83 replies to this topic

[ChineseTiger1986]

According to Deng Xiaoping's doctrine, China's nuclear arsenal doesn't need to wipe out the Earth more than 100 times, but once is enough. He also believed that China has to keep its nukes less transparent which would cause greater panic to her rivals. You can't deal with our nukes when you don't know how it looks like!

I think this is how far China's nuke force would go, it has the legacy of Deng.

[marshall]

The U.S. will make China pay a price for significantly destabilizing the military balance between the U.S. and China.  Japan hates China a lot more than the U.S.  Japan is located off China's coast.  There is almost no time for China to react to a short-range or intermediate-range Japanese nuclear ballistic missile.

On the other hand, the U.S. will have many chances to shoot down any Japanese nuke headed over the North Pole or Pacific Ocean towards the United States.  In other words, a nuclear Japan is far more dangerous to China than to the U.S.

That's why the U.S. keeps warning China to "play ball" and ensure that both countries aren't worse off.

Why Obama Can't End Nukes - Newsweek.com

During the Cold War, the USSR underwent a gigantic nuclear weapons expansion, at which time, no U.S. ally, who was not already a United Nations Security Council member, went ahead to create their own nuclear weapons, except for Israel for defense against other Middle-Eastern countries, not the USSR.  Suggesting that the U.S. is now somehow preventing Japan from going nuclear against this historical fact is preposterous.  China ALREADY has hundreds of IRBMs whose deterrent is OBVIOUSLY meant for the immediate neighborhood, given their range.  This has been the status quo for DECADES now.  My guess is, this is an American strategic effort related to the push for greater Chinese nuclear weapons transparency.

Here's a quote of what I said earlier.  This applied during the Cold War and it still applies today...

I'm sure the U.S. has restrained Japan from going nuclear, but not for the reasons suggested.  Japan is not controlled by the U.S. like a banana republic.  Given the right circumstances, Japan will go nuclear, how else to explain the 43 tonne plutonium stockpile it retains.  However, the U.S. does not want Japan, NOR ANY ally, to ever go nuclear because it's strategic calculations revolve around it's overwhelming power and ultimate leadership.  Any country that has advanced nuclear weapons disturbs this calculus and removes the Trump Card from America's hands.

[marshall]

DONG FENG MARV WARHEAD IS DESIGNED TO EVADE PATRIOT AND STANDARD DEFENSE MISSILES

By the way, MaRV means "a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MARV)."

http://www.informationdissemination.net/20...evelopment.html

"Saturday, March 28, 2009
PLAN ASBM development

I was contacted by Galrahn to read over a Chinese blog entry on PLAN's ASBM development (found here) and post my thoughts on it.  I think that before you look further, there are some other good reads on this topic. Sean O'Connor has posted one of the better summaries on this regarding to OTH radar and ASBM threat. I have also written an entry in the past regarding ASBM threat, but it's really not that well researched. That one was based on an article that stated China has solved the difficulties surrounding hitting a moving target with a ballistic missile.

I think that the blog entry I read was definitely the best researched work on PLAN's ASBM plans. It listed many research papers that were written in Chinese and published years ago. As a result of that, I cannot possibly confirm that some of the things I've read are actually accurate. The sources that I can confirm on the Internet do seem to conform to what he was stating. I think in order to continue, it would be beneficial to read some of the resources that he mentioned. The include:
Sinodefence's Space Page
Sinodefence's Missile Page
Xianglong UAV Page
Yilong UAV page
The first one is important, because you can look through the current and future development in China's space industry. It's important to look through the communication, IMINT and EO satellites that China will use in this system.
In the second link, the important missiles to look for are DF-21 and possibly DF-15. In the third link, it lists China's probably most recent venture into HALE UAV. It's about 2/3 the size of Global Hawk or maybe even smaller. We don't have any figure on its endurance, but one would guess it's much less than that of Global Hawk due to the smaller size and less efficient engine. Although at this point, I would think that PLAN would be fine with an Asian Hawk. And the final link is an entry with information on China's version of Predator MALE UAV. The stats listed on that page were actually from its ddescription in the Zhuhai airshow, so I can verify that they are accurate. The two UAVs are both developed by Chengdu AC (the developer of J-10), so my guess is that Xianglong's endurance is comparable to Yilong (around 20 hours).

Reading through those links + Sean's blog entry are important in appreciating the rest of the ASBM system. I will try to make this out in Q&A format:

1. What caused China to start develop this system?
There are two main causes that drove this project. The first one is USA's Pershing II project. I guess this showed PLA the accuracy that can be achieved through MaRV warhead and active radar guidance. The second one is the Taiwan incident in 1996 when PLA's powerlessness against USN carrier group was on full display.

2. When did the project start and where is it now?
China probably started researching on MaRV right after Pershing II was deployed in 1984. By 1991, China had finished research on MaRV. According to the blog, there was a famous research paper in 1994 about attacking fixed target using MaRV technology. In 1999's national pride parade, they showed a missile with all the basic technology needed for the missile part of the ASBM system. If we look at the current status of the satellite constellations and reconnaissance platforms, we could probably say that the system has achieved some operational capability. The entire system needed for ASBM probably will not get set up until all the space assets and UAVs are online next decade.

3. Which missile are they using and what kind of improvements are they putting in?
It looks like DF-21 is the missile that ASBM is based on. It uses a solid propellant, is road-mobile, widely deployed and also have recently been improved to DF-21C. It's range of around 2000 km would perfectly cover the areas where future conflict is likely to be fought. Its range also would cover most of the areas that China's OTH-B radar would cover. It is also large enough to carry a large warhead needed to inflict damage on carrier while also holding a more complex guidance/seeker. They have put a MaRV warhead on DF-21 for maneuverability. In order to improve the penetration capability, they have added a third stage to it to provide unpredictable movement (I think the blog described it as some kind of oscillation). They have apparently made modifications to the warhead in order to lower its radar signature. They have also added a new multi-mode seeker that apparently has an active, passive radar and infrared seeker (I'm not sure how that works). It didn't mention how the missile would counter ESM of the fleet except for improving the seeker and getting more updated info from the sources that provided it initial targeting data.

4. What are the sources that provide targeting data for this ASBM system?
The blog basically listed 5 sources and they are:

    * Reconnaissance Satellites - I think you can look at the Ziyuan and Yaogan series of satellites that have EO, CCD and SAR sensors as possibilities here. They could also be talking about the FY series, which is actually expected to be a constellation of Earth Observation satellites. I think it's important that in the 18th Committee on Earth Observation Satellites plenary and workshop in 2004, they announced they would launch over 100 Earth Observation satellites. I don't know enough about this to comment on which specific satellites I think will be used for scanning ships, but the blog did mention that China has used FY-2 series of satellites to track movement of targets. Another possibility is launching many short duration, micro-Earth Observation satellites in times of conflict. It mentioned that China can launch a 100 kg satellite on 12 hours notice. In peace mission 05. They launched an experimental satellite on August 2nd for detection/science experiment work. This operated for 27 days and returned to earth on August 29th after the conclusion of the exercise.
    * Elint satellites - It mentioned something like USN's White Cloud Spaceborne ELINT System. The problem I have with this is that I can't find any mention of China having similar system anywhere.
    * OTH Radar - Has a range of 800 to 3000 km. The accuracy in targetting is around 20 to 30 km. This can be improved to 2 to 3 km with improved algorithm. OTH radar can work with the recon satellites to provide more accurate targeting info.
    * UAV - As mentioned above, China does have a robust UAV program going right now including the aforementioned XiangLong program. As we've seen in the Zhuhai airshow, they have numerous HALE and MALE UAV projects going. The major problem currently with Chinese UAV programs is that they simply don't have many small turbojet/turbofan engine series. As a result of having to work with what they have, the major design institute in AVIC-1 can't come up with the most optimal UAVs. I think that this will change in the next 10 years, so this part of the targeting system is behind recon satellites and OTH radar.
    * Radio post - This is problem the most confusing one for me. The blog talked about working with elint satellites (which I don't think they have) to get the location of the carrier group through communications between ships and satellites/aerial assets.


5. How does the launching/attacking process work?
I think that in times of war, they would launch many micro-EO satellites that have short duration to increase reconnaissance in the area approaching Taiwan. Similar to US, they would have HALE UAVs to do advanced scouting in front of the war zone. The OTH radar will give the base initial idea of incoming fleet. This information would be combined with data of the recon satellites to provide a more precise and more accurate targeting data. The missile would be launched to the estimated position based on initial position + velocity, but this would obviously be off. Although, I think the movement of the carrier group will not be overwhelming. If the target is 2000 km away and the missile is traveling at mach 10 (343 * 3.6 * 10 = 10,000+ km/h) , it would get there in less than 12 minutes. During that time, if the fleet moves at 30 knots, it would move at most 6 knots or around 11 km from the original location. Still, if we add this to the initial precision problems of OTH radar + EO satellite, this could still cause the fleet to be outside the scanning area of the ASBM. In the cruising process, the missile would have to continuously communicate with the base through those new Data relay satellites (like TianLian-1 that they launched recently) to get more improve the precision. The ASBM will also likely veer off the path at this time, so it would need communication with Beidou-2 constellation in order to keep it on track. When it gets close to the target, the blog talked about 3 phases in its attack: high altitude guidance, high altitude gliding and low altitude guidance. I'm really not sure how accurate is the blog's description of the process. Its general theme is slowing down the speed of the missile as it gets closer to the target to maybe give the seeker more time to lock on to target and make unpredictable movements to penetrate defense.

6. What is the operational status of this system?
From all the past sources I've read, it seems like PLAN already considers this system to have achieved IOC. Normally, I don't read about a certain capability developed in a Chinese military magazine until after it is attained. From reading through different sources, it looks like IOC was probably in 2007 or 2008. As mentioned before, more elements in the system like UAV and satellites are getting added as time goes on, so I look at this as a continuously evolutionary process.

7. How beneficial is this system?
That I really would have no idea. I wouldn't even know how much damage would 1 missile cause on a carrier. I would think that if this system can even temporarily put one carrier out of commission and/or keep carrier groups further out from the mainland, it would've achieved its purpose.

8. Are there other launch platforms to this system?
I always thought that an-air launched version of ASBM from JH-7A is possible. There are certainly a large variety of short range ballistic missiles that JH-7A would be able to carry and provide updates for. I have not thought about launching ASBM from a SSBN, since that could easily be mistaken for a nuclear missile.

That's about it. I think a lot of resources on this are available to form an opinion.

Posted by Feng at 7:02 PM"

After reading this over, I will concede, an ASBM has a reasonable chance of becoming operationally effective.  My previous opinion was not swayed because ALL of the other analyses I had read did not include realistic technical references and were very often tinged with an element reminiscent of a fear campaign.  Those sorts of strategic analyses in my opinion are nothing more than ideologically/politically motivated rationalizations.  However, this post from this "Feng" character makes a lot of sense.  How the heck did China advance so fast???

So, assuming an ASBM that has say a 20-50% hit probability is deployed by the hundreds within the next 10 years.  Then, I will agree, this is not only a game changing weapon.  It will be a turning point in history because if a supercarrier can be taken out from 2000kms out, then that means the CEP on a stationary target would be in the neighborhood of ~10m.  In other words, this would mean any airforce base, and even naval bases, could be taken out of action from thousands of kilometres, with similar ballistic missiles.  It's not just game changing, it wouldn't just be the end of the aircraft carrier age, it might even be the beginnings of the end of foreign NON-ARMY military bases.  Either a radical defense platform will need to be developed to counter this, or it means the U.S. better get used to sharing Asia with China.

[Martian]

After reading this over, I will concede, an ASBM has a reasonable chance of becoming operationally effective.  My previous opinion was not swayed because ALL of the other analyses I had read did not include realistic technical references and were very often tinged with an element reminiscent of a fear campaign.  Those sorts of strategic analyses in my opinion are nothing more than ideologically/politically motivated rationalizations.  However, this post from this "Feng" character makes a lot of sense.  How the heck did China advance so fast???

So, assuming an ASBM that has say a 20-50% hit probability is deployed by the hundreds within the next 10 years.  Then, I will agree, this is not only a game changing weapon.  It will be a turning point in history because if a supercarrier can be taken out from 2000kms out, then that means the CEP on a stationary target would be in the neighborhood of ~10m.  In other words, this would mean any airforce base, and even naval bases, could be taken out of action from thousands of kilometres, with similar ballistic missiles.  It's not just game changing, it wouldn't just be the end of the aircraft carrier age, it might even be the beginnings of the end of foreign NON-ARMY military bases.  Either a radical defense platform will need to be developed to counter this, or it means the U.S. better get used to sharing Asia with China.

Feng is the operator of the well-respected website "China Air and Naval Power."  On the front page of SinoDefence.com, Feng's website is the third "Recommended Site" on the left of the page.  Feng has been chronicling China's air and naval power for four years.  His website can be found at http://china-pla.blogspot.com/

Feng makes a reference to: "Sean O'Connor has posted one of the better summaries on this regarding to OTH radar and ASBM threat."  Sean O'Connor is the operator of the highly-regarded website "IMINT & Analysis" with 432,535 visitors.  His website can be found at http://geimint.blogspot.com/

[Martian]

Here are pictures of part of "China's Nuclear Strike Force."


China's most-powerful Jin-class SSBN nuclear deterrent.

China?s Nuclear Option | The Diplomat

"China’s Nuclear Option
April 26, 2010

By Richard Weitz

Chinese policymakers say the country’s rapidly modernizing nuclear force is nothing to fear. They could do more to prove it."


China's road-mobile ICBMs.

[Martian]

Are the JL-2 Mod 2 & 3 operationally verified systems?  That JL-2 mod 2 has an awfully long range for a 2-stage ICBM that can hold up to 10 warheads.  These sound like far superior delivery systems, even when compared against similarly sized ICBMs in the American and Russian inventories.  I'll be doing some research into this.  These technology advances by China cannot possibly be moving as fast as this, given all the technology sanctions China has been under for decades now.  I'll admit, I have some bias against China here.  Will be doing some research into this, these stories seem to be getting more numerous and conflict with others I've been reading.

rhino123's post:

The basic variant of the JL-2 missile had a range of around 8000km to 8600km (max).

But there are two more variants, JL-2 "Jia" and JL-2 "Yi".

JL-2 "Jia"

NATO code: CSS-N-4ModI
Structure: 2 stages
Fuel: 1st: solid-fueled; 2nd: liquid-fueled
Operational range: 12,000 km
Mass: 23+ t
Warhead: Single or MIRV; 6~8 Nuclear 250 kt /thermo
Guidance system: Inertial + stellar update
Accuracy: 80+ CEP (with satellite guidance)
Platform: SSBN
Designer: The Second Research Institute of the Ministry of Aerospace Industry
Manufacturer: CASTC

JL-2 "Yi"

NATO code: CSS-N-4ModII
Structure: 2 stages
Fuel: 1st: solid-fueled; 2nd: liquid-fueled
Operational range: 14,000 km
Mass: 23+ t
Warhead: Single or MIRV; ~10 (max) Nuclear 250 kt /thermo
Guidance system: Inertial + stellar update
Accuracy: 40+ CEP (with satellite guidance)
Platform: SSBN
Designer: The Second Research Institute
Manufacturer: CASTC

One of them have 12000km range and the other had 14000km range.

Reference:

1) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JL-2
2) http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2005-06-22/0953299582.html
3) http://product.news.sohu.com/ml/article.php?id=012004002011

[Martian]

rhino123's post:

The basic variant of the JL-2 missile had a range of around 8000km to 8600km (max).

But there are two more variants, JL-2 "Jia" and JL-2 "Yi".

JL-2 "Jia"

NATO code: CSS-N-4ModI
Structure: 2 stages
Fuel: 1st: solid-fueled; 2nd: liquid-fueled
Operational range: 12,000 km
Mass: 23+ t
Warhead: Single or MIRV; 6~8 Nuclear 250 kt /thermo
Guidance system: Inertial + stellar update
Accuracy: 80+ CEP (with satellite guidance)
Platform: SSBN
Designer: The Second Research Institute of the Ministry of Aerospace Industry
Manufacturer: CASTC

JL-2 "Yi"

NATO code: CSS-N-4ModII
Structure: 2 stages
Fuel: 1st: solid-fueled; 2nd: liquid-fueled
Operational range: 14,000 km
Mass: 23+ t
Warhead: Single or MIRV; ~10 (max) Nuclear 250 kt /thermo
Guidance system: Inertial + stellar update
Accuracy: 40+ CEP (with satellite guidance)
Platform: SSBN
Designer: The Second Research Institute
Manufacturer: CASTC

One of them have 12000km range and the other had 14000km range.

Reference:

1) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JL-2
2) http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2005-06-22/0953299582.html
3) http://product.news.sohu.com/ml/article.php?id=012004002011

JL-2 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"Propellant 2-stage
solid-fueled 1st stage
liquid-fueled 2nd stage

Operational range
8600 km (JL-2)[1][2]
12000 km (JMA)[1][2]
14000 km (JMB)[1][2]
...
History

The whole JL-2 project lasts roughly about one decade, till present. The original designation of the project was so-called "New DongFeng Goes Undersea" ("新东风下海"), by the COSTIND and CMC. The project was co-held by the First and Second Research Institutes of the Ministry of Aerospace Industry (defunct, see CNSA)

At 10:20 AM, 22nd Dec, 2002, the first ship of a new type of SSBN was formally launched by China in Huludao, which now is known as Type 094 (Jin-Class). But, its SLBM was, just as convention, lagging behind. JL-2 has three subtypes, the initial experimental one, the "Jia" (甲, Chinese literally means "The First", or "I"), and the "Yi" (乙, Chinese literally means "The Second", or "II"). The codes for "Jia" and "Yi" are JMA and JMB, respectively. The tests happened of JMA/B are listed like below:

    * JMA: Land-based tests, 3 times; launched from a base in Shanxi, most likely the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center or nearby; 2001; successful.
    * JMB: Sea-based, 8 times; launched near Dalian, by the modified Golf-class diesel-powered ballistic missile submarine; 2002; successful.
...
JL-2 "Yi"

[1][2]

    * NATO code: CSS-N-4ModII
    * Structure: 2 stages
    * Fuel: 1st: solid-fueled; 2nd: liquid-fueled
    * Operational range: 14,000 km
    * Mass: 23+ t
    * Warhead: Single or MIRV; ~10 (max) Nuclear 250 kt /thermo
    * Guidance system: Inertial + stellar update
    * Accuracy: 40+ CEP (with satellite guidance)
    * Platform: SSBN
    * Designer: The Second Research Institute
    * Manufacturer: CASTC"

[Martian]

How many nuclear warheads does China possess?

Well, according to the Chinese government's website:
"Among the nuclear-weapon states, China has performed the least number of nuclear tests and possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal. It has never taken part in any nuclear arms race or deployed any nuclear weapons outside its territory. "

This would put China's nuclear arsenal below 200.

You have to be careful.  You could be jumping to a false conclusion.  You have to interpret the Chinese government's statement from a lawyer's view and recognize the ambiguity in their claim.

http://www.nukestrat.com/china/Book-35-125.pdf

"Estimating the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal has always relied almost exclusively on U.S. intelligence estimates, while Chinese government information about the size or composition of its nuclear forces has been almost non-existent.  In the Chinese view, secrecy increases the potential adversaries’ uncertainty about Chinese capabilities and therefore increases the deterrent effect, although it may also – as in the case of the United States – cause that adversary to assume the worst. Perhaps in recognition of this dilemma, the Chinese Foreign Ministry in April 2004 published a fact sheet that included the statement: “Among the nuclear-weapon states, China ... possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal.”93  Since Britain has declared that it has less than 200 operationally available warheads, and the United States, Russia and France have more, the Chinese statement could be interpreted to mean that China’s nuclear arsenal is smaller than Britain’s.94

Not surprisingly, the devil is in the details. When the Chinese statement uses the word “arsenal,” does that mean the entire stockpile or just the portion of it that is operationally deployed? To add to the confusion, Britain has not disclosed the size of its stockpile but only declared that “less than 200 warheads” are “operationally available.” This strongly suggests that there may be additional British warheads in storage."  (see pp. 38-39)

[marshall]

But some Western Military think-tanks refuse to believe that China has anything comparable to USA.

And they believe Type 094 is even noisier than the 1970s Soviet SSBN and can't even hit Seattle.

http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2544/chinas-noisy-new-boomer

This is the typical arrogance of some western supremacists, underestimating/belittling your arch-enemy would be proved to be your ultimate mistake.

Have you ever thought that this may sometimes be done on purpose to goad people with your attitude into getting angry enough to give away information you should not be giving away because you feel you have something to prove?  If you ask me, this is exactly where China should want their antagonists.  China like any country, gains an advantage when they retain strategic ambiguity, whether as military secrets or commercial secrets.

Regardless, in the case of China, there are very good reasons to be skeptical of China's weapons platforms because of how far behind they were technologically, up until recently.  I often find it hard to believe some of the stories coming out about China because they were 15-30 years behind concerning civilian technology and between 25-40 years behind militarily, only 15 years ago.  So, when I hear about these superior game breaking weapons systems coming out now when they were 1-3 generations behind in almost everything in the 1990s, its just unbelievable.  Consider this in the context of the Western military arms & technology embargo China has endured since 1990, the Wassenaar Arrangement on dual-use technology and its COCOM technology predecessor treaty and you will begin to see that China had/has HUMONGOUS roadblocks that should have prevented it from ever catching up to the most advanced countries.

http://crossick.blogactiv.eu/2010/02/04/re...a-arms-embargo/
http://www.theeuros.eu/The-European-Arms-E...o-on-China,3545
http://www.wassenaar.org/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wassenaar_Arrangement

Something not understood by most casual observers is the cross-pollination of advanced technologies that is freely exchanged among the OECD countries but restricted from China.  This is why relatively small developed countries can have R&D who appear to punch well above their weight considering they have this worldwide OECD technical/research/educational framework in place.  This exchange which was largely prevented from being disseminated in China prior to year 2000, could not be completely stopped once the Internet became ubiquitous worldwide from the late 1990s onward.  So, although technical and multilateral discriminatory military-commercial agreements were effective means to stifle other countries advancement, this was not so for China given its gigantic size and pre-existing comprehensive industrial development.  China also has the benefit of technical-commercial relationships with Taiwan businesses whose already relatively advanced technology has allowed China to circumvent some of these restrictions.  The question is how could China get this far this fast.

There has been a noticeable acceleration of China's technological advancement in the last 5 years.  Prior to this, it was catching up fast, but now it's as if things are on afterburner.  I believe China reached critical mass in multiple technologies right after year 2000 and became technologically self-sustaining from that point, albeit still behind technologically.  The result has been a rapid technology acceleration and why there is so much talk about China's "stealing" this or that technology because no other country has ever done things this quickly without blue prints or wholesale purchase of the companies required to do whatever it is they needed done.  Another message thread was talking about what was left for China to catch up in.  There are alot of things they are still far behind in, but it seems to be catching up quickly in everything.  This is why China is such a huge threat.  It seems to do everything dirt cheap and its quality is also catching up fast.  For Americans, with their misguided policy of laissez-faire trade policy, has been a disaster for them and it'll just get worse in the near future given their impending financial implosion.

[marshall]

Feng is the operator of the well-respected website "China Air and Naval Power."  On the front page of SinoDefence.com, Feng's website is the third "Recommended Site" on the left of the page.  Feng has been chronicling China's air and naval power for four years.  His website can be found at http://china-pla.blogspot.com/

Feng makes a reference to: "Sean O'Connor has posted one of the better summaries on this regarding to OTH radar and ASBM threat."  Sean O'Connor is the operator of the highly-regarded website "IMINT & Analysis" with 432,535 visitors.  His website can be found at http://geimint.blogspot.com/

Nice sites.  I've visited the first website before, I didn't know "Feng" was the owner of that.  He seems to be very logical and makes sense in pretty much every single one of his assessments.  In my opinion, this guy should be hired to do strategic analysis for a think tank.  Currently, there are far too many biased think tanks out there pursuing their political agendas.  You can easily spot the biased think tanks by finding out if they get their funding from the government in one way or another.  Sad considering it takes public knowledge from guys on the Internet to do proper strategic analysis.  Some of these think tanks get a big chunk of their insider knowledge from blogs like this one and quote our messages as insider information before they present some erroneous conclusions.  

[marshall]

rhino123's post:

The basic variant of the JL-2 missile had a range of around 8000km to 8600km (max).

But there are two more variants, JL-2 "Jia" and JL-2 "Yi".

JL-2 "Jia"

NATO code: CSS-N-4ModI
Structure: 2 stages
Fuel: 1st: solid-fueled; 2nd: liquid-fueled
Operational range: 12,000 km
Mass: 23+ t
Warhead: Single or MIRV; 6~8 Nuclear 250 kt /thermo
Guidance system: Inertial + stellar update
Accuracy: 80+ CEP (with satellite guidance)
Platform: SSBN
Designer: The Second Research Institute of the Ministry of Aerospace Industry
Manufacturer: CASTC

JL-2 "Yi"

NATO code: CSS-N-4ModII
Structure: 2 stages
Fuel: 1st: solid-fueled; 2nd: liquid-fueled
Operational range: 14,000 km
Mass: 23+ t
Warhead: Single or MIRV; ~10 (max) Nuclear 250 kt /thermo
Guidance system: Inertial + stellar update
Accuracy: 40+ CEP (with satellite guidance)
Platform: SSBN
Designer: The Second Research Institute
Manufacturer: CASTC

One of them have 12000km range and the other had 14000km range.

Reference:

1) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JL-2
2) http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2005-06-22/0953299582.html
3) http://product.news.sohu.com/ml/article.php?id=012004002011

These links are speculating the JL-2 missiles specifications.  I'll assume all but the JL-2 mod 2 is probable for now.  The thing that sticks out is the weight of the JL-2 at only 23+ tonnes.  The JL-2 can supposedly carry up to 10 MIRV warheads which is comparable to the Trident II missiles whose variants are ~33 tonnes and ~58 tonnes each.  The heavier ~58 tonne Trident II UGM-133 variant can carry a max of 12 MIRV warheads with ~12000km range.  Given the supposed backward state of Chinese missile tech up until the 1990s, is it probable that China could make such a vast technological leap in the last 15 years?  The Trident II UGM-133 was developed by 1987.  The JL-2 mod 2 will supposedly be operational within the next 5 years.  In 1987, China was considered to have missile tech that was technologically behind the U.S. by 25-30 years.  Today, U.S. leading-edge rocket research involves the Ares V rockets to launch ~125 tonnes into LEO vs China's leading-edge rocket research in their Long March V rocket to launch ~25 tonnes into LEO.

http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/aresv.htm
http://www.satnews.com/cgi-bin/story.cgi?number=1904727826

American rocket technology is still far ahead of China's leading edge.  Concerning the Trident IIs development in the 1980s and the JL-2s development today, consider that the JL-2 is a vastly more advanced rocket from the specs considering its throw weight is about the same as the most advanced Trident II UGM-133 while being less than half its weight with a greater range.  This seems like a dubious claim if you ask me especially given that the Tridents use alot of composite materials.

[zhou]

These links are speculating the JL-2 missiles specifications.  I'll assume all but the JL-2 mod 2 is probable for now.  The thing that sticks out is the weight of the JL-2 at only 23+ tonnes.  The JL-2 can supposedly carry up to 10 MIRV warheads which is comparable to the Trident II missiles whose variants are ~33 tonnes and ~58 tonnes each.  The heavier ~58 tonne Trident II UGM-133 variant can carry a max of 12 MIRV warheads with ~12000km range.  Given the supposed backward state of Chinese missile tech up until the 1990s, is it probable that China could make such a vast technological leap in the last 15 years?  The Trident II UGM-133 was developed by 1987.  The JL-2 mod 2 will supposedly be operational within the next 5 years.  In 1987, China was considered to have missile tech that was technologically behind the U.S. by 25-30 years.  Today, U.S. leading-edge rocket research involves the Ares V rockets to launch ~125 tonnes into LEO vs China's leading-edge rocket research in their Long March V rocket to launch ~25 tonnes into LEO.

The United States built most  its military power during the cold war while at that time the PRC was in decades of political movement.It's quit unfair to compare a matured power with a rising power though it's a solide fact that the PRC is still decades behind the US in  space techs.And if you compare China with other powers,it doesn't look that bad, maybe somehow looks nice.
And you also need to consider that the US is a global power which requires that it should have the nuclear deterrence against all the other nuclear powers, while China doesn't need this ability.China may only need to target 2 or not more than 3 countries.300 nuclear warheads are sufficent to achieve the goal.In the long run China might need to increase its nuclear arsenal and current speed is enough.
And the Long March V is for future space station and  moon mission, since there's no such an urgent need, they did test its engine for a long time.I gurantee if China was in an arm race with other country, they will not allow such a slow speed.

[ChineseTiger1986]

These links are speculating the JL-2 missiles specifications.  I'll assume all but the JL-2 mod 2 is probable for now.  The thing that sticks out is the weight of the JL-2 at only 23+ tonnes.  The JL-2 can supposedly carry up to 10 MIRV warheads which is comparable to the Trident II missiles whose variants are ~33 tonnes and ~58 tonnes each.  The heavier ~58 tonne Trident II UGM-133 variant can carry a max of 12 MIRV warheads with ~12000km range.  Given the supposed backward state of Chinese missile tech up until the 1990s, is it probable that China could make such a vast technological leap in the last 15 years?  The Trident II UGM-133 was developed by 1987.  The JL-2 mod 2 will supposedly be operational within the next 5 years.  In 1987, China was considered to have missile tech that was technologically behind the U.S. by 25-30 years.  Today, U.S. leading-edge rocket research involves the Ares V rockets to launch ~125 tonnes into LEO vs China's leading-edge rocket research in their Long March V rocket to launch ~25 tonnes into LEO.

http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/aresv.htm
http://www.satnews.com/cgi-bin/story.cgi?number=1904727826

American rocket technology is still far ahead of China's leading edge.  Concerning the Trident IIs development in the 1980s and the JL-2s development today, consider that the JL-2 is a vastly more advanced rocket from the specs considering its throw weight is about the same as the most advanced Trident II UGM-133 while being less than half its weight with a greater range.  This seems like a dubious claim if you ask me especially given that the Tridents use alot of composite materials.

58 tonnes is the total weight of the rocket. Its full payload is 2800kg which can carry up to 8 warheads of the Mark 5 (475kt each). With full payload, Trident II missile can reach about 7500km. While reduced its payload, the range can reach 12,000km.


Range: >7,400 kilometers (>4,500 miles) with full payload
~11,000 kilometers (~6,800 miles) will reduced payload

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/uk/slbm/d-5.htm

[Martian]

Senior PLA commander spells out defensive nature of China's nuclear arsenal


China's Second Artillery Force

http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-08/...ent_4184084.htm

"Senior PLA commander spells out defensive nature of China's nuclear arsenal
(Source: Xinhua)         2010-August-14 07:26

BEIJING, Aug.13 (Xinhua) -- China's nuclear weapons are for self-defense purposes, a top commander in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China strategic missile corps said.

"If no power presses for nuclear war with China, the Second Artillery Force will always keep silent," General Jing Zhiyuan, commander of the PLA Second Artillery Force that controls China's nuclear weapons stockpile, said in an article published in the latest issue of China Armed Forces.

China's development of a nuclear arms capacity is limited to that of the lowest level necessary to safeguard national security, Jing said in the article in the quarterly magazine affiliated to the Xinhua News Agency.

"We will firmly pursue a defensive nuclear strategy and resolutely implement the 'no first use' policy," he said.

China has long insisted its military nuclear drive is purely defensive in nature.

At the Nuclear Security Summit in April this year, Chinese President Hu Jintao put forward a five-point proposal calling on all nuclear-armed countries to keep their nuclear weapons facilities safe.

Jing said China's nuclear military forces will carry out Hu's five proposals and actively support international efforts to enhance nuclear security.

"We, the Second Artillery Force, will always stick to the principle of limited development of nuclear weapons and we will not engage in a nuclear arms race," Jing wrote.

China began building its own nuclear arsenal after the country exploded its first atomic bomb in the deserts of northwestern China in 1964.

In 1971, the country became the fifth country in the world to launch a nuclear submarine.

China successfully tested a carrier rocket in 1980, shooting it from northwest China to the South Pacific to showcase its intercontinental strike capabilities.

It also conducted an underwater missile launch in 1982.

In 1996, China declared it would suspend nuclear testing to promote nuclear disarmament.

Editor: Ouyang Dongmei"

[buckingham]

Range: >7,400 kilometers (>4,500 miles) with full payload
~11,000 kilometers (~6,800 miles) will reduced payload

Quite reasonable

[Martian]

MIRVed Julang 2 being launched

For Sinophiles, the good news is that the JL-2 has been successfully tested and its blunt nose is consistent with a MIRVed missile.  The bad news is that there are no known reports in the public domain of the JL-2 tested to its maximum range.  For Sinophobes, invert the good news and bad news.

China Shows Seaborne Muscle | The Right Guy on The Left Coast at Hypocrisy.com

"China Shows Seaborne Muscle
May 11th, 2009 • Richard Cochrane



China’s state-run television has broadcast the first images of the new JL-2 long-range submarine-launched ballistic missile to be deployed aboard the new Type 094 ballistic missile submarine.

The JL-2 photos were broadcast on CCTV in connection with the PLA Navy’s anniversary, which included a massive show of naval forces including new submarines near Hainan Island in the South China Sea.

According to photo analyses, the JL-2 appeared to be launched from a Type 094 submarine based on its cold launch from an underwater tube. The distance from the missile and what appears to be periscope and antennae suggest that it is not what had previously been used for JL-2 test launches, a PLAN Golf class conventional missile submarine obtained from the former Soviet Union.

“What is interesting about this missile shape is the very blunt nose structure,” said Richard Fisher, a China military analyst at the International Strategy and Assessment Center.

“This would be consistent with the carriage of multiple warheads. Previously, Asian military sources have commented that the JL-2 could carry three or four warheads. To extend its range, this missile likely uses an aerospike, as does the U.S. Trident SLBM,” he said. The aerospike engine maintains its efficiency across a wide range of altitudes through the use of an altitude compensating nozzle.

Fisher said that so far there have been no reports indicating the JL-2 has been successfully launched to its full range, which may be between 7,000 and 8,000 kilometers.

“However, it appears that the PLA may seek to divide its early enlarged ‘minimum’ deterrent of about 120 missiles between the Navy and the Second Artillery. This will serve to focus even greater Chinese and U.S. attentions on the new PLAN SSBN base on Hainan Island, which may host most of the estimated five 094 SSBNs,” he said."

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/j...1-102521-5027r/

"China advances missile program
By Bill Gertz
10:25 p.m., Tuesday, June 21, 2005

China has successfully flight-tested a submarine-launched missile that U.S. officials say marks a major advance in Beijing's long-range nuclear program.

"This is a significant milestone in their effort to develop strategic weapons," said a U.S. official familiar with reports of the test.

U.S. intelligence agencies monitored the flight test of a JL-2 missile about 10 days ago, officials said.

The missile was launched from a Chinese submarine near the port of Qingdao and was tracked to a desert impact point in western China several thousand miles away, the officials said.

The Air Force's National Air Intelligence Center reported that the JL-2 "will, for the first time, allow Chinese [missile submarines] to target portions of the United States from operating areas located near the Chinese coast."

The JL-2 is estimated to have a range of up to 6,000 miles, enough to hit targets in the United States.

A defense official said the missile test was a major step forward in China's strategic nuclear missile program and shows an improved capability to produce and launch submarine-launched missiles. "It was a successful test," this official said.

The JL-2 is a submarine version of the DF-31 land-based missile."

[Martian]

Julang 2 launch on China's state-run television CCTV-7

China's state-run television CCTV-7 had broadcast a series of photographs on the Julang 2 SLBM launch in May 2009.  Here is the complete set of sequential images.

[Martian]

What is the deterrent value of Jin-class SSBN with 12 Julang 2 SLBMs per boomer?

Let's make a conservative estimate. Let's assume 3 Chinese Jin-class nuclear submarines are carrying 12 Julang-2 SLBMs per sub. 3 x 12 = 36. If China destroys the top 36 cities of a major country, the casualties will be in the tens of millions. Long ago, China demonstrated mastery of the technology to precisely place multiple satellites into different orbits from one launch. Instead of satellites, the same technology can be used to place warheads into different trajectories.

I have read different estimates of China's MIRV capability. The range is from 3 to 8, with most estimates falling between 3 to 6. If the Julang-2 is MIRVed with 3 warheads, the casualty is 36 x 3 = 108 cities. If 6 is the correct estimate then 36 x 6 = 216 cities.

It is important to remember that China's technology continues to improve over time. The number of cities targeted by China's Jin-class submarines will continue to increase until it eventually hits a plateau of roughly 12 MIRVed warheads per SLBM (e.g. match Trident II SLBM technology).

Whether it's 36, 108, or 216 cities, China's Jin-class submarines with Julang-2 SLBMs serve as an important deterrent.

[macau boy]

Balance of terror. As long as we achieve that goal, these warheads will never be used. On the flip side, we can't do without it.

[gnak]

I have read different estimates of China's MIRV capability. The range is from 3 to 8, with most estimates falling between 3 to 6. If the Julang-2 is MIRVed with 3 warheads, the casualty is 36 x 3 = 108 cities. If 6 is the correct estimate then 36 x 6 = 216 cities.

It is important to remember that China's technology continues to improve over time. The number of cities targeted by China's Jin-class submarines will continue to increase until it eventually hits a plateau of roughly 12 MIRVed warheads per SLBM (e.g. match Trident II SLBM technology).

Whether it's 36, 108, or 216 cities, China's Jin-class submarines with Julang-2 SLBMs serve as an important deterrent.

depends how far apart each city is from another example with mirv warheads u cant hit los-angeles and new york with one missile, plus the yield factor comes into play... usually mirv warheads have smaller yields so u mirv the same city but at different locations

as this video simulation shows http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p_Glx1dSc2w

anyway u cant create eva lasting peace by scaring the sh1t out of ur opposition cus they will also build more weapons and the cycle goes on and on until one day both sides destroy each other or the victor destroys itself.

[Martian]

Beijing Defends Buildup of Its Nuclear Arsenal

China Needs Weapons to Deter Nuclear Attack, Military Paper Says - WSJ.com

"Beijing Defends Buildup of Its Nuclear Arsenal
APRIL 22, 2010, 9:42 P.M. ET
By GORDON FAIRCLOUGH

SHANGHAI—China needs weapons capable of retaliating against any nuclear attack on the country, according to a commentary published Thursday in the nation's main military newspaper that sought to explain the strategic thinking behind Beijing's push to modernize its atomic arsenal.


Nuclear-capable missiles are displayed at a massive parade to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 2009 in Beijing.  (Getty Images)

The commentary in the official Liberation Army Daily also reiterated China's longstanding stated policy that it "will never be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances."

Written by a retired general, the piece follows last week's international nuclear-security summit in Washington and comes amid questions in the U.S., Japan and elsewhere about the intent behind China's efforts to strengthen its nuclear forces.

In recent years, China has been expanding its arsenal of ballistic missiles and investing in weapons that are more mobile and sophisticated. The country has also developed a new generation of submarines capable of launching nuclear weapons.

Even so, China's atomic arsenal—with fewer than 100 long-range missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads, according to the Pentagon's 2009 estimate of Chinese military power—remains far smaller than those of the U.S. or Russia. Washington and Moscow recently agreed to limit their deployed nuclear warheads to 1,550 each. However, opponents of arms reductions by the U.S. have argued that such cuts could make it easier for China to catch up in terms of nuclear capability.

Officials in the U.S. and elsewhere have called on Beijing to better explain the motives behind the Chinese government's increased spending on both nuclear and conventional forces.

The commentary's author, Xu Guangyu, who now works for the state-run China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, said in an interview Thursday that he was responding to complaints from abroad that China's nuclear intentions are "not transparent." Gen. Xu said he wanted to dispel "misunderstandings" and challenge those who "promote a China-threat theory by exaggerating China's nuclear capabilities."

China has developed solid fuel-powered rockets that can be moved by truck, making them easier to launch and harder for foreign militaries to track than the liquid -fueled, silo-based missiles that previously had been the mainstay of China's nuclear force. The country also appears intent on deploying nuclear-armed submarines.

The point of such steps, Gen. Xu wrote, is "to really possess, and to convince the other side that it faces an intolerable second-strike nuclear capability, thereby deterring an enemy from using nuclear weapons against us." Other states, he said, "must grasp, without the least ambiguity, that we possess a deterrent." He also stressed that China "adheres to a defensive nuclear strategy."

In its annual report on the Chinese military last year, the U.S. Defense Department said China has developed a "more survivable and flexible strategic nuclear force" that "would be able to inflict significant damage on most large American cities." But the report concluded that: "There is no evidence that China's doctrine of 'no first use' has changed."

—Gao Sen in Beijing contributed to this article.

Write to Gordon Fairclough at gordon.fairclough@wsj.com"

[Martian]

China's system of securing its nuclear weapons


Lying at the north foot of Taibai Mountain (the peak of Qinling Mountain), Taibai Mountain National Forest Park, is located in Meixian County, Shaanxi Province. Covering an area of 7,287 acres, 94.3% of which is covered with forest, it contains 10 scenic districts and over 180 attractions. Since its height above the sea level varies from 0.39 miles to 2.18 miles, Taibai Mountain National Forest Park is the highest national forest park of China. It was officially established in 1991 and has been formally open to the public since July, 1992.


Taibai Mountain National Forest Park is a fantastic place for visitors to find relaxation and refreshment. With respect to its climate, it is better to travel here in July and August, but do not forget to bring a cotton coat and rain gear. Traveling by ropeway (with a length of 0.68 mile) gives visitors the chance to appreciate the marvelous spectacle of glacier relics and sea of clouds.

Reports shine light on nuclear weapons vigilance

"Reports shine light on nuclear weapons vigilance
By WALTER PINCUS
Tuesday, March 16, 2010

While public attention is focused on a new arms-control treaty between Russia and the United States,  the slow, dull work of keeping nuclear warheads and weapons-grade uranium and plutonium protected from terrorists goes on almost unnoticed.

But two new reports have shed light on the subject. A fascinating study on China's system of securing its nuclear weapons was published last week. Two days earlier, an update on the multiyear U.S. effort to secure Russian nuclear sites, and those of other countries, was presented to the House Appropriations subcommittee on energy and water, which has jurisdiction over funding for the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.

Mark A. Stokes's study of Beijing's nuclear weapons for the Project 2049 Institute, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization focused on Asia, describes where the Chinese are storing their warheads and how they are protecting them. Stokes, who served 20 years in the Air Force, also worked in the Defense Department's office of international security affairs, where he handled China, Taiwan and Mongolia.

Stokes writes that "under its declaratory no-first-use policy, the PRC's [People's Republic of China's] nuclear deterrent has relied upon quantitative and geographic ambiguity," while the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission "maintains strict control over China's operational nuclear warheads." In peacetime its warheads stock is managed "through a system that is separate and distinct" from the People's Liberation Army's Second Artillery missile bases. This includes warheads for use by the air force and the navy but separate from China's civilian-controlled fissile materials.

Stokes identifies an independent organization called 22 Base as the prime group "responsible for storing and managing most of the Second Artillery's warhead stockpile." The storage complex is in central China near Taibai Mountain, one of the highest peaks in the country. Tunnels have been dug deep into the mountain, and rail lines enable constant movement of nuclear weapons in and out of the 22 Base complex. "China's warhead and handling system is designed to survive a first strike and retain sufficient operational capability for retaliation," Stokes writes.

Stokes concludes that "22 Base's physical protection system appears to be founded upon more than 'guns, gates, and guards,' " which often mark the U.S. system. While a dedicated security battalion and a cavalry company patrol the 400-square-kilometer security zone, a technical support battalion works on safekeeping warhead components. The report points out, however, that China's warheads are "most vulnerable" during their constant transport between storage and launch sites -- the movement that Beijing counts on to make itself less vulnerable to a first strike."

[Martian]

Has China "crossed the multiple-warhead Rubicon"?


The old projections may have to be revised in the face of new information.  Well-known analyst Richard Fisher, Jr. states: "While a worst-case estimate, there is good reason to consider that China's warhead numbers could exceed 500 by 2020."


DF-31As camouflaged

FISHER: China and START - Washington Times

"FISHER: China and START
Missile buildup may surpass U.S., Russia as they denuclearize
By Richard D. Fisher Jr. - The Washington Times 5:56 p.m., Wednesday, September 15, 2010

Might China someday have more nuclear warheads than the United States? Than Russia? Inconceivable as it may sound, this could come to pass, because China may just be starting a period of double- or triple-digit annual growth in its warhead numbers as the Obama administration sets its sights on further U.S. warhead reductions, with little hope that China will join a regime of negotiated nuclear stability. But even if it did, would nuclear "parity" with China be in America's interest?

The new START Treaty signed in May commits the United States and Russia to a "parity" that reduces deployed nuclear warheads from 2,200 to 1,550 and reduces to 700 the number of deployed nuclear delivery vehicles. However, President Obama has made clear his intention to seek further reductions; late 2009 leaks to the press suggested further goals of 1,000 warheads or even fewer.

Since it started deploying intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the 1980s, China has refused to join in nuclear weapons negotiations. This did not matter as long as China deployed a small number, about 20 liquid-fueled 13,000-kilometer-range DF-5s with single warheads, until early this decade. Furthermore, China had lulled many analysts by regularly suggesting that it adheres to a doctrine of "minimum deterrence" that abjures U.S.- or Russian-level warhead numbers. But China has also rejected U.S. and Soviet levels of nuclear "transparency" as part of its deterrence calculus, with the result that nobody knows its nuclear force goals.

China began modernizing its nuclear missile forces by mid-decade, replacing early DF-5s with a similar number of improved DF-5A missiles based in stationary silos and deploying the new 7,000-to-8,000-kilometer-range, solid-fueled and mobile DF-31 and the larger 11,200-plus-kilometer-range DF-31A. In its latest report to the Congress on China's military released on Aug. 16, the Pentagon says there are less than 10 DF-31 and "10-15" DF-31A ICBMs, up to five more than reported in the previous year's report, covering 2008. However, in the 2010 issue of "Military Balance," Britain's International Institute of Strategic Studies notes there is one brigade of 12 DF-31s and two brigades or 24 DF-31A ICBMs, indicating a possible increase of one new brigade from 2008 to 2009.

In addition, China may be close to fielding two more long-range nuclear missiles. First is the new 7,200-plus-kilometer-range JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Though reported to be experiencing developmental challenges, when completed, 12 each will go on the new Type 094 nuclear ballistic missile submarine, which the Pentagon estimates will number at least five, for a potential total of 60 missiles. Then there is a new yet-unidentified larger ground-mobile ICBM which has been revealed in Chinese Internet-source images since 2007, but which the Pentagon did not publicly acknowledge until its latest China report. The distinguishing feature of the "DF-XX" is its use of a large 16-wheel Russian-style transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), likely derived from Russian-Belarus technology imported in the late 1990s.

But here is where the real danger begins: The Pentagon also notes this new ICBM is "possibly capable of carrying multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV)." Starting in 2002, the Pentagon's China report noted the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) interest in developing multiple warheads, with more explicit language being used in the 2009 and 2010 reports. Might some PLA ICBMs already have multiple warheads? This analyst has been told by Asian military sources that the DF-31A already carries three warheads and that one deployed DF-5B carries five or six warheads. These sources speculate the new "DF-XX" may carry a similar number of warheads.

While it is not possible to confirm these disclosures from open sources, they point to an alarming possibility: China has crossed the multiple-warhead Rubicon and, with the possibility that it can build one brigade of DF-31A and DF-XX ICBMs a year, could be capable of annual double- or triple-digit increases in its deployed nuclear warheads. Chinese sources also suggest interest in developing longer-range versions of the JL-2, which could also be MIRV-capable. While a worst-case estimate, there is good reason to consider that China's warhead numbers could exceed 500 by 2020.

In addition, China may also be on its way to fielding a national missile-defense system by the 2020s. Its recent, successful Jan. 11 missile warhead interception test marks the culmination of China's second anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program; the first was ordered started by Mao Zedong in 1963 and was pursued until 1980. This stands in contrast with years of howling complaints by Chinese diplomats against American missile-defense programs and their fervent campaigning to ban outer-space weapons. Was this merely deception designed to limit American defensive programs while China gathered the capacity to pursue its own ABM and space-warfare programs?

These potential trends would logically cause one to ask: Why not talk to the Chinese about their nuclear strategic plans? Indeed, the administration's April Nuclear Posture Review calls for "strategic assurance dialogues" with China. However, not only has China traditionally rejected any "negotiations" regarding its nuclear forces, it won't even send its main nuclear missile forces commander on a courtesy visit to the United States. Normal military-to-military dialogue is regularly held hostage to Washington ending arms sales to democratic Taiwan.

But there is a deeper basic conflict: China wants to displace U.S. strategic leadership in Asia and is building military forces capable of defending its global interests, even if that means challenging the United States well beyond Asia. So until China achieves its desired level of global power, which may not include concepts of "parity," China may have no interest in "negotiations" that limit or even inform others about its nuclear weapons plans.

But even if the United States and China could agree on nuclear parity, that may come at the cost of America's Asian alliances. A larger and defended Chinese nuclear arsenal could greatly undermine the U.S. ability to extend its nuclear deterrent, accelerating the process of decoupling the United States from key allies like Japan, South Korea and Australia. America's ability to deter China will decline further when the administration implements its Nuclear Posture Review decision to retire U.S. nuclear-armed TLAM-N cruise missiles carried by secure U.S. submarines, replacing them with tactical nuclear bombs carried by more vulnerable U.S. jet fighters. And then one must consider Russia and its increasing political-military cooperation with China. Might Russia someday "tilt" its nuclear forces with China's to dissuade the United States from defending a future vital interest?

Countries like Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and India are today facing increased Chinese military pressures. They and the United States are also increasingly pressed to fund conventional military forces needed to deter China. It is indeed legitimate to ask if the current START Treaty gives the United States the ability to deter both Russia and a China just starting its strategic nuclear buildup. Furthermore, might START and intended follow-on agreements bring Asia closer to an era of nuclear proliferation and unforeseen instability?

Richard D. Fisher Jr. is a senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center and author of "China's Military Modernization, Building for Regional and Global Reach" (Praeger, 2008)."

[Martian]

Why did China wait 30 years to deploy MIRVs?

Nuclear Warhead Modernization

"In September 1981, China successfully delivered three satellites with one launch vehicle: two satellites were delivered in the nose cone and one was delivered during stage separation. This event may have been China's first foray into the area of MRV/MIRV development.
...
A September 1999 National Intelligence Council document called "Foreign Missile Developments and Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015" concluded that China has had the technical capability for MRVs for over two decades but apparently chose not to develop and deploy them. The report noted, however, that by leveraging current technologies China could develop a basic MRV or MIRV capability for its current missile force "in a few years." Specifically, the report said:

    

"China has had the technical capability to develop multiple RV payloads for twenty years. If China needed a multiple RV capability in the near term, Beijing could use a DF-31 type RV to develop and deploy a simple MRV or MIRV for the DF-5 in a few years. MIRVing a future mobile missile would be years away." [Foreign Missile Developments and Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015, The National Intelligence Council, Washington, DC, September 1999, p. 11.]"

China has possessed dual-use multiple-satellite release/MIRV technology for 30 years.  Why did China wait 30 years to deploy MIRVs?  The most likely explanation is that China is serious about their "no first-use" policy.  In delaying the deployment of MIRVs for 30 years, China has shown that its nuclear arsenal is strictly defensive in nature.

In reaction to military developments in the United States, China has started to deploy MIRVs.  The first concern is stealth attack aircraft.  China has a robust overlapping and interconnected air defense system, but the stealth attack jets may penetrate the current defenses.  This places silo-based Chinese ICBMs and other retaliatory nuclear weapons at risk.  The second problem is the relentless development and improvement of the American missile defense shield.  China is no longer confident that it can inflict a sufficiently-painful retaliatory strike on the United States.

To address the problems of American stealth attack jets and missile defense system, China has built more mobile ICBM launchers (e.g. they are harder to find) and deployed MIRVs to overwhelm American missile defense.  China's goal is to preserve its capability to inflict sufficient damage in a retaliatory strike to deter an American nuclear first-strike.

Here is an exciting video from Northrop Grumman on the ICBM Flight of a Minuteman III:
Click here for Video of ICBM Flight Minuteman III

If you have never seen a real video of incoming MIRVs, then you must watch this:
Click here for Video of incoming MIRVs

[Martian]

1967: THE FIRST CHINESE HYDROGEN BOMB exploded with 3.3 megatons of destructive power

No thread on China's nuclear weapons would be complete without the history-setting first thermonuclear explosion.

"On June 17 1967, China revealed its true military power.

At 00:19, a Chinese H-6 bomber dropped the first Chinese hydrogen bomb. It exploded with a force of 3.3 megatons. It marked the date when China entered the thermonuclear era."

YouTube - THE FIRST CHINESE HYDROGEN BOMB

[Martian]

Air & Space Smithsonian Interview: Yang Guoxiang | Military Aviation | Air & Space Magazine

"A & S Interview: Yang Guoxiang
One of China's top test pilots recalls the H-Bomb that almost backfired.
By Bob Bergin
Air & Space Magazine, January 01, 2010


(Courtesy Yang Guoxiang)

When your assignment is to drop a live nuclear bomb, you’d better not return to base with it. But that’s just what happened in 1971 to Yang Guoxiang, a pilot with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, who told his harrowing tale to Bob Bergin, a former U.S. Foreign Service officer who writes about the aviation history of Southeast Asia and China. Bergin interviewed Yang in Kunming, China, in early 2009, with the assistance of interpreter Zhao Gang, an instructor at Yunnan University.

Air & Space: You hail from the remote mountains of Yunnan Province. How did you come to be a pilot?

Yang: China was at war with the invading Japanese as I was growing up and trying to get an education. In middle school I came in contact with the underground Communist Party and joined a communist youth group. In November 1948, I participated in an armed uprising against the Kuomintang (KMT) government and had to flee into the mountains, where I became a guerrilla. In 1949 I formally joined the PLA.

In 1949 the People’s Republic of China was founded. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was established the same year. We had few pilots, so the PLAAF set up aviation schools to train them. The start of the Korean War in 1950 accelerated the process. I was serving in Yunnan and was one of 1,000 who signed up to join the air force. Six candidates were chosen, and I was the only one remaining after we six were sent to Kunming for health checks.

I was sent to Beijing in February 1950, and from there to the aviation school at Mudanjiang. Most of our instructors were former Japanese POWs who had volunteered to help the PLAAF after the war, and former KMT who had joined us. Our aircraft were Japanese and American types that remained from the war. Our training lasted just three months before we were sent to operational units. I had 70 flight hours, and was sent to fly ground attack aircraft, the Russian Ilyushin IL-10, a version of the famous IL-2 “Sturmovik” of World War II, the “Flying Tank.” I was assigned first to the 22nd Division, and later to the 11th Division, which participated in the Korean war.

We were sent to northeast China and were ready to deploy across the border into Korea when American F-84s destroyed the airport we were to use, and so we did not go. We became witnesses to the Korean War. From our base in China, we could see F-86s in the sky, and knew most of the American pilots had thousands of flying hours, while we had only a few. In terms of experience, we were children. Our only asset was our courage.

After the Korean War we modified the MiG-15 to make it suitable for ground attack. Many of the aircraft the Soviets had given us were abandoned because of the short life of their engines. When Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated in 1958, China decided to develop its own ground attack aircraft.

We were short of aircraft then, and short of fuel. Most of our airplanes stayed on the tarmac for lack of fuel and spare parts. Our pilots could fly only about 40 hours a year, and the recruitment of new pilots was suspended for several years.

A & S: Describe your role in the development of China’s Qiang-5 aircraft.

Yang: It would take years of arduous work, but China would develop its first military aircraft, a supersonic ground attack plane designated the Qiang-5, or Q-5. The chief designer was a former KMT officer, Lu Xiaopeng, who had studied aircraft design in the U.S., but stayed on the mainland after the KMT evacuated to Taiwan. He used the Russian MiG-19 as his model, and adapted its features to create a ground attack aircraft with much greater range than the MiG, but with many changes to the original design. The completed airplane was similar to the American F-4 Phantom.

In 1965 I was one of four pilots chosen to participate in the Q-5 flight tests. I had never flown a supersonic aircraft. To make the transition to the Q-5, I was sent to fly the MiG-19 and then the upgraded MiG-19 attack version. Finally, I was sent to Tangshan city to fly the Q-5. In 1966 and 1967, I made over 200 flights in the aircraft. At the end I prepared a report on the Q-5’s strong points and flaws.

In 1967, a meeting was held in Beijing to discuss the feasibility of producing the Q-5. The meeting was the key to implementing the program, and I was asked to speak. I cited the issues that I had covered in my written report, including the Q-5’s problems, such as its controls. They were hydraulically activated and responded very slowly to inputs. Hydraulic pressure was too low. That also made it difficult to retract the undercarriage when the airspeed reached 330 kilometers per hour (205 mph).

The meeting led to the production of the Q-5. Despite the turmoil caused by the Cultural Revolution then underway, the CPC Central Committee decided to produce 250 Q-5s. I was appointed Director of the Q-5 test flight panel, and named as Director of the Air Force Scientific Research and Development Department.

Despite our best efforts, the Q-5 program lagged well behind our hopes. It was 1969 before the Q-5 passed all its tests. After I made the last flight in December of that year, the Q-5 was declared operational, and the plant was given formal approval to go into full production. My work with this project was completed. I was named commander of an operational unit, the 19th Division in Shandong.

While we were still in test flight stage, the Director of the Nuclear Weapon Research Institute had talked with me and I started to sense that the Q-5 might be included in some strategic program. He asked about aircraft that could carry a big bomb, like the H-bomb, which was much bigger than any other bomb we had. I told him it might be possible to use the Q-5.

Later, when Zhou Enlai asked about aircraft appropriate for an H-bomb mission, the Air Force Engineering director recommended the Q-5. That led to the question of a pilot qualified to fly the mission. In a regular bomber like the Tu-22, there was a crew of six, but on the Q-5 there was only one man. He would have to be a highly skilled pilot, totally familiar with the Q-5, and politically acceptable. The Nuclear Weapons Research Institute later requested that I be named as pilot for the mission. At the end of April 1970, I was told that I would drop the H-bomb.

A & S: Can you discuss the logistics of this mission?

Yang: I met with the Director of the Nuclear Weapon Research Institute to discuss the Q-5’s capability. The Q-5 had limited space inside its fuselage for weapons. The H-bomb was two meters (6.5 feet) long and weighed a ton. We discussed the problem for three days, and in the end decided the bomb could be carried externally, slung under the fuselage, in a semi-recessed bay, on a mounting that was like two hooks. Later we added a device that would push the bomb out so that it could not collide with the aircraft when it was released. This variant of the Q-5 modified to carry a thermonuclear hydrogen or H-bomb was designated the Q-5A. We believed the bomb could be dropped by the end of 1970.

The bomb would not literally be dropped, but “tossed” at the target. The technique we used was to approach the target at an altitude of 300 meters (984 feet) to stay below the capability of most radars of the time, and at a speed of 900 kilometers an hour (560 mph). When the aircraft was twelve kilometers (7.5 miles) from the target, we would start a climb at an angle of forty-five degrees. At precisely an altitude of 1200 meters (3,936 feet), I would release the bomb.

After the bomb separated from the aircraft, it would continue to climb to 3,000 meters (9,840 feet) and then start down. As the bomb climbed, it sped toward the target twelve kilometers (7.5 miles) away. It would take the bomb sixty seconds to reach the target and explode right above it. Meanwhile, as soon as the airplane released the bomb, it reversed course to get well away from the area of the blast.

Our target zone was 200 meters (656 feet) in diameter, which I could usually strike. Once in about ten times I could hit within 50 meters (164 feet) of the center. We had practice bombs that replicated the size and weight of the actual H-bomb, but made of steel and cement. I dropped practice bombs 200 times.

Then, in late 1970, we had a problem with the H-bomb itself. During a test at the Lop Nor test site, the bomb exploded, but the expected atomic reaction did not occur. The H-bomb had failed; the cause would have to be investigated. My work preparing for the Q-5A for the mission came to a halt. I returned to my unit in Shandong.

The next year, in September 1971, a political event occurred that eventually determined the timing of the H-bomb project. Vice Premier Lin Biao was killed in an airplane crash while trying to flee to the Soviet Union after a failed coup attempt. There had been an upheaval in the PLA, and to raise morale, Chairman Mao Zedong decided that we would drop the H-bomb that year.

The date of the mission was kept secret. Once the date was chosen, and Chairman Mao concurred, all of the personnel at the nuclear site were restricted to base.

The director of the nuclear weapons institute took me aside and privately briefed me on what I could expect when the bomb exploded. He assured me that I would not be in any danger. Because of that and the many practice missions I had flown, I did not feel any differently when I carried the live bomb.

A & S: And on the day of the actual flight?

Yang: On December 30, 1971, weather conditions were good. I took off from the airbase in the late morning and headed toward the target, ground zero at Lop Nor, three hundred kilometers (186 miles) away. I flew at 900 kilometers an hour (559 mph) and an altitude of 300 meters (984 feet), following the procedures we had established. Twelve kilometers (7.5 miles) from the target, I started my 45-degree-angle climb, and exactly at 1,200 meters (3,936 feet) released the bomb.

Nothing happened! The bomb did not separate from the aircraft. The indicators on the panel showed that it was still attached. I turned back toward the target and prepared to do everything again a second time.

We had planned for emergencies. There were three separate release mechanisms, mechanical links to the bomb shackle, of which two were backups in case the first one failed. I tried all three; none worked.

On my second approach I followed the same procedures, and again the bomb failed to release. I turned to try again. I made a third approach, and for the third time the bomb would not release. The situation was now critical. I was running short of fuel.

Before taking off, I had reviewed our emergency procedures. I had three choices: I could abandon the aircraft by parachute and let it crash in a remote area of the vast desert that surrounded the Lop Nor Test site. I could crash-land the aircraft to assure that it was set down in place where it would harm no one. Or I could try to bring the aircraft back to base. I reflected on the time and the effort that went into the H-bomb project, and the great deal of money it cost the Chinese people, and I made my choice. I would try to bring the airplane and the H-bomb back to base.

There was a great risk in doing this. There were 10,000 people on the airbase, although only a few knew about the mission I was on. If anything went wrong, thousands would lose their lives. The bomb under the fuselage would be hanging just ten centimeters (four inches) above the ground as I landed.

All radio stations in northwest China had been shut down during my flight, and all flights in the area were banned. I radioed the tower of my decision to return, and asked that everyone on the base be evacuated into the tunnels that were dug underneath the base. It was Zhou Enlai himself who gave the order to evacuate.

A & S: Was there a possibility that the bomb could explode if it contacted the runway on landing?

Yang: There were five “safeties” that had to be deactivated to enable the bomb to explode. When the bomb was mounted to the airplane, the first safety was released. Fifteen minutes after the aircraft took off, the second safety was released; the third when the aircraft reached the target zone. When the pilot decided to drop the bomb, he released the fourth. The fifth and final safety released automatically sixty seconds after the bomb was dropped, an instant before it exploded.

No one could be sure whether or not the bomb would explode if it touched the runway, but I was confident that I could set the airplane down gently. So I landed with the H-bomb hanging under me. It was a perfect landing. When I shut down the engine, there was total silence; I was completely alone. The airfield was deserted. All 10,000 personnel were sitting in tunnels under the ground. I could not leave the cockpit: there was no ladder for me to climb down from the fuselage that was high above the ground.

I called the tower and asked for help. The tower told me to work my way back to the tail and jump. The people in the control tower were angry; in their eyes I had put 10,000 lives at risk,

And I had caused a big mess. When I notified the tower that I was returning with the bomb, the evacuation siren went off. It was lunchtime at the airbase; everyone was sitting down and eating. They had to rush out, put on gas masks and scramble into the tunnels. A big rice cooker caught fire because there was no one left to take care of the kitchen. Everyone there then still remembers my name: I could have brought them their Judgment Day.

It took a long time for anyone to come near my aircraft. Our procedures for dealing with the H-bomb meant we had to wear rubber shoes and clothing that would not create static electricity. No metal was allowed in the area of the bomb. In the nuclear weapons storage bunker, all steel columns were wrapped in copper. Now that I had unexpectedly brought the H-bomb back, there were no service vehicles equipped with the required shielding. I sat out on the field for a long while.

A & S: What had caused the hang-up?

Yang: We sent the release devices to Beijing for analysis. It was determined that one reason the shackle malfunctioned was that the mechanism was carefully kept in a heated area until just before it was mounted on the aircraft. This was not the usual procedure, but as this was the first release of a live bomb, everyone was being especially careful. When the aircraft took into the cold air, it was possible that the sudden temperature change affected the tolerances on parts of the mechanism that caused its failure to release. The shackles and release mechanism were modified so this could not happen again.

A & S: So you were not concerned on your second attempt?

Yang: The decision was to go again on January 7, 1972. Wind conditions were optimal. Weather at the Lop Nor site was good, but there was a cold front moving in. It was snowing at the airbase when I took off.

This time there was no problem. I followed procedures, and when I released the bomb, it separated from the aircraft as it was supposed to. As soon as the bomb was gone, I reversed course to get far away from the blast zone and activated shields that would protect me in the cockpit. Then I saw the flash, a very big flash. The bomb exploded in the air, at a pre-determined height above the ground. I felt the shockwave—it rocked me like a small boat in the ocean—and then I saw the mushroom cloud rising up into sky. By that time I was already 20 kilometers (12.4 miles) away from ground zero.

Watching the mushroom cloud from the air, I could see how different layers of clouds inside the mushroom were connected to one another, just like smoke from a chimney. At that moment I felt very happy. The test had been successful! And then I had to face my new concern: how to land safely on a runway covered in snow.

After I landed, I found little excitement at the airbase. Because of the heavy snow, no one there saw anything, not the great flash of light, nor the mushroom cloud that the people near ground zero saw.

At a ceremony celebrating the project’s success, I was cited for my contribution to China’s nuclear development. Zhou Enlai had said that bringing the bomb safely back after the first attempt was a miracle. At that time everything was top secret. My name was kept secret for another two decades, until I was formally acknowledged in 1999, at a conference commemorating the 50th anniversary of “Two Bombs and One Satellite,” meaning the A-bomb, the H-bomb, and an artificial satellite, the most important projects undertaken by the PLA after the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

Yang continued to fly the Q-5 until he retired at age 50. He moved back to Yunnan Province, and now lives in the provincial capital at Kunming. The Q-5A in which Yang flew the H-bomb tests, Number 11264, is on display at China’s National Air Museum near Beijing. Many other Q-5s continue to serve with the PLAAF, 40 years after its introduction."

[Note: Thank you to Harley-One for the newslink.]

[marshall]

58 tonnes is the total weight of the rocket. Its full payload is 2800kg which can carry up to 8 warheads of the Mark 5 (475kt each). With full payload, Trident II missile can reach about 7500km. While reduced its payload, the range can reach 12,000km.


Range: >7,400 kilometers (>4,500 miles) with full payload
~11,000 kilometers (~6,800 miles) will reduced payload

If you want to compare apples to apples, then the same logic must apply to both sides.  In the case of the JL-2 mods, this would result in similar logic suggesting it's maximum range refers to its "reduced payload".  As I pointed out earlier, those websites hyping the JL-2 mods are speculation at best and fear mongering at worst.

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/uk/slbm/d-5.htm

FAS.ORG in my opinion is about as competent as Richard Fisher and certain Republican financed think tanks, if you know what I mean.  My suggestion is to always use multiple sources.  Without a diversity of opinions and viewpoints, it is harder to discern propaganda from the truth.

[Martian]

China's first neutron bomb test was in 1988


China gave a detailed account of how it developed its nuclear capability (Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/394930.stm)

KALKI GAUR - Russian Neutron Bomb Program- Kalki Gaur

"CHINA DEPLOYS W-70 DESIGN NEUTRON BOMB: China said on July 15, 1999, that it has independently mastered the technology needed to build a neutron bomb- a nuclear weapon that produces extremely high levels of radiation. Nobody knows exactly how or what China has developed. Beijing ordered a neutron bomb test in 1988. China stole the blueprints to the W-70 warhead, the basis of a neutron bomb, as long ago as the late 1970s. Neutron research began in the United States in the 1970s.
...
INDIGENOUS NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY: The technological breakthroughs made by Chinese scientists had paralleled those of their US counterparts. China insists that its scientists developed neutron bomb technology independently of the US. China is keen to demonstrate it is a world class nuclear power capable of keeping up with the latest technology without resorting to espionage. China detonated its first neutron bomb 11 years ago in 1988, but made no public announcement about the test."

[Martian]

United States gives up on intercepting Chinese ICBMs

There were two important components of U.S. ballistic missile defense against China. Now, they have both been canceled. The United States has given up on neutralizing incoming Chinese thermonuclear warheads.

The Boeing Airborne Laser (ABL) was canceled last year, because it required two minutes to shoot down an unprotected (e.g. non-spinning and non-ablative armored) ballistic missile at an effective range of only 50-100km.

There is a problem in bringing Chinese ICBMs during the boost phase within the ABL's puny 50-100km range. It is impossible to fly a large aircraft near the Chinese coastline without being shot down. Never mind the idea of flying a large aircraft into the interior of the Chinese mainland.

Reference: Lights Out For The Airborne Laser | AVIATION WEEK

Now, the SBX has also been canceled. In the past, I have criticized the SBX as a fantasy and that it would never work in practice. In theory, if your opponent does nothing then the SBX might work. However, Chinese ballistic missiles, sea-skimming anti-ship missiles, and torpedoes will quickly destroy the large SBX target.

The concept of the SBX looks good on paper if China doesn't attack the SBX. However, in a real war, China would destroy the SBX in the opening minutes. A barrage of 50 ballistic missiles with MARV (maneuverable reentry vehicle) warheads alone would virtually guarantee the destruction of the SBX.

Without the SBX, the United States cannot track incoming Chinese DF-31A and DF-41 ICBMs. Being blind, the United States would lack the information to direct its ground-based interceptors (GBI) to their targets.

Let's assume that China does not attack the SBX (which is obviously ridiculous), U.S. missile defense against incoming Chinese thermonuclear warheads still would not work. According to the diagram, the kill vehicle on the GBI will attempt an intercept near the end of the mid-course phase.

By that time, the MIRVed warheads on the Chinese ICBMs would have separated. It is mathematically impossible for the United States to build three GBI missiles for every 3-MIRVed DF-31A and ten GBI missiles for every 10-MIRVed DF-41 Chinese ICBM.

Also, the U.S. GBI missiles are not reliable. Under ideal test conditions (e.g. clear weather, single target, prepositioned sensors, no decoys, lack of multiple multi-angled flight trajectories, special pre-launch preparation for high-profile test, etc.), half of the intercept tests have failed.

Reference: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

Apparently, common sense has finally sunk in at the Pentagon and they canceled the SBX.

SBX-1 at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii

MDA Slashes $1B from Budget; SBX Shelved

"MDA Slashes $1B from Budget; SBX Shelved
Feb 13, 2012
By Amy Butler abutler@aviationweek.com
THE PENTAGON

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s funding request of $7.75 billion includes a major departure for the agency’s testing regime: shelving the massive Raytheon Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) radar.

MDA has long used the radar, which is mounted on a large, floating platform, for providing targeting and discrimination data during flight tests in the Pacific region.

Officials will now use the AN/TYP-2 radars, also made by Raytheon, to support this testing as well as future deployments there, one MDA official says. Additionally, the agency has Upgraded Early Warning Radars and the Cobra Dane system to aid in sensor support for testing. The early warning radar in Clear, Alaska, is being upgraded to a more advanced configuration with completion slated for 2016.

SBX funding, which was at $176.8 million in fiscal 2012, sharply decreases to a steady $9.7 million annually through fiscal 2017.

The White House in budget documents suggests that the SBX will be maintained in a “limited test support” role, saving “at least $500 million over five years while also retaining the ability to recall it to an active, operational status if and when it is needed.”

MDA officials are not providing a press briefing on their budget Feb. 13 along with the rest of the Pentagon; instead, a five-page summary of its budget was released.

In it, the agency says it will complete preliminary designs for the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS), a satellite constellation designed to provide midcourse tracking of warheads as they travel through cold space toward their targets. PTSS is also optimized to help interceptors destroy targets earlier in flight.

Based on MDA’s request, funding should increase from $80.7 million in fiscal 2012 to $297.3 million in fiscal 2013, with another roughly $1.2 billion through 2017.

One sensor effort that appears stalled, however, is the Airborne Infrared (ABIR) project, which aims to use a UAV-mounted infrared system to provide early tracking data of ballistic missiles after they are fired. No funding is provided for this project through 2017.

Another account, dubbed “advanced remote sensor technology,” however, is slated to receive roughly $150.5 million through 2017. MDA’s documents do not outline what technologies are included in this account.

The agency appears to still be committed to development of the SM-3 IIB interceptor, which is slated for fielding around 2020. This yet-to-be-designed missile is intended to enable earlier interception of medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Funded at $13.4 million in fiscal 2012, the agency is proposing to raise spending to $224.1 million in fiscal 2013, with another $1.7 billion to follow through 2017.

MDA’s classified “special programs” are listed as requiring $1.6 billion through fiscal 2017.

MDA plans to maintain 30 Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Interceptors (GBIs) in Alaska and California and continue upgrading the missiles. Additionally, five more GBIs are slated to be built for “enhanced testing, stockpile reliability and spares” for a total of 57 in the entire fleet.

Also in the request is funding for 29 Raytheon SM-3 Block 1B missiles as well as 36 Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense weapons."

[Martian]

A small window to neutralize India

The Indian Threat

At some point in the future, India will successfully detonate a crude hydrogen bomb. Once India crosses that red line, China must take immediate action to stop India from deploying hundreds of thermonuclear warheads and holding Chinese cities hostage.

The past cannot be used as a guide to estimate the length of time required for India to miniaturize its future hydrogen bombs. Though it required 25 years between China's first 3.3 megaton blast in 1967 and the development of a W-88 class warhead, this timeline cannot be applied to India. India has access to incredibly powerful modern supercomputers, which can greatly shorten the time to test a new design.

China and India are on a collision course. At some point in the future, China will free the Chinese Tibetan mongoloids living in Sikkim and South Tibet (see below). However, Indians are aggressive and nasty imperialists. They will desire to reclaim their colonies in Sikkim and South Tibet.

China must not permit imperialist India the opportunity to develop a thermonuclear arsenal to threaten Chinese civilization and to enslave our fellow Chinese brothers and sisters in Sikkim and South Tibet.

There are two necessary components for an ICBM with a thermonuclear warhead. There is the rocket/missile delivery vehicle and the fusion warhead. China cannot stop India from building missiles. However, China can stop India from building thermonuclear warheads.

Order of Battle

India has a million-man army. It'll take all day to kill or capture all of them. Therefore, China's opening move should be a neutron bomb detonation (see below) above all major Indian military bases. The fireball and destruction from a neutron bomb are relatively small, but it is powerful enough to eliminate the Indian Army.

Just like the United States takeover of Panama, Chinese paratroopers will land and assume control of all major Indian military bases. Now, China has effective control of India. Like the United States in Afghanistan, Chinese military convoys can drive out on patrols.

The search and removal of all uranium, plutonium, and thorium from India

Without uranium, plutonium, or thorium, it is impossible to build a thermonuclear warhead. China should send in multiple teams of expert geologists to survey every square mile of India. Every deposit of uranium must be mined and transferred to China.

Thorium can be transmuted in a nuclear reactor into uranium. Thus, all thorium deposits must also be mined and removed. China must also search and remove all existing Indian stockpiles of plutonium.

China will compensate the Indians and pay market prices for the removed uranium, thorium, and plutonium.

To reduce Indian resentment, China should build roads, hospitals, and dams while the Chinese geologists are surveying and mining fissile material in India under the protection of military convoys.

Politics

The application of neutron bombs to Indian military targets is not a violation of China's NFU (no first use) pledge. China's NFU pledge does not apply to nuclear weapon states like India. Also, China only attacked legitimate military targets. No civilians were harmed.

China can invoke George Bush and recite the American policy of pre-emptive strikes against grave threats to China. Specifically, there are three justifications.

1. For decades, India has harbored the terrorist leader Dalai Lama. India and the Dalai Lama are responsible for the terrorist deaths of innocent Chinese men, women, and children during the Tibetan riots of 2008. Paraphrasing George Bush again, "any country that harbors a terrorist is a legitimate target of Chinese military power."

2. For decades, India has colonized and imposed its imperialist rule over Chinese people in Sikkim and South Tibet. Such action is intolerable. Today's military action is necessary to liberate Chinese citizens from the yoke of alien Indian repression.

3. It is in the interest of all countries of the world that a rogue state is not permitted to develop weapons of mass destruction. India has repeatedly refused to sign the NPT, which virtually all nations in the world has done. Therefore, to safeguard all countries in the world, China is in the process of neutralizing India's ability to threaten everyone with thermonuclear weapons.

Conclusion

When India detonates a thermonuclear bomb and crosses the Chinese red line, there is very limited time to permanently defang India. China cannot afford to take the risk of another Nehru. It is unacceptable for India to develop a full-fledged thermonuclear arsenal and possess the capability to annihilate all Chinese cities with the push of a button. If another Nehru were in charge, he would probably push the button to spite China.

Once China has removed all uranium, plutonium and thorium from India, the Indians will never pose a mortal threat to all Chinese. The PLA can withdraw to China and the liberated territories of Sikkim and South Tibet.

Everyone will live in peace.

----------


Sikkim is populated by Chinese people. Take a close look at the picture. Do they look like Chinese or Indians to you? China will eventually free the Chinese people in Sikkim from Indian tyranny. (Source: TRAVEL 2 SIKKIM: Sikkimese people and its culture and tradition.)

South Tibet/Arunachal Pradesh is also populated by Chinese people. Once again, I ask you to take a close look at the photograph. Do they look Indian at all to you? China must liberate our fellow brothers and sisters from alien Indian despotic rule. (Source: Chinese Media Call for integration of Northeastern States of India with China | NagaJournal - Breaking News | NE India News | Naga News | Photos | Articles | Folktales)

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Freedom Network - williambova.net

"China Test-detonates Kiloton Neutron Bomb
U.S. likely knew about surface explosion
By David M. Bresnahan
WorldNetDaily.com

China has detonated at least one neutron bomb above ground with the knowledge and perhaps even the co-operation of the U.S.

Photographs of the secret test in late 1995 or 1996 have been provided to WorldNetDaily through a U.S. intelligence source who cannot be identified. The photographs have been tested and evaluated by several sources who have concluded they are genuine.

The pictures show what is alleged to be the detonation of a neutron bomb above what appears to be an orchard, somewhere in China. The photos were most likely taken from an airplane, although some sources believe they could have been taken by satellite. The possibility that they were taken by a U.S. spy satellite was not ruled out.

The disclosure of the secret test, made possible through U.S. technology, comes at a sensitive time because China Premier Zhu Rongji is currently visiting the U.S. in efforts to ease concerns about the U.S. relationship with communist China.

"Attached are two deliberately degraded, but still very good imagery of a possible/probable atmospheric or open air, above ground, test of an Enhanced Radiation Device (neutron bomb) (EHRD) in the PRC (People's Republic of China), supposedly in the late 1995 or 1996 time frame," detailed the description that came with the photos. The source has access to satellite high resolution, multi-spectral imagery and other intelligence photos.

The source who provided the pictures is known to WorldNetDaily and has proven to be reliable. His background has been checked independently and has been verified. He is who he claims to be. To protect him and his viability as a continual source for information, his name and location cannot be revealed.

The first photograph was taken less than a microsecond after the detonation, and the second was taken within a millisecond or two of the first.

"These images are very rich in the IR (infrared) spectrum, both reflected and absorbed, so some things appear very dark and some seem very light -- both unnaturally so in the normal visible spectra. Please note also that to have taken these images one must have had considerable foreknowledge, or intelligence, of the planned event well beforehand," commented the source.

He believes there is a likelihood that the pictures were taken by a U.S. spy satellite of the KH type. This would mean that the U.S. knew in advance that the test would take place and the location of that test.

WorldNetDaily sent copies of the pictures to the man who originated the idea of the neutron bomb, retired nuclear physicist Sam Cohen. He confirmed that he believes the photographs to be genuine.

Cohen said the photographs appear just as they should, and that it would take someone with very sophisticated knowledge of nuclear physics to fake such a photograph. Other military experts were also consulted and they too confirmed that there is no reason to suspect that the photos are not real.

Additional copies were also sent to high-ranking members of the intelligence community with requests for comments. Absolutely no comment has been received. The request was made by the intelligence source who provided the pictures.

Cohen said it is likely that the device was a low yield neutron bomb of approximately one-kiloton in size. It would have been dropped from a plane at an altitude of approximately 10,000 feet. The explosion should have taken place in the area of 3,000 feet above the ground to have the optimum effect of destroying life without damaging property.

"There would have been zero effect on the pilot or crew," Cohen told WorldNetDaily. "I don't even think the airplane would have felt a shudder at that low yield and at that especially low yield regarding blast that comes out of a neutron bomb."

Cohen, and a different military source familiar with such tests both agreed that one test above ground is not enough. It is expected that this was one of at least two tests. A previous underground test by China was dismissed by U.S. officials as improperly conducted.

Cohen and others agreed that U.S. technology has enabled China to develop their nuclear capabilities, and that technology was not stolen from the U.S. It was cooperatively provided they all agreed.

What appears to be a defect in the fireball in the pictures is actually purposely created to tailor the effect of the bomb. Cohen said he first proposed this very technology 35 years ago.

Cohen put together a study group of other nuclear physicists working with him for the government and determined that a neutron bomb could be tailored to produce a pattern. His group found that advanced, discriminate, tailored effects of battlefield nuclear warheads with a very low yield could be designed.

Because of lingering requirements related to top secret information, Cohen was unable to provide the details of how such bombs can be tailor-made, but he said it is possible. He said the photographs show just such a possibility.

"What you're seeing in this picture [Photo 1] is a fireball. It's pretty hot," Cohen told WorldNetDaily. "Initially when the fireball is formed it is white hot. It is not in the infrared region. It's at the far end of the visible region approaching ultraviolet. I say this having witnessed many a test, and, boy, are things bright.

"If you were to look at it with the naked eye from the very beginning, you would be flash blinded, but good. You'd be out of commission for a long time, and you would suffer a little bit of eye damage, but not enough to blind you.

"The area around a nuclear shock turns extremely white. It's like a thousand suns were beaming down. The whole landscape become eerie (as seen in the second photo It lasts a number of seconds and fades in intensity as time goes on. That fireball just glows and glows. At the beginning it's the hottest, then it gradually begins to cool down. Then it starts rising and we get the mushroom cloud and all that sort of stuff," explained Cohen.


This photo was taken within a few hundredths of a microsecond of the detonation of the device. It was most likely taken from an airplane, but it could have been shot from a satellite. The fireball can be seen at its brightest, and a uniquely designed pattern is also very easily seen.
  

This second photograph was taken approximately a millisecond after the first. The dome of the fireball can be seen, along with the specially created pattern of neutrons impacting the ground.

Above ground tests of neutron bombs are not only useful but necessary. Without such tests, military leaders will not know exactly what to expect from such a weapon until it is used. The size of the bomb and the ideal height for detonation can only be determined from a test.

Cohen said he estimates the size of the fireball in the pictures to be about 200 to 300 feet across. He believes it is a good example of what to expect from a one-kiloton, low yield neutron bomb. The photos came without technical information, so Cohen and others who evaluated the pictures were unable to provide conclusive details.

"We have the fireball and off to one side we have this haze," Cohen continued to describe. "There's very little doubt in my mind that this haze was caused by radiation escaping from the bomb. Neutron bombs emphasize radiation, prompt radiation." He said it would take a specially designed bomb to direct radiation more to one side than to another.

"You've got to think multi-spectral across the entire spectrum, so you're looking at everything from UV, visible, to infrared as you look at these pictures," explained one military source who declined to be named.

"What we're seeing here (in the second photo) as the fireball is rapidly cooling down, we're seeing secondary atmospheric effects that just haven't been observed before," the source suggested.

"The first photograph is probably in the hundreds of microseconds region of the event. Therefore you're seeing it before the actual effects have hit the ground. That may be a stretch, I don't know," he added to explain the dark shadow area in the first photograph, which then becomes extremely white in the second picture.

"We understand how they work, but we've never had a good understanding of their effect," commented Cohen about the frustration of the U.S. scientific community. "We were never allowed to test these things in the atmosphere. All the neutron bomb tests that we did were underground. The military was dying to know just exactly what these effects might be. I think that's exactly what happened over in France, that the military wanted to know what these effects were, so they snuck off to the south Indian Ocean and detonated this thing.

The military source believes the U.S. has full knowledge of the above ground test conducted by France in 1979, and that the U.S. cooperated in that test. Cohen was in France at the time and suggested that French scientists find a way to conduct an open air test.

The U.S. government has known about the Chinese test and most likely has the data from that test. All sources agreed that is why no mention has been made."

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Tech-Ex: Neutron bomb inventor Samuel Cohen dead at 89

"Neutron bomb inventor Samuel Cohen dead at 89
Friday, December 03, 2010



Samuel Cohen, the inventor of the neutron bomb, which he called "the only nuclear weapon in history that makes sense in waging war," has died. He died on Nov. 28, two weeks after a cancerous tumor was removed from his stomach, at the age of 89.

Before inventing the neutron bomb, Samuel Cohen was also involved in the development of one of the two atomic bombs the U.S. dropped on Japan during WWII, "Fat Man," the more complex plutonium weapon dropped on Nagasaki. While those atomic bombs and later nuclear bombs did substantial damage over a wide area, as well as irradiating people and structures, while dropping considerable radiative fallout in its wake, the neutron bomb was different.

The neutron bomb was designed to produce neutrons pass through objects, leaving them pretty much undamaged. People and animals were not so lucky. The neutrons would cause lethal damage to the nuclei of cells, killing combatants. However, the range of the device was limited, so that neighboring civilians could escape unscathed. There would also be little or no residual radiation.

Cohen recently told the New York Times that "It's the most sane and moral weapon ever devised. It's the only nuclear weapon in history that makes sense in waging war. When the war is over, the world is still intact."

As true as that was, concern over the neutron bomb perhaps validating nuclear weapons was widespread. President Ronald Reagan eventually ordered 700 such devices, as a way of deterring any Soviet attack across Western Europe, but those were eventually dismantled when the Soviet Union disintegrated. Other countries were thought to have built neutron bombs, as well, but it is unclear if they have any operational ones left.

In his memoir, Cohen said the inspiration for the neutron bomb came from a visit to Seoul, South Korea, in 1951. The city had been devastated during the Korean War. He later said, in his memoir, "If we are going to go on fighting these damned fool wars in the future, shelling and bombing cities to smithereens and wrecking the lives of their inhabitants, might there be some kind of nuclear weapon that could avoid all this?"

Samuel Cohen is survived by his wife Margaret; three children, sons Paul and Thomas and daughter Carla Nagler; as well as three grandchildren."

[Martian]

India only has low-yield atomic weapons. China can do what it likes.

China must never allow expansionist and imperialist India to develop thermonuclear weapons. It was only decades after independence that India annexed Sikkim (in 1975) and South Tibet (in 1986). The British have gone home and left their former Hong Kong colony. The Portuguese have also gone home and left their former colony in Macau.

We will eventually kick Indian imperialists out of Sikkim and South Tibet and send you packing.

Currently, India only possesses pathetically weak 4 to 25 kiloton atomic weapons. In comparison to a single Chinese 3.3 megaton thermonuclear weapon (which is over 100 times more powerful), Indian atomic weapons are like little firecrackers. However, at an unknown point in the future, I believe India will eventually develop a crude thermonuclear device. It could be 25, 50, or 75 years in the future.

Regardless of the exact time of India's development of a crude thermonuclear bomb, I have already formulated China's strategic neutron-bomb response, military control of Indian airfields, and survey and collection of the raw ores (e.g. uranium, thorium, and existing plutonium) to produce Indian fissile material.

A future Indian Nehru must never possess the capability to truly threaten China.

U.S. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory concluded the Indian thermonuclear device was a failure.

Reference (from Federation of American Scientists): Nuclear Weapons - India Nuclear Forces

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1967: THE FIRST CHINESE HYDROGEN BOMB exploded with 3.3 megatons of destructive power

No thread on China's nuclear weapons would be complete without the history-setting first thermonuclear explosion.

"On June 17 1967, China revealed its true military power.

At 00:19, a Chinese H-6 bomber dropped the first Chinese hydrogen bomb. It exploded with a force of 3.3 megatons. It marked the date when China entered the thermonuclear era."

[macau boy]

These Bhararts tested five N-devices in 2 day some 14 years ago with no follow-up test.

[gnak]

Martian, on 09 March 2012 - 04:22 PM, said:

India only has low-yield atomic weapons. China can do what it likes.

China must never allow expansionist and imperialist India to develop thermonuclear weapons. It was only decades after independence that India annexed Sikkim (in 1975) and South Tibet (in 1986). The British have gone home and left their former Hong Kong colony. The Portuguese have also gone home and left their former colony in Macau.

We will eventually kick Indian imperialists out of Sikkim and South Tibet and send you packing.

Currently, India only possesses pathetically weak 4 to 25 kiloton atomic weapons. In comparison to a single Chinese 3.3 megaton thermonuclear weapon (which is over 100 times more powerful), Indian atomic weapons are like little firecrackers. However, at an unknown point in the future, I believe India will eventually develop a crude thermonuclear device. It could be 25, 50, or 75 years in the future.

Regardless of the exact time of India's development of a crude thermonuclear bomb, I have already formulated China's strategic neutron-bomb response, military control of Indian airfields, and survey and collection of the raw ores (e.g. uranium, thorium, and existing plutonium) to produce Indian fissile material.

A future Indian Nehru must never possess the capability to truly threaten China.

im not so worried about wat weapons indians can or cannot build, my view india will always lag behind china in technology

im more worried about indian superior ability to make babies, with more than half of india's 1.2 billion population under the age of 25

one day indians will beat china and the rest of the world through demographic warfare...

[macau boy]

gnak, on 11 March 2012 - 02:27 AM, said:

im not so worried about wat weapons indians can or cannot build, my view india will always lag behind china in technology

im more worried about indian superior ability to make babies, with more than half of india's 1.2 billion population under the age of 25

one day indians will beat china and the rest of the world through demographic warfare...

It is a foregone conclusion and a coming reality that india will overtake us to become the country with the world's largest population very soon. Also, China's population will start to age towards the middle part of this century as a result of the standing family policies. There is nothing much we could do about it even if we make a 180 degree turn in current policies and no attention was paid to this issue during the NPC Congress now being held in Beijing.

[ISI2003]

macau boy, on 11 March 2012 - 09:55 AM, said:

It is a foregone conclusion and a coming reality that india will overtake us to become the country with the world's largest population very soon. Also, China's population will start to age towards the middle part of this century as a result of the standing family policies. There is nothing much we could do about it even if we make a 180 degree turn in current policies and no attention was paid to this issue during the NPC Congress now being held in Beijing.

the only hope for china (as i guess the government hopes) is that with the industrial revolution in other nations, the older people will die off sooner and ease the burden on the younger population (the goverment is for this reason doesn't provide a safety net, and regular people have to save up enough money for their own medical care)

eventually a china with under a billion people with a higher standard of living for the middle class people is what i think the CCP is hoping to get to

otherwise spending on old people will mean china has to live with the "getting old before getting rich"

---------------------
any idea what china expects to do with its population once they are to well off to work low wage jobs as they currently do, and those jobs will go to india and other poorer asian nations

[macau boy]

ISI2003, on 11 March 2012 - 07:20 PM, said:

any idea what china expects to do with its population once they are to well off to work low wage jobs as they currently do, and those jobs will go to india and other poorer asian nations

You may want to review the current Five Year Social and Economic Development Scheme (5 year Plan) to learn about the details. Also, this will be one of the hot topics in Primer Wen's press conference after the close of NPC. I believe you'll find some of the answers you're looking for.

[ISI2003]

macau boy, on 12 March 2012 - 09:59 AM, said:

You may want to review the current Five Year Social and Economic Development Scheme (5 year Plan) to learn about the details. Also, this will be one of the hot topics in Primer Wen's press conference after the close of NPC. I believe you'll find some of the answers you're looking for.

any highlights

also, wouldn't it be better for china to shift these lower wage jobs inland (where labor costs are lower) and give the higher end jobs to the coastal dwellers as they go up the value added chain

it will allow more prosperity to spread out and prevent loss of jobs overseas

it follows the CCP's policy of becoming the technology innovators of the future and not just the manufacturing center of the world

[macau boy]

ISI2003, on 12 March 2012 - 12:38 PM, said:

any highlights

also, wouldn't it be better for china to shift these lower wage jobs inland (where labor costs are lower) and give the higher end jobs to the coastal dwellers as they go up the value added chain

it will allow more prosperity to spread out and prevent loss of jobs overseas

it follows the CCP's policy of becoming the technology innovators of the future and not just the manufacturing center of the world

If you're really interested in Chinese affairs, you should get those info from the horse's mouth, not from a messenger.
You may follow the news and the upcoming press conference at:
    www,people.com.cn
There is an icon near the top for English version; just click on the word "English" and it will jump to the English home page.

[Martian]

Chinese Mobile ICBMs Seen in Central China » FAS Strategic Security Blog

"Chinese Mobile ICBMs Seen in Central China
By Hans M. Kristensen
March 1, 2012


Road-mobile DF-31/31A ICBM launchers deploying to Central China are visible on new commercial satellite images.

Recent satellite images show that China is setting up launch units for its newest road-mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in central China. Several launchers of the new DF-31/31A appeared at two sites in the eastern part of the Qinghai province in June 2011. This is part of China’s slow modernization of its small (compared with Russia and the United States) nuclear arsenal.

An image taken on June 27, 2011 (see above), shows two DF-31/31A launchers on the launch pads of a small launch unit near Haiyan (36°49’37.12″N, 101° 6’22.97″E). One is positioned in a circular pad with support vehicles surrounding it. The circular pad was added to the facility sometime between 2005 and 2010. The other launcher is on a pad to the north, located next to an x-shaped launch pad and a missile garage. The layout of the Haiyan launch site is similar, yet not identical, to the DF-31 launch unit of the 813 Brigade at Nanyang.

Another image taken on June 6, 2011 (see below), shows six DF-31/31A launchers lined up on the parade ground at the 809 Brigade base in Datong about 50 kilometers (32 miles) to the east (36°56’57.67″N, 101°40’2.63″E). The brigade has been thought to be equipped with the DF-21 medium-range missile, but might be under conversion to the longer range DF-31/31A. It is unclear if the launchers are permanently based in the area or temporarily deployed from the 812 Brigade some 500 kilometers (290 miles) to the southeast.


Six mobile DF-31/31A launchers seen on display at a launch brigade in Datong, Qinghai, in central China in June 2011.

Slow Deployment

Deployment of the DF-31 has been slow since it first entered service in 2006. Less than 10 missiles had been deployed with as many launchers by 2010, and not many more were added in 2011.

The DF-31A began deployment in 2007 with about a dozen missiles on as many launchers by 2010. Also counting 20 silo-based DF-5As, the U.S. intelligence community estimates that China currently has “fewer than 50” missiles that can target the continental United States, suggesting that less that 25 DF-31As are currently deployed. (The number is a little more uncertain now after the Pentagon in 2011 started supporting Chinese nuclear secrecy by no longer providing a breakdown of Chinese missile forces in its annual report on Chinese military power).

As older missiles with shorter range are retired and replaced by the DF-31/31A over the next decade, a greater portion of the Chinese missile force will be able to target the continental United States, perhaps twice as many by 2025.  But even then, the Chinese force will be small compared with that of Russia and the United States."

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It's about time the Pentagon stops publishing their ridiculous estimates of Chinese ICBMs.


Do you see these nine DF-31s (which were first shown at China's 1999 military parade)? The Pentagon claims China built less than 15 of them in total. During the 13 years since 1999, the Pentagon absurdly claims China built only six more DF-31s.

To protect their nation from American military power, the Pentagon claims China is leisurely building a new DF-31 every two years. No intelligent person believes the Pentagon propaganda. (Source of Pentagon estimate of less than 15 DF-31s: http://www.fas.org/i...c/NASIC2009.pdf)


China showed us 12 DF-31A TELs at the 2009 Chinese military parade. After finally developing the critical solid-fueled DF-31A that can strike anywhere in the continental United States, the Pentagon propaganda is that China built a total of 25 DF-31As. In the five years since being put into service in 2007, the Pentagon claims China only built one dozen more in addition to the 12 DF-31As shown in this picture. Again, not a credible estimate.

Contrary to Pentagon propaganda, the photographic evidence shows DF-31As are being deployed throughout China. This latest article (see post above) shows Chinese DF-31/DF-31As are being deployed in central China.


The Pentagon and western military experts (including Hans M. Kristensen) are shameless in claiming China's 5,000km Underground Great Wall might be a storage depot and there are no ICBMs down there. The photographic evidence in this picture clearly shows two 13,000km DF-5/DF-5A missiles, which can each carry a four to five megaton warhead.

[Note: Thank you to Kailash for the newslink.]

[macau boy]

Martian, on 18 March 2012 - 11:08 PM, said:

The Pentagon and western military experts (including Hans M. Kristensen) are shameless in claiming China's 5,000km Underground Great Wall might be a storage depot and there are no ICBMs down there. The photographic evidence in this picture clearly shows two 13,000km DF-5/DF-5A missiles, which can each carry a four to five megaton warhead.

[Note: Thank you to Kailash for the newslink.]

There is no need to get upset. Most western "sino-experts" still believe China has no more than two dozen outdated single warhead DF-5 in silos. Just like all the clear close-up of J-20 you posted here, there are folks trying to "prove" that the engines is AL-31F.