38 replies to this topic

[mHussain]

Sallam Brothers, long time but thought I'd share my defence policy paper and see what kind of reactions I get. Hope you don't mind the self-posting.

Defending Pakistan

Insaf for the Armed Forces
A draft policy paper for the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf.
Meinhaj Hussain, Grandestrategy.com
m.hussain@grandestrategy.com
May 16^th, 2012



“The key aspect in removing this brown sahib mentality is to carefully consider the institutional aspects by which the disease replicates itself and then making policies to judiciously correct those elements.”


Despite the doom and gloom of the present crisis in the Western Front, the Pakistan defence establishment remains one of the few institutions in the Muslim world that have the ability to execute successful long-term strategic defence policies. Some of the highlights of this success include the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the establishment of such weapons manufacturing facilities as Wah, Kahuta, Kamra and Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) as well as various defence laboratories and facilities that produce everything from tanks, combat aircraft, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and a wide variety of other devices. We shall later look more closely at the vital importance of such a nascent military-industrial complex. To achieve this feat, Pakistan has had approximately 50,000 engineers, scientists and other skilled workers, and an additional 10,000-15,000 foreign qualified engineers and scientists.

I will not bore the reader with the basic data of the armed forces of Pakistan in general and other well-known information, instead this paper is going to focus on some key and lesser known aspects in the most concise manner possible. This paper will begin by looking at some of the weaknesses of the Pakistan armed forces and how they can be addressed. It will then look at the problem of building a viable military-industrial complex. Afterwards I shall move on to considering a solution to the endemic problem of military coups and finally end by considering the future of warfare. I am broadly considering a 5-10 year time-frame in this paper.

As a final word before we begin, criticism of the Pakistan armed forces is sometimes taken as unpatriotic and anti-state. The following section is written with all good intent and a desire to fix some of the issues for a better and stronger Pakistan.

1. The Problems of the Pakistan Armed Forces
1.1 Under-Equipped & Out-dated Equipment
1.2 Secular-Servile Mentality
1.3 Incompetence in the basic art of war
1.4 Joint Forces Coordination Problem
1.5 Organizational Restructure
1.6 Close Air Support
1.7 Air Defence Artillery
1.8 Air Force
1.9 Navy
2. Building Real Military Strength
3. People’s Army
3.1 A Three-tiered Army
4. The Future Ahead.
4.1 Air Defence and the Future
Read more: http://www.grandestr...-for-armed.html

[SUPARCO]

Salaam,

Welcome back brother.

Salaam

[Sanguine]

I read your paper and it was indeed very interesting. I do believe that we need to get rid of this English language syndrome but that does not mean that without having any translated works we can claim to promote our national language. Knowing English and still prefering to communicate in Urdu is one thing that certainly needs to be appreciated but I myself find it very weird that people who have no basic understanding of a language push to replace English with Urdu as an official language (owing to the fact that every reading material we lay our hands on is in English). I have seen many officers with horrible English but they have to communicate in it because anything other than English (and sometimes Urdu) is considered vernacular. That should be discouraged. Nonetheless the initial  English test candidates take at recruitment centres is so easy and even in ISSB the selectors seldom test your linguistic skills. One thing I would like to add  is that we seriously need to change the trend of sending the not so good officers to ISSB.

I liked the way you articulated the lack of trust between sister forces. However I believe that the mistrust that prevailed between Army and PAF during Operation Gibraltar is a more pertinent example as compared to Kargil, owing to the justification we have had for Kargil. Last but not the least, I think army's role as a stake-holer in our economy and its implications is something you overlooked.

[Caesar]

When you say English syndrome I am assuming you mean Western influence. I have to be honest with you here ..... the biggest country in this world in terms of population is China, and I have observed that every person there wants to be a wannbe Western looking dude or girl. Chinese younger generation is basically copying the Americans. Their cities look like Western cities, their cloth look like western, their blonde coloured hair looks like Western.


The point being you will have this type of influence everywhere incuding Pakistan.

[Sanguine]

Caesar, on 20 May 2012 - 12:01 AM, said:

When you say English syndrome I am assuming you mean Western influence. I have to be honest with you here ..... the biggest country in this world in terms of population is China, and I have observed that every person there wants to be a wannbe Western looking dude or girl. Chinese younger generation is basically copying the Americans. Their cities look like Western cities, their cloth look like western, their blonde coloured hair looks like Western.


The point being you will have this type of influence everywhere incuding Pakistan.

I dont know if you have read the paper or not because I was talking as regards to colloquial English since the author has discussed it in his paper. I was never referring to Western infulence in this very thread. Plus, I have also edited my post for removing any ambiguity.

[mHussain]

Fatima47, on 19 May 2012 - 01:55 PM, said:

I read your paper and it was indeed very interesting. I do believe that we need to get rid of this English language syndrome but that does not mean that without having any translated works we can claim to promote our national language. Knowing English and still prefering to communicate in Urdu is one thing that certainly needs to be appreciated but I myself find it very weird that people who have no basic understanding of a language push to replace English with Urdu as an official language (owing to the fact that every reading material we lay our hands on is in English). I have seen many officers with horrible English but they have to communicate in it because anything other than English (and sometimes Urdu) is considered vernacular. That should be discouraged. Nonetheless the initial  English test candidates take at recruitment centres is so easy and even in ISSB the selectors seldom test your linguistic skills. One thing I would like to add  is that we seriously need to change the trend of sending the not so good officers to ISSB.

I liked the way you articulated the lack of trust between sister forces. However I believe that the mistrust that prevailed between Army and PAF during Operation Gibraltar is a more pertinent example as compared to Kargil, owing to the justification we have had for Kargil. Last but not the least, I think army's role as a stake-holer in our economy and its implications is something you overlooked.

Sallam Sister Fatima,

Thank you for a thoughtful and well-considered response. I am glad that overall, you liked my paper. I totally agree with you that without having any translated work, particularly of the military's curriculum, there can be no switching to Urdu. I think that it has perhaps been a laps in the planning that over the years Pakistan has been unable to do this.

I do not think however that it is a great barrier. Virtually all major countries from Italy to Japan use their own language, definitely in the military and often even in academia. Even a tiny country like Singapore has all its directives and government documents translated in four languages.

I think therefore, the problem is not one of an impossibility in administration, but rather a lack of will or some would say because that same culture is reproducing itself, and thus does not want to be dislodged (given hundreds of years of conditioning).

Thanks again, I wish there were more posters like yourself.

-Meinhaj Hussain

[faizan khaliq]

Hussain congratulation for the nice work, you have been very thought provoking  and almost covered most of the aspects however before modernizing the Armed forces we have to analyse the political objectives thoroughly and then formulate a policy and then finally creating a war machine that is subservient to policy.The political challenges right after creation of Pakistan were massive and probably beyond the capabilities of Armed forces to defend them and plus of that our leadership failed to realize the importance of policy which is suppose to be the foundation stone on which the war machine is built.  Few of the challenges were
1.how to keep two parts together (politically and militarily which have 1000 miles of hostile land in between)
2.Accession of Kashmir for survival of Agro based economy of west Pakistan
3.Very friendly Afghanistan where no one else can interfere like US and Canada
The objective needed multiple approach and use of armed forces for the attainment or defending these objectives as last resort.Had we done the analysis thoroughly our forces structure would have been entirely different .For example right from the outset we needed a naval based power followed by strong Air force and highly flexible mobile Army.but we engaged ourselves in useless alliances like SEATO and CENTO and further increased our security challenges.
    We have advanced much further than 60,s and we have bigger resources however our challenges have become huge which can not be addressed through conventional war machine.We can not have the luxury of conventional war but right from outset have to the war on absolute scale so  the need of Armed forces is there to hold ground  during and after nuclear exchange for that purpose we need to develop force structure to follow the national strategy .This post is inconclusive because it is a long subject however all of us can reach on some conclusion after the debate as to what our strategic objectives can be and what kind of war machine we require to pursue them if our diplomatic efforts fail.

[Sanguine]

mHussain, why did you overlook army's stake in economy and its implications in your paper?

[mHussain]

Sallam Sister Fatima,

Perhaps you can write something related to that topic. My work was not related to Pakistan's economy, which is a theme for another paper perhaps. We enter an area here of subjective opinion as to what is important for the defence policy of Pakistan. That is not to say that I have conclusively covered everything possible, for surely I may have missed many other important aspects even of defence that may perhaps be covered by others.

To be honest, that is a somewhat strange question to ask.

[lamdacore]

mHussain, on 19 May 2012 - 05:38 AM, said:

Sallam Brothers, long time but thought I'd share my defence policy paper and see what kind of reactions I get. Hope you don't mind the self-posting.

Defending Pakistan

Insaf for the Armed Forces
A draft policy paper for the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf.
Meinhaj Hussain, Grandestrategy.com
m.hussain@grandestrategy.com
May 16^th, 2012



“The key aspect in removing this brown sahib mentality is to carefully consider the institutional aspects by which the disease replicates itself and then making policies to judiciously correct those elements.”


Despite the doom and gloom of the present crisis in the Western Front, the Pakistan defence establishment remains one of the few institutions in the Muslim world that have the ability to execute successful long-term strategic defence policies. Some of the highlights of this success include the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the establishment of such weapons manufacturing facilities as Wah, Kahuta, Kamra and Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) as well as various defence laboratories and facilities that produce everything from tanks, combat aircraft, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and a wide variety of other devices. We shall later look more closely at the vital importance of such a nascent military-industrial complex. To achieve this feat, Pakistan has had approximately 50,000 engineers, scientists and other skilled workers, and an additional 10,000-15,000 foreign qualified engineers and scientists.

I will not bore the reader with the basic data of the armed forces of Pakistan in general and other well-known information, instead this paper is going to focus on some key and lesser known aspects in the most concise manner possible. This paper will begin by looking at some of the weaknesses of the Pakistan armed forces and how they can be addressed. It will then look at the problem of building a viable military-industrial complex. Afterwards I shall move on to considering a solution to the endemic problem of military coups and finally end by considering the future of warfare. I am broadly considering a 5-10 year time-frame in this paper.

As a final word before we begin, criticism of the Pakistan armed forces is sometimes taken as unpatriotic and anti-state. The following section is written with all good intent and a desire to fix some of the issues for a better and stronger Pakistan.

1. The Problems of the Pakistan Armed Forces
1.1 Under-Equipped & Out-dated Equipment
1.2 Secular-Servile Mentality
1.3 Incompetence in the basic art of war
1.4 Joint Forces Coordination Problem
1.5 Organizational Restructure
1.6 Close Air Support
1.7 Air Defence Artillery
1.8 Air Force
1.9 Navy
2. Building Real Military Strength
3. People’s Army
3.1 A Three-tiered Army
4. The Future Ahead.
4.1 Air Defence and the Future
Read more: http://www.grandestr...-for-armed.html

Your analysis of the armed forces seems quite thorough with respect to their strengths and weaknesses. There are many instances where you have pinpointed the acute problems that the different services face. Generally, I am very much inclined to agree with your article. However, I do feel that to truly give a neautral perspective the mention of PTI as a potential political party, paving the way to controlling certain negative elements in the armed forces, should have been excluded from your paper. The reason is that you are trying to highlight the fundamental weaknesses of the armed forces and highlighting certain caveats that would aid different think tanks to set a course for the country. This would then create the necessary social, economic, and political will to change the armed forces posture in doing its business in the correct manner. Therefore, such a mention of PTI should be removed from this paper (I say this even though I admire PTI to ensure complete neautrality of the paper).

The other point that I would like to highlight is Section 3 of your paper. I disagree in the creation of a "People's Army" with the mandate of keeeping the army in check when a coup is brewing. The army has a mandate to protect Pakistan and it personnel take oaths to uphold the constitution of Pakistan. It is the weaknesses of multiple institutions and political parties that such rogue elements in the army form a coup in the first place. We need to augment and strengthen the law enforcement agencies and the judiciary such that the army generals serve under it. There should be no fear of passing a law that a general is gone rogue and that the death penalty should be announced. All those soldiers serving the rogue elements are to be branded as mutineers. This requires a well developed society, judicial system and a subservient army to ensure optimum success. However, the mere proposal of creating People's Army is as if one is trying to create an army to combat an army i.e. two state armies meant to keep check and balance. This will be a disaster since the wretched politicians will make optimum use of such a scenario, a form of political arm-twisting would ensue. Above all else, I am against it since it pits a Pakistani against a Pakistani, a Pakistani patriot against a Pakistani patriot. Please remove this section as it would aid in the destablilizing of Pakistan rather than its stability.

Section 4 is more or less along the same lines of Section 3 and so requires some revisioning.

You can have Section 5 that can provide a prelude of how to achieve more positive results from our war machinery keeping in view of the pros and cons we have faced. You can create a new paper that can highlight the following:

1) Politics and Social conditioning for successful politics in Pakistan - Talk about the ways of different political parties in conditioning the Pakistani massess to win votes and highlgith the short term and long term implications that each of these mechanisms pose for the country should the different political parties win. This will allow us Pakistanis to predetermine the outcome of elections based on election campaings that some political parties are currently undertaking.

2) Pakistani economy under an ideal Pakistani government. - Discuss the policies and industrialization that is to ensue from such a scenario. Talk about how industrlization and education can play a crucial role in ensuring a stable Pakistani growth. Talk about how all this is to be augmented by government politices to enhance trade etc. etc.I am no economy expert but I am sure you get the drift

3) Industrialization and Education - This should be number 2 on the list but out economy is in bad shape. Or shall I say that points 2 and 3 go hand in hand and it is difficult for me to come up with a suitable topic at this point that highlight the synergy of such discussions that would show a path to success for the Pakistani nation. I leave that to you on how to proceed from here onward.

Nonetheless, focus on industrial capacity that is lacking and discuss on improving failing industries. Talk about innovation and how to acheive such results.

Education is the basic pillar based on how we do everything in the country to progress. Therefore, it is very important that we pin point all possible weaknesses in this system and discuss on ways of improving it. It will definitely bear fruit 15-20 years down the line.

4) Judical system and law enforcement - We all know the problems time to pin point them out and come up with a valid solution.

5) Talk about the forementioned successes could tranform the military and then link all of that to this paper you have written. It would be an excellent way of bridging the gaps and give think tanks a holistic of understanding shortcomings and potential at all levels of governance and different aspects of running the country.


A paper is needed that can articulate the weaknesses of Pakistan as a whole so as to fix them by having a clear roadmap. It will then be easy for others to chip in to fill in the gaps and address any caveats that may arise.

I hope my input was valuable.

Lamda

[mHussain]

Sallam Brother Lamdacore,

Thank you for your well thought out reply, I sincerely appreciate it.

About the PTI, I am actually involved with the PTI and these are meant essentially for the PTI to be influenced by insh'Allah. I am not interested in neutrality, this isn't academic, we live by what we believe.

On the issue of the People's Army, I fear we will just have to agree to disagree, this is an important check and balance to ensure that the Army cannot take over, as it has repeatedly done again and again over the last 60 years, over any excuse. Laws are meaningless without adequate implementation, something not possible without proper checks an balances. The Army needs that check and balance, it has worked in Iran for instance in ensuring the revolution lasted.

It is also a very good way to augment the size of the army on a minimal budget; a conscript people's army supporting and reinforcing the professional army.

On the other issues you have thought of, Brother Lamdacore, you must understand that such papers take many years of research and experience to write and something that is not an easy job to do, and in entirely different topics at hand, I do protest that you say this too lightly.

However, it just so happens that I have written about a few of the topics you've mentioned, as they have been of interest to me in the last decade or so. Here are some that you may like:

http://www.insaf.pk/...aj-Hussain.aspx

Regarding a political framework, an economic model and a legal revision:
https://www.smashwor...oks/view/162539

Thanks again for your constructive criticism, may Allah bless you for it.

Sallam,

M. Hussain

[Panzer-kiel]

well well mHussain, am also back for about 10 days, so will chip in now and then in your topics as usual.....goood paper as usual from your side.....must improve it......!

[mHussain]

thanks Panzer-kiel, perhaps you can give me some tips and thoughts, I think we could really improve it with that impetus.

[Panzer-kiel]

mHussain, on 29 May 2012 - 03:52 AM, said:

thanks Panzer-kiel, perhaps you can give me some tips and thoughts, I think we could really improve it with that impetus.

do write somethin abt Logistics, exercises held at all levels almost always experience a logistics breakdown. This prob has been lingering on for many decades by now, many examples are there from 65, 71, Kargil etc, when logistics played a vital role in the success/failure of an op. Even then this point isnt given much emphasis, even in our Verbal /Written Orders.....this is one thing.......supplying your troops over a variety of terrain, particularly desert is another problem.....several solutions have been put forward but nothin implemented as yet....!Lets discuss......

[mHussain]

Ah yes, that is a very good point, and I think I have missed out on that. I think its particularly true when related to how key logistics platforms have degraded in operational readiness and capability, at least partially due to the present conflict and partially due to a lack of funds.

[SLD10]

Salam brothers.

I am unable to read the mHussein's'paper. I get a "page does not exist" from my mobile device.

but what I disagree  about people's'army.  Even if you are right about check and balance as was proposed by Musharaf, having a people's'army means people is jahil and it's'institutions are not strong so we need an army who will do the check and balance.  And look how it work in Iran, the "army of people" works. The very people for who they work is frigthened by them... A State based on the "dhar" is not a State... It's' simply a gang leading the people of jahil...
What we need is to educate, educate and educate  people as stated  ! And have respect for each Pakistani, be it shia, be it sunni, be it christian be it hindo or sikh. Because with the respect is what lead to the win !
When people will be well educated and all politicals decisions will be discussed openly and publically, then people will be able to do the check and balence itself. No need  of gang...

Regards.

Edited by SLD10, 30 May 2012 - 03:40 PM.

[Chief of army staff]

Brother Hussain! I have to ask you about two question
1- According to Imran Khan, 3 carore 80 laks bogus votes could be use for upcoming elections. How can we stop them from happening???
2- What was the reason of removing General pasha from his post????

[Chief of army staff]

As all of us know that Yousuf raza gillani is a convicted prime minister who deliberately refused the court order. He is hiding behind corrupt PPP speaker. She (Speaker of the parliament) saved him from recovery of  500 million USD from swiss a/c. Do you beleive that she should be prosecuted for her criminal act??I mean who is she to give green signal to Gillani??To me, she should face a trial for money laundering. She is helping a convict which is also a crime. What is your opinion???

[mHussain]

Sallam Brother COAS,

Stopping bogus votes, I do not know, I think every dirty trick in the book will be tried by not only the internal lalas but Pakistan's external enemies particularly the CIA, who are now well entrenched. I do not think it is in their interest to see IK win.

Lets hope insh'Allah that there are enough "good men" left in the institutions of Pakistan, including the Election Commission, the Army and the ISI to somehow ensure that a bogus election does not take place.

About Pasha, my guess would be as good as yours. I think the ISI is not dependent though on the capabilities of one person, and the institution is fully capable of staying effective with or without a particular person. I personally think its down to the ISI and the armed forces to ensure a fair elections, without IK Pakistan's future is at stake and any patriotic and sane Pakistani should understand that.

[Panzer-kiel]

mHussain, on 31 May 2012 - 05:53 AM, said:

Sallam Brother COAS,

Stopping bogus votes, I do not know, I think every dirty trick in the book will be tried by not only the internal lalas but Pakistan's external enemies particularly the CIA, who are now well entrenched. I do not think it is in their interest to see IK win.

Lets hope insh'Allah that there are enough "good men" left in the institutions of Pakistan, including the Election Commission, the Army and the ISI to somehow ensure that a bogus election does not take place.

About Pasha, my guess would be as good as yours. I think the ISI is not dependent though on the capabilities of one person, and the institution is fully capable of staying effective with or without a particular person. I personally think its down to the ISI and the armed forces to ensure a fair elections, without IK Pakistan's future is at stake and any patriotic and sane Pakistani should understand that.

why dont we stick to the topic....its such a nice topic if we discuss it......i mean several new solutions and revelations will surely come out if we thoroughly discuss it.....wht do u think, mHussain??

[salaudin]

Asslam o alikum mHussain bro,
For some reason, the website does not open the full text so I cannot read the whole paper hence cannot comment much.
To the extent I managed to read, it looked fine. Keep it up !
PDF surely is a good place to look for inputs as there are many who can constructively contribute.

[mHussain]

Panzer-kiel totally agree. Its a wonderful topic really, something that I think is a productive discussion to have. What do you think about the joint forces command idea?

My dear friend Salaudin, my apologies, the P is capitalized in Pakistan automatically and thus the site doesn't open. The final version is now available on the PTI website here:
http://www.insaf.pk/...aj-Hussain.aspx

However the website is sometimes down because PTI servers are having a hard time keeping up with the popularity of the party (my guess).

If everything fails just google "Defending Pakistan insaf for the armed forces". or go to www.grandestrategy.com and its on front page.

[Panzer-kiel]

mHussain, on 01 June 2012 - 01:18 AM, said:

Panzer-kiel totally agree. Its a wonderful topic really, something that I think is a productive discussion to have. What do you think about the joint forces command idea?

Joint Forces Command brings together unique military and civilian strengths to support the delivery of success in Operations. Educated and qualified people need to come together in this as part of a team and coordinate and route all the resources in an efficient manner to the point where they are most needed, on a matter of priority.
Of course, such a thing wont only comprise of armed forces personnel, relevant people also include leading business, stake holders and representatives of every department which has a hand in the development of our country......once they are all assembled, they need to sit together and plan and generate.
Imagine all sitting on one table and army rep saying that he need a particular item with some special specifications, the man who deals with such items can jump in and give out his options and improvements which can be made.......once the problem of transport comes, its rep can jump in and arrange all the transport so that all the items flow in the right direction, in time. This organization will need to have top priority so that normal, daily chores do not interdict with the smooth running of this organization.....scholars and intellectuals can also form part of this team, making their own think tanks which can shape the future policy for this country......food for thought!

[Caesar]

I have read some parts of this paper and I don't agree with it. Things like PA is still following WW1 doctrine is just plain and simple non-sense. Then things like PAF doesn't engage USAF as it knows the "Technology Gap" between itself and USAF is like comparing a grape with a water melon. Even the former USSR was no match for USAF and you are talking about Pakistan?

Sorry but the paper sounds more like a "political speech" than a "military analysis".

[mHussain]

Panzer-kiel, on 01 June 2012 - 04:00 AM, said:

Joint Forces Command brings together unique military and civilian strengths to support the delivery of success in Operations. Educated and qualified people need to come together in this as part of a team and coordinate and route all the resources in an efficient manner to the point where they are most needed, on a matter of priority.
Of course, such a thing wont only comprise of armed forces personnel, relevant people also include leading business, stake holders and representatives of every department which has a hand in the development of our country......once they are all assembled, they need to sit together and plan and generate.
Imagine all sitting on one table and army rep saying that he need a particular item with some special specifications, the man who deals with such items can jump in and give out his options and improvements which can be made.......once the problem of transport comes, its rep can jump in and arrange all the transport so that all the items flow in the right direction, in time. This organization will need to have top priority so that normal, daily chores do not interdict with the smooth running of this organization.....scholars and intellectuals can also form part of this team, making their own think tanks which can shape the future policy for this country......food for thought!

Panzer-kiel, on 01 June 2012 - 04:00 AM, said:

Joint Forces Command brings together unique military and civilian strengths to support the delivery of success in Operations. Educated and qualified people need to come together in this as part of a team and coordinate and route all the resources in an efficient manner to the point where they are most needed, on a matter of priority.
Of course, such a thing wont only comprise of armed forces personnel, relevant people also include leading business, stake holders and representatives of every department which has a hand in the development of our country......once they are all assembled, they need to sit together and plan and generate.
Imagine all sitting on one table and army rep saying that he need a particular item with some special specifications, the man who deals with such items can jump in and give out his options and improvements which can be made.......once the problem of transport comes, its rep can jump in and arrange all the transport so that all the items flow in the right direction, in time. This organization will need to have top priority so that normal, daily chores do not interdict with the smooth running of this organization.....scholars and intellectuals can also form part of this team, making their own think tanks which can shape the future policy for this country......food for thought!

Yes, its to ensure everyone works together and in synergy rather than everyone fighting their own battles. I think my paper can be improved in the sense that it looks at fixing the inter-services problem and does not look at how non-military elements can be incorporated in a wider "jointness". I think that it is an important factor given the information warfare age we are in; one example of this is the importance of fighting the media war or cyber warfare.

Better use of the civilian logistics facilities in war could also help improve the logistics problem you earlier touched upon.

[Panzer-kiel]

Caesar, on 01 June 2012 - 06:15 AM, said:

I have read some parts of this paper and I don't agree with it. Things like PA is still following WW1 doctrine is just plain and simple non-sense.

waise truth is we still tend to follow old tactics and doctrines, including world wars ofcourse, bitter truth it is Caesar, shudnt be there but then, it is there, being taught, of no use ofcourse.........several, multitude of reasons for all this!

[safdar]

mHussain, on 01 June 2012 - 01:18 AM, said:

My dear friend Salaudin, my apologies, the P is capitalized in Pakistan automatically and thus the site doesn't open. The final version is now available on the PTI website here:
http://www.insaf.pk/...aj-Hussain.aspx

Hello mHussain. I read bits of you paper (I’m not into army and politics). And I agree with some points raised. And you have pretty much youself summed up the real cause of  the problems in a nutshell by externalising in a few words what most Pakistanis already think.

It is only incompetence, nepotism, empire-building, red-tape and other such evils that cause a no-funding situation in the first place.

You combine those things with standardization, centralization, concentration, and synchronization, and you wind up with a style of organization we call bureaucracy.

I have not a single solution to the above and sometimes think how many bhuttho’s or others will someone kill to rid and then simply replace our society of inherited corrupt lords in this fiefdom we call Pakistan. Besides, with so many problems within your paper, expanding any one would require many days of research and thinking, which is to be honest beyond everyone put together on this forum. Its not impossible just time consuming, and no one has the time to fix Pakistan.

However I could expand on one particular sentence from you paper:

My personal views are that strategic, long and medium range SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile) systems need to be organized.


All armies in the world recognise that Modern layered air defence systems makes it very risky for aircrafts to get close to their target. Hence for Pakistan to have layered air defence system we require more funds. Easy. But what if there are no funds or limited funds? Then, of course Pakistan requires a strategy based on Indian air power to adopt a defence systems accordingly. We know they haven’t got anything in their inventory (in fact their isn’t a system in the world for that matter) to drop a laser guided JDAM from a distance of more then 15 km with any precision ( 15 Km would be the hypotenuse). This is just one example, say: if they want to target our mobile TBM’s, which would be our primary weapons against their attack. Our best option with limited funds would be to have short to medium range SAMs. Long range SAM only work best at long ranges, hence a layered defence is required. In Pakistan case due to limited funds any threat at altitude is down to PAF fighters to intercept and neutralise. If Pakistan was to get great numbers of long range SAM and not short/medium range SAM’s then we know there is something wrong in their decision making.

However considering Pakistan, not only do we have limited funds, but also corruption, if funds are available and the above logic is applied to divert those funds by corrupt bureaucrats to instead fund their extravagant life style, then of course one is faced with the chicken and the egg situation. So we don’t even know if have any funds (because we are a poor nation) or funds are available but corruption prevents funds to further strengthen defence.

Where does anyone begin from?

[mHussain]

Sallam Brother Safdar,
Thank you for taking the time to read and comment on my work. I think you read too much into some of the words you quoted. For instance you quoted:

It is only incompetence, nepotism, empire-building, red-tape and other such evils that cause a no-funding situation in the first place.

You combine those things with standardization, centralization, concentration, and synchronization, and you wind up with a style of organization we call bureaucracy.

The first part is from a different location in the paper from the second part. The context in the first part is given if I reproduce the paragraph:

"Lastly, it must be noted that funding will flow when there is productivity; good R&D efforts generate considerable cash flows. It is only incompetence, nepotism, empire-building, red-tape and other such evils that cause a no-funding situation in the first place.Lastly, it must be noted that funding will flow when there is productivity; good R&D efforts generate considerable cash flows. It is only incompetence, nepotism, empire-building, red-tape and other such evils that cause a no-funding situation in the first place."

I did not mean to make a broad brush statement about the armed forces as being incompetent.

The second part which you quoted together with the first, is actually from a completely different section, and not even subsequent from the first quote. It goes as follows:

"He describes the First Wave as settled agricultural society, the Second Wave as industrial society. In his words:
The Second Wave Society is industrial and based on mass production, mass distribution, mass consumption, mass education, mass media, mass recreation, mass entertainment, and weapons of mass destruction. You combine those things with standardization, centralization, concentration, and synchronization, and you wind up with a style of organization we call bureaucracy."

You have stated:

Quote

However I could expand on one particular sentence from you paper:

My personal views are that strategic, long and medium range SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile) systems need to be organized.

But you aren't quoting a sentence but a portion of a sentence. Let me reproduce the original:


"My personal views are that strategic, long and medium range SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile) systems need to be organized under a separate service that falls under the PAF, similar to the relationship of US Marines to the US Navy. This implies a high degree of independence and a separate budget allocated not by the PAF but by the proposed OJCOS. Modern strategic air defence requires very close coordination and integration with all strategic assets including the national radar net and air force fighters and other airborne assets. At the same time, air forces have a tendency to idealize air combat and pay less attention to less glamorous but effective anti-aircraft assets. These two reasons and similar reasons dictate that the organization of Strategic Air Defence Artillery should be as has been proposed here."

What the balance of the budget allocated between SAMs and combat aircraft is something I have not commented.

But I understand that you wish to discuss this issue and what you are stating is basically the PAF viewpoint which undermines credible medium and long range SAMs for fighter aircraft. Incidentally, this in my opinion is not a sound policy, but I said nothing against it in the paper. let the relevant OJCOS office decide on that balance, away from the bias of the PAF which is run mainly by fighter jocks.

It is somewhat strange that you talk about defending against PGMs on small, mobile targets, as if that is the main task. This I think is a very narrow way to look at the air defence paradigm, which should be seen as a holistic and comprehensive IADS. One must prepare for the worst; medium and long range SAMs are an important element. In fact, a well-balanced synergy of the different layers of an IADS would provide far better bang-for-the-buck than an unbalanced IADS.

The question of budgets is one that frankly, I fail to understand your point. You seem frustrated with what you perceive as a "chicken and egg" situation. Yes, of course, there is not military in the world that thinks its budget is enough. That is not the question. The question is how you allocate the budget that you have. How effectively do you utilize that budget? For instance, do you allocate it maintaining F-16s, building a separate base for it, buying various armaments for it or do you spend it elsewhere? And that is not even considering what price the nation has to pay for those "free" F-16s.

The question is, who should decide where the budget is allocated? Who should allocate the budget between the various services? if Air Defence Artillery is a separate entity under the PAF, who decides how much money they get allocated?

I think OJCOS needs to be a meaningful entity that makes some of those critical decisions.

[faizan khaliq]

Probably if we go for missile defence shield it will take care aircraft too
The strategic air defence command need to be organized  as under for the purpose of achieving air superiority
1,Air superiority through active means
a.destruction of enemy air bases and strategic missile sights(PAF and strategic force command combined wing)
2, Passive means for achieving air superiority
a. Missile defence and interdiction by PAF combined team ,
3. Electronic warfare at strategic level combined team of PAF and elements corps of signals  
The dream of PAF in achieving air supremacy through classical dog fights does not seem practical  but still might be used in combination of missile defence and interdiction.
at tactical level Pakistan Army and Navy can look after local air defence through SAMs and anti aircraft  artillary

[ali23]

Quote

Joint Forces Command brings together unique military and civilian strengths to support the delivery of success in Operations. Educated and qualified people need to come together in this as part of a team and coordinate and route all the resources in an efficient manner to the point where they are most needed, on a matter of priority.
Of course, such a thing wont only comprise of armed forces personnel, relevant people also include leading business, stake holders and representatives of every department which has a hand in the development of our country......once they are all assembled, they need to sit together and plan and generate.
Imagine all sitting on one table and army rep saying that he need a particular item with some special specifications, the man who deals with such items can jump in and give out his options and improvements which can be made.......once the problem of transport comes, its rep can jump in and arrange all the transport so that all the items flow in the right direction, in time. This organization will need to have top priority so that normal, daily chores do not interdict with the smooth running of this organization.....scholars and intellectuals can also form part of this team, making their own think tanks which can shape the future policy for this country......food for thought!

IIRC NDU conducts a workshop where stakeholders from every walk of life are invited to participate. I am sure a joint committee can be formed based on the lessons from such workshops.  Here are some details:

National Security Workshop (NSW)
1. The Background.   The Background. The need to conduct the National Security Workshop (NSW) was felt in 2003 when on the desire of the then President of Pakistan, the Prime Minister directed the then National Defence College to organize one short duration workshop on national security. It was to be for the participants from all segments of the society including leading politicians / parliamentarians, senior civil bureaucrats, district nazims, private sectors representatives i.e. industrialists / lawyers / media persons etc. The first workshop was conducted during May / Jun 2003. Since then, NDU has conducted twelve workshops. So far 642 individuals have participated in these workshops.
2.   Aim.    National Security Workshops are aimed at enabling the senior leadership from various segments of the society in understanding national security issues and policy formulation processes.

3.   Scope.   The scope of these workshops embodies thread bear discussion on the following:-
  a. Fundamentals and attributes of strategy and statecraft and their relevance to Pakistan’s
security and progress.
  b. Elements of National Power and their impact on national aims and objectives.
  c. Impact of socio-political environment and economy on National Security.
  d. Role of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy in promoting national interests and security.
  e. Role of Military Power in National Security and the formulation of Defence Policy.
  f. The process of formulation of National Security Policy in the context of comprehensive
    security.

4.   Study Modules.   The national security workshop consists of following eight study modules
which comprise lectures, panel discussions, seminars and visits:-
   a. Study – 1: Fundamentals of Strategy and Statecraft
   b. Study – 2: National Security Policy and Strategy
   c. Study – 3: External Environment and Foreign Policy
   d. Study – 4: Internal Environment and Domestic Policy
   e. Study – 5: Economic Policy and Strategy
   f. Study – 6: Defence Policy and Strategy
   g. Study – 7: Strategic Management
   h. Study – 8: Inland Study Tours
5.   As a part of the inland study tours, the participants are taken to all provincial capitals, headquarters of the three services and major military and civil establishments to have a first hand knowledge of the respective departments. The workshop concludes with an exercise “Qaumi Salamti” aimed at providing practical exposure to the participants in formulation of National Security Policy.

http://www.ndu.edu.p...s_issra_nsw.php


I

[Panzer-kiel]

ali23, on 02 June 2012 - 03:36 AM, said:

IIRC NDU conducts a workshop where stakeholders from every walk of life are invited to participate. I am sure a joint committee can be formed based on the lessons from such workshops.  Here are some details:

National Security Workshop (NSW)
1. The Background.   The Background. The need to conduct the National Security Workshop (NSW) was felt in 2003 when on the desire of the then President of Pakistan, the Prime Minister directed the then National Defence College to organize one short duration workshop on national security. It was to be for the participants from all segments of the society including leading politicians / parliamentarians, senior civil bureaucrats, district nazims, private sectors representatives i.e. industrialists / lawyers / media persons etc. The first workshop was conducted during May / Jun 2003. Since then, NDU has conducted twelve workshops. So far 642 individuals have participated in these workshops.
2.   Aim. National Security Workshops are aimed at enabling the senior leadership from various segments of the society in understanding national security issues and policy formulation processes.

3.   Scope.   The scope of these workshops embodies thread bear discussion on the following:-
  a. Fundamentals and attributes of strategy and statecraft and their relevance to Pakistan’s
security and progress.
  b. Elements of National Power and their impact on national aims and objectives.
  c. Impact of socio-political environment and economy on National Security.
  d. Role of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy in promoting national interests and security.
  e. Role of Military Power in National Security and the formulation of Defence Policy.
  f. The process of formulation of National Security Policy in the context of comprehensive
security.

4.   Study Modules.   The national security workshop consists of following eight study modules
which comprise lectures, panel discussions, seminars and visits:-
   a. Study – 1: Fundamentals of Strategy and Statecraft
   b. Study – 2: National Security Policy and Strategy
   c. Study – 3: External Environment and Foreign Policy
   d. Study – 4: Internal Environment and Domestic Policy
   e. Study – 5: Economic Policy and Strategy
   f. Study – 6: Defence Policy and Strategy
   g. Study – 7: Strategic Management
   h. Study – 8: Inland Study Tours
5.   As a part of the inland study tours, the participants are taken to all provincial capitals, headquarters of the three services and major military and civil establishments to have a first hand knowledge of the respective departments. The workshop concludes with an exercise “Qaumi Salamti” aimed at providing practical exposure to the participants in formulation of National Security Policy.

http://www.ndu.edu.p...s_issra_nsw.php


I

...am sure such orgs do exist and are working, no doubt about that, need of the hour is to give priority to the views of these org, similarly, politicians, keeping their personal interests at a side, must also give priority to wht these orgs have to say so that there is absolutely no compromise on issues pertaining to national security and interests.....we are not a poor country at all like the world potrays us, we have all the resources which a developed nation ought to have, only thing is to use them in the right manner......we do that and let me see anyone overtaking us!

[platinum786]

Bro, for some reason the link doesn't open an article.

[safdar]

mHussain, on 02 June 2012 - 01:02 AM, said:

Sallam Brother Safdar,
Thank you for taking the time to read and comment on my work. I think you read too much into some of the words you quoted.

Wsalam brother mHusain.

Those quotes were just an ice breaker, think nothing of them. Of course for reader’s discretion the whole paragraph should be quoted, else the original message is lost. But I do tend to debate in peculiar way by pressing on a singular issue with the least bit of reader discretion by skipping writing some thoughts. Of course this style might seem a little lopsided considering your paper which takes wide ranging issues from the armed forces to air forces. Or you probably might think I am nit picking for argument sakes. I can assure you I am not. I try to further explain why I quoted the single passage regarding long range SAMs. You need not to reply to the 3 paragraphs below.

As far as I know Pakistan apart from short/medium SAMs has never operated or procured long range or high altitude SAMs (maybe we a have limited number from the 70s). Pakistan has on a number of occasions did try to acquire PAC-3 SAMs and maybe be others I.e. Chinese HQ-9 system, however nothing has come to fruit.

What could be the reason? Is it due to fund shortages (which I’m also taking into account how funds are allocated due to complicity or incompetence) since we know that high altitude integrated SAM systems are already being adopted as anti-TBM batteries pushing the price out of our range, or does Pakistan have a strategy based on specific threat (hence my logically counterweighted assumption of a simple example of PGMs vs. TBMs and their defence and offence). Or we have simply been refused sale due to proliferation concerns. With all the ills in Pakistan, I still have faith and belief in Pakistan that maybe this is due to fund shortages and a strategy not to have a small condensed regions with a limited number of long/medium/short range SAM in favour of a coherent wider area with low/medium altitude defence and high altitude left for PAF fighters e.g. J-10s and Mirages for time being until funds are available.

Of course I understand that a layered defence frees up fighters to press on with other duties. And one cannot neglect the benefits of different systems and their capabilities, where we could rather then defend on our back foot take the fight to the enemy. Hence I agree with you that we do require a three tier integrated air defence system.

mHussain, on 02 June 2012 - 01:02 AM, said:

The question of budgets is one that frankly, I fail to understand your point. You seem frustrated with what you perceive as a "chicken and egg" situation. Yes, of course, there is not military in the world that thinks its budget is enough. That is not the question. The question is how you allocate the budget that you have. How effectively do you utilize that budget? For instance, do you allocate it maintaining F-16s, building a separate base for it, buying various armaments for it or do you spend it elsewhere? And that is not even considering what price the nation has to pay for those "free" F-16s.

Now this is what I like, I don’t think you have stated this in your paper and (maybe) reluctantly over here taken the step to go beyond your own principles of getting into the nitty-gritty of the most complex unknown world of military procurement and budgeting. This is the reason why I press on a singular issue in a debate, one tends to get what the other has on his mind, eventually.

We have actually come to a conclusion (after a combined almost 2000 word posts) from the single passage I quoted from your paper regarding SAM systems. That maybe we don’t have/mismanaged funds to divert to long range SAMs procurement. Solution could be that F-16s are too expensive or probably needless. I might just have to agree with you here, considering Americans, we always tend to pay a heavy price to be left with nothing in the end. Maybe that a department that does not look at Pakistan’s defence with eurocentric myopia and roughshod over actual defence needs is the answer.  

I will refrain from expanding on this further due to concerns I might hijack the thread and divert it in to a different direction to what you intended. Because now I have pulled the debate in to my element and  Faqat yeh dar hai aap ko laa jawab na kar dun ;). I’m joking.

It was nice talking to you brother mHussain.

[blueazure]

the military institution is like a big battleship at sea that takes long to change course ( read , inertia )  , plus, the core issue with PA hi command is lack of tough decision making regards policy matters ( i would say a dilemma of the nation, we are overall meek and docile ) . the notion of might is right, lack of guts from junior commanders to question senior commander's idiotic decisions is a collateral problem . speaking up in bara khanas or even informal  discussion sessions can jeopardize your career.  rest is rather too much emphasis on table wars and 'paper courses ' , conceptual hangovers and battle plans that take years in the making yet dont survive the first hour of contact with the enemy .


the problem stems from deep cultural paradigms and thinking dogmas instilled from home and early schooling, teachers routinely scolding, terrorizing ( even in good schools ) to instill the weird concept of 'discipline'  , using snub tactics when rather too probing questions are asked from students etc  is the norm which kills the 'confidence' of the future talent ( read kids )  . the same pattern is repeated when the  kid comes homes where parents have laid down plans for him / her adopting a certain profession and the necessity to 'perform' and 'be on top'  ( only to brag with relatives later on ) .

the result is a hollow, lacking substance, deformed,and mentally handicapped individual who is equipped with bare tools to earn a living ( read , a univ degree )  yet doesn't dream of anything spectacular or out of ordinary ,  let alone challenge established rituals and bring revolutionary ideas.

i dont call this brown sahab dilemma , we've been independent for 6+ decades from the brits . i call this a training and upbringing disaster

[Panzer-kiel]

blueazure, on 02 June 2012 - 12:50 PM, said:

the military institution is like a big battleship at sea that takes long to change course ( read , inertia )  , plus, the core issue with PA hi command is lack of tough decision making regards policy matters ( i would say a dilemma of the nation, we are overall meek and docile ) . the notion of might is right, lack of guts from junior commanders to question senior commander's idiotic decisions is a collateral problem . speaking up in bara khanas or even informal  discussion sessions can jeopardize your career.  rest is rather too much emphasis on table wars and 'paper courses ' , conceptual hangovers and battle plans that take years in the making yet dont survive the first hour of contact with the enemy .


the problem stems from deep cultural paradigms and thinking dogmas instilled from home and early schooling, teachers routinely scolding, terrorizing ( even in good schools ) to instill the weird concept of 'discipline'  , using snub tactics when rather too probing questions are asked from students etc  is the norm which kills the 'confidence' of the future talent ( read kids )  . the same pattern is repeated when the  kid comes homes where parents have laid down plans for him / her adopting a certain profession and the necessity to 'perform' and 'be on top'  ( only to brag with relatives later on ) .

the result is a hollow, lacking substance, deformed,and mentally handicapped individual who is equipped with bare tools to earn a living ( read , a univ degree )  yet doesn't dream of anything spectacular or out of ordinary ,  let alone challenge established rituals and bring revolutionary ideas.

i dont call this brown sahab dilemma , we've been independent for 6+ decades from the brits . i call this a training and upbringing disaster

completely agreed to, summed up the problem pretty well and in a NEAT manner!

[blueazure]

Panzer-kiel, on 02 June 2012 - 12:58 PM, said:

completely agreed to, summed up the problem pretty well and in a NEAT manner!

ty PK

[mHussain]

safdar, on 02 June 2012 - 12:18 PM, said:

Wsalam brother mHusain.
...

My Dear Brother Safdar,

Assallamalaikum and I deeply appreciate your most civil reply. I do disagree that I have not discussed the decision making issues - I have focused on OJCOS in quite detail, as a central decision making body. With the OJCOS, our argument can be drummed down to a cost-benefit analysis, which is a painstaking but quantifiable process, that can then be weighed by appropriate decision makers appropriately.

I think that Musharraf was on the right track in developing Pakistan's own LR-SAMs, if I am not mistaken, the program is/was frozen.
Beforehand though, I want to clarify that I am not interested in what the balance of the IADS should be, I just am interested that the right decision making body makes that decision, and the forces are structured effectively.

Given that disclaimer, it is of interest to note that the topography of Pakistan is ideally suited to LR/M-SAMs if defending against the Eastern theatre. They are an ideal force multiplier for a defending air arm faced with a quantity and quality disadvantage. Just having a relevant strategic SAM network brings a whole new dimension that the IAF has to counter, simultaneously with other combatants in mind.

Now, an opposing pilot has to think of the threat of PAF aircraft and simultaneously threats from the ground, while flying in enemy territory. Even as it is, a very good deterrence effect.

The possibility of cooperation with Iran also exists, where the Iranians are trying head over foot to build their own LR-SAMs from reverse engineering the S-300s components they received.

There was also a report sometime back of Pakistan ordering some longer ranged SAMs from China, if memory serves me right "HQ-18" (16?)

Imagine also the impact on the maritime front for defending Karachi and providing protection for the defensively (and coastally) poised PN, who incidentally lack decent AD on their ships.

Sallam,

M. Hussain

PS: about the other argument, Pakistan has very talented and brave young officers, who often disobey orders of their seniors to do many acts of heroism unknown to the public. However, such individuals who are seen to have an independent mind get into a lot of trouble and are almost never promoted further than the rank of Major.

[Panzer-kiel]

mHussain, on 03 June 2012 - 12:09 AM, said:

My Dear Brother Safdar,

Assallamalaikum and I deeply appreciate your most civil reply. I do disagree that I have not discussed the decision making issues - I have focused on OJCOS in quite detail, as a central decision making body. With the OJCOS, our argument can be drummed down to a cost-benefit analysis, which is a painstaking but quantifiable process, that can then be weighed by appropriate decision makers appropriately.

I think that Musharraf was on the right track in developing Pakistan's own LR-SAMs, if I am not mistaken, the program is/was frozen.
Beforehand though, I want to clarify that I am not interested in what the balance of the IADS should be, I just am interested that the right decision making body makes that decision, and the forces are structured effectively.

Given that disclaimer, it is of interest to note that the topography of Pakistan is ideally suited to LR/M-SAMs if defending against the Eastern theatre. They are an ideal force multiplier for a defending air arm faced with a quantity and quality disadvantage. Just having a relevant strategic SAM network brings a whole new dimension that the IAF has to counter, simultaneously with other combatants in mind.

Now, an opposing pilot has to think of the threat of PAF aircraft and simultaneously threats from the ground, while flying in enemy territory. Even as it is, a very good deterrence effect.

The possibility of cooperation with Iran also exists, where the Iranians are trying head over foot to build their own LR-SAMs from reverse engineering the S-300s components they received.

There was also a report sometime back of Pakistan ordering some longer ranged SAMs from China, if memory serves me right "HQ-18" (16?)

Imagine also the impact on the maritime front for defending Karachi and providing protection for the defensively (and coastally) poised PN, who incidentally lack decent AD on their ships.

Sallam,

M. Hussain

PS: about the other argument, Pakistan has very talented and brave young officers, who often disobey orders of their seniors to do many acts of heroism unknown to the public. However, such individuals who are seen to have an independent mind get into a lot of trouble and are almost never promoted further than the rank of Major.

i see only one HQ-2 site which their besides the GT Road east of PAF Base Chakala.....otherwise there is a complete lack of Long Range SAMs......and then.....protecting strategic targets with LR SAMS is one prob, protecting own mobile strike forces, while they are on the mov with Mobile Short Range SAMs is also a big enough problem, both problems are big enough and need to be rectified, till then, no use of AD and having 35-40 Gun regiments........no aircraft would come in their gun range to hit a target....!
...do remember, a missile hitting a target may not always be neeeded, imagine a pilot flying at 50, 000 ft and he just gets a beep, a flashing on his monitor telling him that he is being 'painted' and he better do something abt that.......even that is enough to throw a pilot away........

[mHussain]

Panzer-kiel, on 03 June 2012 - 01:41 AM, said:

i see only one HQ-2 site which their besides the GT Road east of PAF Base Chakala.....otherwise there is a complete lack of Long Range SAMs......and then.....protecting strategic targets with LR SAMS is one prob, protecting own mobile strike forces, while they are on the mov with Mobile Short Range SAMs is also a big enough problem, both problems are big enough and need to be rectified, till then, no use of AD and having 35-40 Gun regiments........no aircraft would come in their gun range to hit a target....!
...do remember, a missile hitting a target may not always be neeeded, imagine a pilot flying at 50, 000 ft and he just gets a beep, a flashing on his monitor telling him that he is being 'painted' and he better do something abt that.......even that is enough to throw a pilot away........

Exactly! AD has been such a problem and its horrendously outdated because everyone neglects it. This is why I tried to focus on the problem of force structure and give AD a meaningful place.