunkers even though the bunkers are on Indian territory.

India has neither removed the bunkers nor does it plan to do so. The matter is now between the two foreign offices and indications are that India is going to stand its ground on the bunker issue.

The reports of Chinese incursions into Bhutan, a couple of days after the Indian Army chief denied reports of Chinese intrusions into India, could not have come at a more inopportune time. External affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee is scheduled to visit China later this month to prepare the ground for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to China, presumably early next year.

Earlier, fresh reports of Chinese intrusion through Arunachal Pradesh had raised temperature in Itanagar as well as New Delhi, though the government simply refused to acknowledge the reports.

TT

Wait ...... wait for it ..... awh come one Saeed wait for it ............. oh look indians startin to wet their pants in p|$$!!

I wonder why Indians should worry. Were'nt they ranting about India being Superpower? And now they are peeing in their pants? Tsk Tsk Tsk.....

What happened to you fitting reply as you used to use it?

cheers

hindoos always like Make foolish thing!First Must Solve starveling and poor from Hindoos...Didn't Made a military Idea Current.....Looking youself All weapones!!Full from Abroad.....

these guys are still making fun here...


mods take a note.....

Is that right? So I take you're feelings are hurt? Awe, ain't that the saddest thing! Stop whining, as it is, you indians have spread on our forum like a disease and the Mods tolerate that. Be grateful that you are being allowed to be here on PDF ....... for now.

The Chinese Army has made around 140 incursions into the Indian territory across the Line of Actual Control in the past one year alone

Tuesday, October 23, 2007: The age-old contentious issue of border incursion by China into India has cropped up once again. In a startling revelation, the Chief of the ITBP (Indian Tibetan Border Police) has confirmed to TIMES NOW that the Chinese Army has made around 140 incursions into the Indian territory across the Line of Actual Control in the past one year alone.

TIMES NOW has brought the issue of incursion by Chinese Army into the forefront time and again. Despite the Indian government's denial on the incursion issue, TIMES NOW had reported instances of incursions by the Chinese Army into India in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.

Just a few weeks back, TIMES NOW had also reported that the Chinese Army had urged the Indian Army to vacate its bunkers in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh claiming that the bunkers were on Chinese soil. The Indian and Chinese government share a disputed border and are currently engaged in talks to resolve the dispute. Though there has been considerable talk of resolving border disputes, both the countries have avoided talking on the issue publicily. The issue is likely to come up for discussion on Union External Affairs Minister - Pranab Mukherjee 's - visit to China later in the week.

TN

Toronto, Tuesday October 23, 2007: A successful invasion of India by China is the China watcher's pipedream. They always envision that China could unleash its army of 2.5 million men on India and conquer it. That would only be possible if China were able to muster all its 2.5 million soldiers on the India-Tibet border, however. This is highly unlikely. If they did, they would meet India's army of 1.1 million men, ready to spoil their party. These China lovers in the West have become more vociferous since China completed its Tibet-China rail link. They believe it has become very easy for the Chinese to move men and materials to Tibet.

This newly built rail link is a paper tiger. It is so open to a missile or air attack that it would be foolish for the Chinese military to consider it as a vital supply link. Bridges and tunnels in large number on this route could be targeted by Indian Brahmos cruise missiles. Rebuilding them would be a long process. In addition, the hostile Tibetan populace could make it impossible for this rail link to function.

China maintains about 16 to 18 divisions in Tibet, facing India in Arunachal Pradesh and Akash Chin in Kashmir. A minor disposition of troops is maintained in the central sector to safeguard supply routes. In all, 240,000 men are lightly equipped mountain divisions, foot mobile and very vulnerable to heavily equipped Indian troops across the Himalayas. China's more heavily armed troops are retained in Chengdu military district, 800 miles away.

The Chinese air force is a bulky, poor quality force. It has a very limited number of high performance aircraft from Russia. The Chinese have reverse engineered a few Russian and American models, but these copies are poor quality. Most of these aircraft are deployed opposite Taiwan. Even if some were relocated to the Indian border, they would have trouble landing and taking off at elevations of 7,000 to 8,000 feet, with their full complement of armaments in Tibet. That makes it difficult for them to match Indian fighter aircraft.

China's navy faces certain death, including its aircraft carriers and their nuclear submarines, if they venture far away from their homeports. In any India-China war, it is unlikely that the West would either stay neutral or go to the Chinese side. They would be delighted if the Chinese navy suffered a major reverse at the hands of the Indians. This they could ensure by providing timely information to India on its movements.

Hence, it would boil down to a fight between China's lightly equipped infantry and India's medium to lightly equipped infantry. The army with superior tactics, knowledge of the ground and high-tech surveillance would carry the day. The last military match in 1962 went to China, as Indians were poorly equipped and poorly deployed.

The Chinese know the Indian military advancements well. They also know about their own vulnerability in Tibet. In the last ten years, when they increased their defense expenditures substantially in Tibet, they built four new airfields and several new missile bases. This in fact has bolstered their offensive capability, but it also made them targets to tactical theater missiles.

China spends US $ 90 Billion in defense-related expenditures every year. It admits to only US $ 50 Billion. The rest is hidden in secret state security operations and development projects unrelated to the military. Also a bulk is spent on nuclear submarines, nuclear missiles and aircraft carriers to match the West. Although China's military expenditure at US $ 45 Billion is huge, yet consider this:

China has to support an army of 2.5 million men, an Air Force of 3,000 old aircraft and a navy of 250,000 men, with 45 submarines, destroyers, battle cruisers and other naval craft. Considering the size of the military forces, this much expenditure is about average.

Until 1995, Chinese ground forces and air force were equipped with 1950s era hardware all supplied by the Soviet Union. The Soviets withdrew all military support from China after the Chinese demanded the return of large tracts of land from the Soviet Union. The Ussiri River military clashes followed. This falling out was never repaired. Hence the Chinese were stuck with old and very old hardware until about 1995. Modernization is now underway, but modernizing a 2.5 million force is a long and tedious job, especially when no modern hardware is available for purchase.

China's current military commitments are also large. The country has stationed 20% of its forces on the China-Russia border. The other 30% are stationed opposite Taiwan, together with the bulk of their high-tech hardware. Of the remaining 50% of its forces, about 50% are reserves (about 20 divisions) and the remaining forces face India and other Southeast Asian neighbors like Vietnam, Myanmar, and Thailand.

Hence it is not a very large force that faces India.

China does have one advantage - Chinese troops and garrisons are very close to the India-Tibet border. This will allow them to reinforce their border guards very quickly. They could maintain huge pressure on India's forward positions. That would give them a huge psychological advantage. The disadvantage would be that depleting the reserves in Tibet would be an invitation to Tibetan rebels to take advantage. India would surely help.

Facing all this, India has equipped a total of eight mountain divisions, with four more that could easily convert to mountain warfare. These are foot mobile and are larger in strength than their Chinese counterparts. They are trained in mountain and snow warfare. Their equipment is a couple of shades heavier than that of the Chinese. These troops are stationed a bit farther away from the border, which is a disadvantage. But the Indian border guards occupy high ground, which would be an advantage in a defensive battle. They could hold the line until the bulk of the army arrived.

Overall India spends about US $ 22 Billion a year on its defense forces, which number about 1.1 million and 600 combat aircraft and two dozen submarines, two aircraft carriers and a multitude of other vessels. About 50% of India's defense commitments are Pakistan related. The remaining 50% are divided between protecting the border with China, internal security and reserves.

India's military hardware is a bit more sophisticated. These are not reverse-engineered copies but the real thing, hence a bit superior. Israel has been India's conduit for sophisticated hardware. Other sophisticated hardware is procured through open bidding.

The road networks on both the Indian and the Chinese sides are not well developed. The Chinese, because they were on a plateau, would find themselves at an advantage in reaching the border compared to the Indians. That again would be a psychological advantage.

The situation would change immediately if India vacated its isolated forward positions in favor of a better defensive line and waited for the Chinese. If the Chinese did come, they would immediately suffer the disadvantage of distance from their supply bases, with the mountains in between. This would neutralize their numbers advantage.

Indian tactical missiles, if cleverly placed, could play havoc to the Chinese supply lines. The Tibetan plateau is open and treeless without cover.

India's combat-ready Air Force is more than a match for anything the Chinese could throw at the Indians. The Indians come from bases which are at about sea level and carry heavier combat loads. These bases are located well within 300 to 400 miles of the India-China border.

The same advantage does not exist for the Chinese. First their fighter planes are inferior, second they cannot carry their full payload as the available runway length at elevations of 7,000 to 9,000 feet limits the payload, and third the airbases are in open area and could be constantly monitored by Indian AWACS. Hence the Chinese would fight a defensive air war. This would be an advantage for India.

In short, China would fight a highly unsuccessful military campaign should they ever think of a rematch with India. The Indians are much better prepared today than in 1962. The military dispositions of India and China are evenly matched in Tibet, with the Indians having an equipment advantage. No walkover like in 1962 is possible now.

(Hari Sud, the author of this article isn't a joker either; they are serious about it:

Hari Sud is a retired vice president of CIL Inc., a former investment strategies analyst and international relations manager. A graduate of Punjab University and the University of Missouri, he has lived in Canada for the past 34 years. © Copyright Hari Sud.)

UPI

I don't really take part in this kind of thread but from the article above, one can see clearly the amount of hatred, extreme bias and constant bashing and the main point of this article is 1962 I guess.

It seems like this Hari Sud guy spends most of his time doing this crazy thing and care a lot about China

He sounds a lot more like a frustrated forumer than a vice president of something.

And the love fest for Indians continues. Only crappy media will print this idiot's drivel. Indians should be happy that their affairs are run by people a little more intelligent than this moron. The last time an Indian leader had a wet dream, their daddy (China) gave them a rude awakening. If there is another adventurous fool like Nehru, we will have several Indias.

Thursday, October 25th, 2007: The alarm bells are ringing in New Delhi. In clear signs that India is increasingly becoming wary of China's muscle-flexing, Defence Minister A K Anthony has warned the Armed Forces of China's military expansion and growing military might.

External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee is currently in China holding talks with the government, but even as India uses diplomacy to gloss over a clutch of sticky issues dogging India-China ties - especially repeated Chinese incursions by the Red Army into India - back home in New Delhi the government is wary of Chinese military expansion and modernisation.

The country's Defence Minister A K Antony has told the Army that it must take note of China's military modernisation"

"We must take note of China's military modernisation. There is a need to carefully monitor the international environment and formulate flexible response options to emerging situations," Anthony said.

The warning comes on the back of TIMES NOW carrying reports of a huge military exercise in the heart of China that wowed the world. The exercises were aimed at showcasing to the world that China had acquired the capability to fight a war in the information age.

A number of foreign observers especially invited by the Chinese government, had come away impressed.

A British military commander was shown on Chinese television on October 5 saying that Chinese military expansion was going in a "very sensible direction", with particular regard to the development of lazer trainng systems.

China's military modernisation is of particular concern to India, because it will fast track it toward military superiority and alter the balance of power in the region. Already China has been flexing its muscle, regularly encroaching on Indian territory along the LAC with little regard for India's concerns. In September 07 incursions were reported near Kayala pass in Arunachal; pictures in the possession of the Indian Army show Chinese scribbles on the rocks in areas near the Kayala pass.

Meanwhile External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee in China was unwilling to reveal much, only divulging that the contentious issue of the border dispute did crop up during talks.

"We discussed (the border issue), and the 11th Round of the Special Representatives meeting took place. It was successful, they decided to set up a working group to prepare a framework arrangement. Let us wait for their reccomendation of the working group," said Mukherjee today.

Now the ball is in the court of India's newly appointed Army chief, General Deepak Kapoor who incidentally on his first day in office has pledged to modernise the Indian army.

TN

Gangtok, Friday October 26th, 2007: China’s sudden investment and development spree in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) across the Sikkim border is more than meets the eye, the Indian Army has made it clear in a presentation.

Senior army officers believe that the development activity in TAR, which includes the construction of five highways, four airports and a railway link from Quinghai to Shigatse, is much more than what is needed to cater to the 27 lakh people (2.7 Million) residing there. Singatse is 300 km from Yatung, the town nearest to the border.

Army sources said the rail tracks are likely to be extended to Yatung, 21 km from the Sikkim border. The Gormud-Lhasa pipeline is also being extended and will cover more than 6,300 km.

The army’s apprehensions were made public to a select group of journalists at a recently held interaction at Black Cat Institute, Burtuk, scarcely a kilometre from here.

A senior officer in charge of the border brigade, who described himself as a “soldier-diplomat” (the word was coined after the improvement in Sino-Indian relationship in the past one-year), had made the presentation. The officer said the growth spree implied activity in “the string of pearls” — the cluster of People’s Liberation Army bases encircling the region.

Border trade with China through Nathu-la — a pass in Sikkim at 14,000 ft — resumed in June last year. The reopening of a trade link after 44 years— Nathu-la had closed down after the 1962 war — is generally preceded by development activity on both sides.

But what is worrying the Indians is the capacity of the Chinese infrastructure, which, according to army calculations, is 12 times more than what it needs to cater to the 7.5 lakh urban and 20.2 lakh rural population.

“Roads and bridges to nowhere are coming up. Around 16,700 tonnes of ration and goods can be supplied by road, rail, air and pipelines in one single day. It cannot just be for a population five times that of Sikkim’s,” the officer told The Telegraph.

Many of the newly built roads brush past areas close to the line of actual control. These include Shigatse, Gyantse, Yatung and Chumbi valley across Sikkim, all within 500 km. Among them Yatung and Chumbi are the closest as they are located right across the border.

The roads are such that despite the elevation of 13,000 ft, a distance of 280 km — from Shigatse to Yatung — can be covered in three hours flat.

In comparison, the Indian side has one single-lane national highway (31A), which is often blocked with landslides. This, the army feels, is a great impediment. Not only that, there are no airports or rail links in Sikkim.

TT

Boohooo!

hi, all, long time no see , i've almost forgot my passwd, sorry~~ too busy those days.
may be i'm most low-profile here
i've seen this thread thoroughly,
so complicated..
IMO, this thread sould be closed, i don't what's the purpose of such a thread, actually, it only leads to hatred, extrame bias, bash,like wat harrypotter said, there is no rational discuz,no main point,


and to leishman, "gua wa , mo diu ren xian yan le"(sorry for my chinese pinyin here,i just don't know how to say that in english)

In short - this Hari Sud is infact a joke. No walkover like in 1962? During 1962 Indians thought China was a walkover and they still think China is a walkover today.

This article seems to state that India holds the super power status. The author is high on something or living in fantasy.

yes,,,Hindoos like wet-dream always.hindoos peoples like watching these news of foolish from Hindus . MADE IN HINDOOS

New Delhi, Thursday November 08, 2007: Credible minimum deterrent and not energy, according to the BJP, should be the central concern while considering the Indo-US nuclear deal. The BJP is of the view that given the situation in the subcontinent, and Pakistan in particular, giving up the India’s right for future testing is not desirable.

Pakistan, which is a nuclear state as well, could well be faced with a situation where break away groups may having access to the country’s nuclear arsenal or nuclear fissile material. Given the contentious relationship between India and Pakistan, the BJP believes that agreeing to the nclear deal would jeopardise India’s strategic security concerns.

The lead Opposition party has viewed the UPA government’s insistence of pushing through the deal as an attempt to dilute the Indian nuclear doctrine and credible minimum deterrent which has been evolved over the years.

It is not merely the current situation in Pakistan that gives more muscle to the BJP’s opposition to the nuclear deal. The party is also concerned about the situation of crisis that has come to typify Bangladesh and the increased Chinese involvement in both Nepal and Myanmar.

China too is a nuclear state and a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The BJP has in past warned the government about the “encircling of India by China.”

Recently BJP president Rajnath Singh warned that “China has developed a deep naval base from Pakistan’s Gwader to the Coco Island in Burma and right through Bangladesh and Sri Lanka has established posts to monitor the movement of Indian Navy.”

Given the reality of the subcontinent, the BJP finds it difficult to accept that the government would like to fritter away the hard won credible nuclear deterrent that has been developed. It feels that the nuclear programmes is the hard work of scientists amd firm political leadership in a mature democratic set up, which would use their nuclear arsenal in a responsible manner.

TET

So when will the Mods close this topic??

New Delhi, Thursday November 22, 2007: It wasn’t just the BJP which put the government on the mat over its silence on incursions by the Chinese army into Arunachal Pradesh. On Wednesday, these sentiments were echoed by Congress Rajya Sabha MP from Arunachal Pradesh Nabam Rebia. Like his colleagues from across the political aisle, Mr Rebia demanded to know what the government was doing.

Since the matter was raised in the Zero hour of Parliament, there was no government response, however, in a written response to a question on the same subject, defence minister A K Antony said incursions were on account of differing perceptions between New Delhi and Beijing on the Line of Actual Control. He said such incursions could be avoided if the two countries had a common perceptions of the LAC.

During Zero hour, Mr Rebia raised the issue of incursions by the Chinese into both Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim. Confirming reports by BJP MPs Tapir Gao and Kiren Rijuju, the Congress MP spoke of the recent demolition of a Buddha statue in Tawang district by Chinese troops.

Accusing the Indian Army and the government of cowardice for keeping silent, the Congress MP asked why the government had not reacted to the demolition of the Buddhist statues at Bum La. “Nothing has come from the mouth of the government, no reaction has come from the government till now. We are in a dilemma. Therefore, I want a clear statement on the stand taken by the Government of India on this issue.”

But neither Mr Rebia nor the BJP, which associated with the statement, were going to get “a clear statement” from the government. The defence minister’s written reply which would provide little comfort or clue to the members from Arunachal Pradesh or BJP, Mr Antony said that the matter had been taken up at an appropriate level in the government. “Mechanism to address instances of intrusions along the LAC are well established.”

Reiterating the need for the government to act on the matter, Mr Rebia said that the Chinese did not recognise the McMohan Line as the international boundary. Mr Rebia said, “China still does not recognise the McMahon Line as the border between the two countries... Chinese advisor, Attache, in the Chinese Embassy has openly claimed that particularly Tawang belongs to China and the claim of China is that 96,000 sq km area of Arunachal Pradesh belongs to China whereas the total area of Arunachal Pradesh is nearly 84,000 sq km”.

Stressing the need for a response, the Congress MP said that the people living in Arunachal felt “a lot of insecurity”. Demanding answers from the government, the ruling party member said, that they were unaware of the government’s stand on the matter. “We are told that a lot of negotiations are going on, lot of discussions are going on but we are yet to know exactly what negotiations are going on or what discussions are going on,” Mr Rebia said.

TET

Thats a joke right INDIA CONTAIN CHINA!!!!!!!!!

NOT even by a long shot.

I read some of CHINA's Defense Toys Journal, Dating back to year 2001. CHINA has over 1000 R&D companies

for Military Technology. Its nearly 2008 now Bro.

PLA is Gona have IA for Lunch

The Chinese flag at the Indo-China border





Kolkata/Gangtok, Saturday December 01, 2007: A few weeks before the first ever India-China military exercises, the real war games have begun. On November 8, Chinese forces demolished some unmanned Indian forward posts near two Army bunkers against which Beijing had raised objections since July.

"The Chinese came, destroyed the posts and went back," said an Army officer. The incident is learned to have taken place around November 8.

The revelation came on the day a 12-member People's Liberation Army delegation landed in Kolkata on a recce for the military exercises to be held next month in China.

The destroyed posts were near the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet border tri-junction. Intelligence sources in Gangtok on Friday said that a "third bunker" located near the two disputed ones had been destroyed by the Chinese. But, Army sources attached to formations overseeing the location said the structures were fibre glass huts, which are manned by a few soldiers when winter sets in.

Senior Army officers in Kolkata were tightlipped about the incident, particularly because the Chinese army delegation led by a senior colonel is in the city. "I have nothing to comment," said a defence spokesman.

The two disputed bunkers at Doka La, near Torsa Nala, had been set up about two years ago. The Chinese first objected to them in July, after which a series of border personnel meetings took place till September. Beijing wanted the bunkers to be shifted but the Indian Army stood its ground and continued to man and arm the bunkers.

The Chinese were left smarting. It is believed the attack on the unmanned posts earlier this month were carried out by the PLA "to show their strength".

Indian officials feel if the Chinese had any objection against these bunkers they should have lodged a protest soon after they were established, or at least within a year.

Border disputes between China and India are nothing new, because China does not recognise the border and even triggered a war over it. Even the Line of Actual Control is difficult to demarcate at places because of the mountainous terrain. Two decades ago, in 1986, the two countries had come perilously close to a skirmish in the Sumdorong Chu valley.

In view of the latest dispute, the visit of Defence Minister A K Anthony and chief of Army staff Deepak Kapoor to Sikkim and north Bengal during the weekend is being considered significant. They will land in Siliguri on Saturday and visit the border at Nathu La on Sunday.

However, military observers believe confidence-building measures like joint war exercises will prove instrumental in easing border tensions.

ToI

Beijing, Saturday December 01, 2007: Chinese troops travelled on the high-speed Qinghai-Tibet railway from mainland China to Lasha for the first time since the world's highest railway line was inaugurated 17 months back.

The move comes immediately after Chinese troops were reported to have demolished Indian Army posts on its border with Arunachal Pradesh.

The official Xinhua news agency quoted an unnamed official of the People Liberation Army as saying that the "railway will become a main option" for transporting troops to Tibet, replacing the air and road routes used since 1950 when Chinese soldiers annexed Tibet.

The move also coincides with signs of strong improvement in China-Japan relations with a Chinese navy missile destroyer visiting Japan on a goodwill mission after several decades. The cold war with Japan made it difficult for Beijing to take an aggressive approach in its relations with other countries including India.

China has maintained a stony silence over suggestions that one of the purposes of the Tibet railway was to transport troops in larger numbers and at much reduced costs from mainland China to border regions in Tibet.

It also refrained from immediately using the railway for this purpose in order to avoid giving rise to a new controversy. The latest move confirms Beijing's strategic purposes, sources said.

Xinhua did not mention the number of troops nor the starting point of the troops, who left for Lasha using the high-altitude railway line.

Official agencies claim that 75 per cent of the goods moving between Tibet and mainland China are being transported by the new rail link instead of using the traditional road routes.

The rail link, which has cut journey time from more than a week to just two days, has resulted in a high-speed growth of tourism rising 64 per cent in the first 10 months of this year as compared to the same time last year.

The Tibet train service drew 350,000 foreign tourists in the first 10 months of 2007, which is a 150 per cent rise from the same period last year.

ToI

New Delhi, Sunday December 02, 2007: The Defence Minister A K Anthony has given a clean chit to China saying that the Chinese military has not destroyed any Indian Army outposts along the disputed border.

Anthony also said: “No such incident took place in the Indian territory.”

Anthony said all this when his attention was drawn to reports that the People’s Liberation Army troops had alleged to have destroyed some Indian Army posts overlooking the Chumbi Valley, a tri-section along the Sikkim border dividing India, China and Bhutan in early November.

Anthony clarified that even otherwise technically the alleged destroyed post might not have been within India.

The Defence Minister added that there was no evidence to suggest that Chinese Army personnel have damaged a Buddhist temple in Tawang a few weeks ago.

This issue was raised in Parliament by a Member of Parliament from Arunachal Pradesh Nabum Rebia.

“There was damage to the temple but we do not have any evidence to suggest that it was done by the Chinese troops,” Antony said.

However, the defence minister admitted that there were problems due to an unresolved border dispute, and said the efforts are being made to solve the issue through negotiations.

The minister also clarified that India has neglected infrastructure in important northeastern states whereas China has built up world-class facilities on their side.

Even as the defence minister tried to play down the issues, Army sources told DNA that there has been “qualitative drop” in the tender peace along the disputed border.

Early this year, the Indian Army had moved almost a Brigade of soldiers into Tawang Valley after the Chinese carried out aggressive patrolling into the disputed areas.

IR

I think it is better to let this thread die out, I mean it is really dull. Saeed Khan, your work is appreciated. This kind of thing is all over the net, and I guess most of us here are bored of them.

Thursday, December 06, 2007: Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee held a high level meeting with top defence officials as India is worried about developments on the eastern front of the country.

The Indian Army has raised an alarm at the increasing Chinese forays into Bhutan, which are close to the strategic Chumbi Valley - the tri-junction between India, Bhutan and China.

The trouble is a small stretch of China's border with Bhutan. Over the past six months, the Chinese have increasingly started making inroads to the strategically important area.

The incursions into Bhutan are precariously close to India's chicken's neck - the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor, linking the Northeast.

Wednesday's meeting between the defence minister, National Security Adviser MK Narayanan and top MEA and MoD officials took stock of this delicate situation.

India feels that there's a larger Chinese military aim behind the incursions to test Indian army's preparedness.

At the moment, Indian military strength is depleted in the East. One of the divisions normally based in hills of West Bengal is currently deployed in Kashmir.

The other division located at Binaguri would be rendered ineffective in case Chinese slice through Bhutan and cut the Siliguri corridor off.

NDTV

I don't know whether India can contain China or not. But I do know that India and China can never be friends. It goes beyond the 1962 war. Indians, particularly North Indian types think nothing of the Chinese people aka the 'chinkis'. The attitude is bordering on racism and extreme prejudice. Even a loyal north-east-indian or Nepalese is called 'chinese' which has become synonymous for an outsider or an enemy. This Indian attitude is disgusting, and I think the root of all this Indian aplomb that it can ever contain China stems from the fact that they consider themselves superior to the 'chinkis' (just as Pakistanis consider themselves superior to Indians, and Afghans to Pakistanis)

I agree with you 100%.

China and India can never be friends. The feeling is mutual. The Chinese think that the Indians are the lowest of low lifes.

A country does not have strategy is a pathetic.
When it is still one of the poorest but claims itself a “developed country”, while it is still very weak, it looks for a country 3 times the size and 10 times more powerful to fight, no fight not happy.

India is not Chinese priority. not the 2nd nor the 3rd even not in top 5.
Only Indians think they are a pair. China wont consider a fight until
it is absolutely required. If fight, after a fight, India will be gone like Soviet.

India contains China, at least meet this condition. It can match China on industry level.
A hard index is steel output and consumption. Indians believe they will be the largest
steel consumer in next decade. But the fact is, China consumes $500 million tons of steel
a year, it is roughly equals to the total of Indin's next ten years consumption.
That means China builds up itself on infrastructure and industry hardware one year
will take India 10 years to get similar jobs done. The gap of these 2 countries is quickly
widen, we do not see any possible improvement from Indian side.

Sources:
=====================================================


China continues to drive world production developments. In the first ten months of 2007, Chinese steel production reached 409 million tonnes, up 18.1% from one year earlier, growing faster than domestic demand. This brings its share of world production to 37%, up from 34% in 2006. ....
http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,3343,en_...1_1_1_1,00.html


Since then, India has almost doubled its crude steel production to nearly 44 million tons each year; of that, 41 million tons come from domestic consumption. According to the IISI, India will consume the most steel in the world over the next decade, with annual demand increasing at a rate of 7.7 percent. Meanwhile,,,,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0212/p07s02-wosc.html

this thread becomes pee contest and boring, let it sink please.

The Sino-Indian border



New Delhi, Thursday December 13, 2007: The Indian Army is relocating some 15,000 troops deployed on the frontier with Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir but there will be no reduction in forces engaged in counter-insurgency operations in the state, an officer said Thursday.

'It should be clearly understood that these troops were engaged on border guarding duties and not in a counter-insurgency role. To that extent, there is no reduction in troop levels in the state,' the officer told IANS, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The relocation of the 27 Mountain Division to its original base at Kalimpong in West Bengal comes amidst heightened tensions on the China-Bhutan border, where the officer said Chinese troops destroyed two bunkers that Beijing claims were constructed on its territory.

There were indications, he added, that the Chinese were eyeing a move into the Dolam plateau in Bhutan that lies near the tri-junction of China, Bhutan and the Indian state of Sikkim.

The Chinese move would bring them closer to the strategically important Siliguri corridor in north Bengal, the officer said, hastening to add that there 'was no immediate cause for alarm'.

'The redeployment (of the division) is only a precautionary move. We have various mechanisms to deal with such issues,' he maintained.

The division was moved to Kashmir in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil war with Pakistan. While its headquarters were located near the state's winter capital of Jammu, its troops were deployed at various places along the Line of Control (LoC).

With the threat perception from Pakistan having reduced due to the uncertain political conditions in the country, the army headquarters had taken the view that the troops would be better deployed at their original location, the officer said.

'In any case, the troops can be quickly moved back (to Kashmir) if the situation so warrants,' the officer added.

ET