148 replies to this topic

[bojangles]

From what we know, Pakistan already has inducted three batches (50-75 missiles per batch) so far and another test firing just around the corner for the 4th batch. (Each test fire means picking one at random from a batch and firing it to certify the rest as a quality control measure)

That means 200 ~ 300 babur Missiles by September 2010. and that is just Baburs.

Then Pakistan also have:

• Hatf1
• Hatf 1A
• HATF1B( With inertial guidance)
• Ghauri1
• Ghauri2
• Shaheen1
• Shaheen2
• Abdali
• M-11
• Ghaznavi
• plus air launched Ra'ad
• H2
• H4.

I was using Babur as the example due to the fact that its a cruise missile (making it quite more stealthy).  I'm not sure if using ballistic missiles would be a good decision seeing as they could be interpreted as a nuclear attack.

[M_ZEE32]

Some one mentioned the structural fatigues of migs that they cant carry intended fuel and ordinance , So I was thinking that our mirages are also pretty old airframes. What's the condition of them and the vipers ?  Are they maintained properly ?

[M_ZEE32]

I was using Babur as the example due to the fact that its a cruise missile (making it quite more stealthy).  I'm not sure if using ballistic missiles would be a good decision seeing as they could be interpreted as a nuclear attack.

Perhaps they can interpret what they want to. the babur is also nuclear capable so what do you think about that ?

[MoThSmOkE]

Can ballistic missiles be used to hit air bases?

[Aliph Ahmed]

Can ballistic missiles be used to hit air bases?

Affirmative.

I was using Babur as the example due to the fact that its a cruise missile (making it quite more stealthy).  I'm not sure if using ballistic missiles would be a good decision seeing as they could be interpreted as a nuclear attack.

It wont be the missiles but the planes formation. Anytime the attacking aircrafts total number goes towards 20, it will be considered a nuclear strike by the defensive country.

For example the minute PAF radars see 20+ Indian aircrafts coming in to attack, they will consider it as a nuclear attack.

Also, if the Pakistan's  nuclear command loses contact and goes blind from the forward positions, they will order nuclear strike.

and all Indian attacks will be responded. So India is going to get it. It can not broaden the conflict and also can not hope for a short conflic.

The Indian army chief is a disable person who is losing his mind. Dont take that retard seriously.

[bojangles]

Perhaps they can interpret what they want to. the babur is also nuclear capable so what do you think about that ?

The Babur is nuclear capable, but it won't show up on the Indian radar until shortly before impact.  That in itself is a huge advantage.  If an offensive is to be taken one devastating barrage of cruise missiles would cripple all military infrastructure in the radius.  If it is done in surprise you can severely damage the Indian military's ability to respond.  Subsequent barrages would be in addition to the initial offensive.  Think blitzkrieg, but with a missile barrage leading rather than air raids.

It wont be the missiles but the planes formation. Anytime the attacking aircrafts total number goes towards 20, it will be considered a nuclear strike by the defensive country.

For example the minute PAF radars see 20+ Indian aircrafts coming in to attack, they will consider it as a nuclear attack.

Also, if the Pakistan's  nuclear command loses contact and goes blind from the forward positions, they will order nuclear strike.

and all Indian attacks will be responded. So India is going to get it. It can not broaden the conflict and also can not hope for a short conflic.

The Indian army chief is a disable person who is losing his mind. Dont take that retard seriously.

I do not know about the 20 aircraft issue, but if the Pakistani military detects incoming ballistic missiles they would for sure prepare nuclear retaliation (this would go for any country).

[faizan khaliq]

No idea what strategic command division might be thinking but it is most likely that Pakistan has rehearsed in detail the tactical employment of low yield device
1.The impact on advancing Armour formations
2.Impact on dug down infantry??
3.The air basis
however Indian threatened with nuclear strike on civil targets and total destruction
Pakistan went for Mutually assure destruction for minimum deterrence purpose
India will never  wage a war but as policy might  be to keep the border hot with Artillery duals and  fire exchange like it has been happening on LOC  in the hope of putting economic constraints on Pakistan like soviet union but Pakistan has better cards that is why Indians cry so loud whenever there is terrorist strike in India.
They are trying to follow the policy of Old British raj vs tribal agencies i.e Keep the  enemy busy without hampering the economic growth on main land but they will lose here for sure too
On the other hand Pakistan has no choice but to take Kashmir through military means so war is the only option but would like to restrict it to Kashmir only.it is matter of concern how India will react to it ,knowing fully well that 2010 and 1965 are entirely different scenarios.

[GreenBeret]

The first objective should be Kashmir.
If entire of Kashmir has to be taken,the action has to be completed within a week before external elements can have their say,also a pre-emptive strike is important,Anyways the main corridor from PathanKot has to be cut off to hamper the road supply to Indian forces in Kashmir.India can still ask Nepal for road access into Kashmir.India has atleast 10 mountain divisions in kashmir.Pakistan has 12th infantry division with 6 Brigades on western Kasmir,FCNA with atleast 3 Brigades on North western kasmhir,a reserve (101)brigade in Rawalpindi,atleast 6 infantry divisions(including 23rd,17th)in Southern Kashmir from Mangla to Sialkot,also include 2 independant armoured brigades(1 in Kharian,1 in Sialkot) and include the northern armoured division,the 6th armoured division.The Corps situated in Gujranwala has not be included,it has atleast 2 infantry divisions.The Corps HQ in Lahore has 3 infantry divisions and 1 independant armoured brigade.Maybe a reserve division from XI corps Peshawar,the division in Kohat most probably.There are also 2 divisions as reserve in Quetta,the 33rd and 41st,but they will supplement Karachi-Hyderabad area. So summing the total divisions Pakistan has for strike on Kashmir are atleast 10 infantry divisions available excluding Lahore Corps,which maybe used along with 6th armoured division to cut off PathanKot.

[faizan khaliq]

NORTHERN COMMAND
15 CORPS
   19 DIVISION
   28 DIVISION
    57 DIVISION
14 CORPS (LEH)
   3rd infantry division
   8th mountain division
16CORPS(Jammun)
   10 division (Akhnur)
    25 division (Rajuri)
    26 division (jamun)
    29 division (Pathankot)
    39 division (nool)
4 Armour brigades
Ratio infantry
india          Pakistan
10              6
Armour
inda            Pakistan
4 brigades      4 armour brigades
I broke down Armour division of Pakistan in brigades for convienience
apparently it is stale mate in comparison of forces though my information is sketchy there is suppose to be something in Samba cantonment too
Ravi Chenab corridor is included in Kashmir theater.

[safdar]

Colonel Charles Callwell of the British Army, wrote in his book, Small Wars, “Strategy is not however, the final arbiter in war. The battle field decides, and on the battle field the advantage passes over to the regular army”.

So my friends, Pakistan army will wage war on three components: aggression, movement, and shock. True Pakistanis have at times waged wars on a shoestring budget, and at times experience has been un-predictably satisfying. Anyone wondering how PAK army will perform when the material balance is not weighted in their favour will not be short of a good few historical evidences. Though India has a numerical advantage in all of its equipment, however, some of their military equipment is either in store or not in service may be because they will not employ every single piece of equipment before a ceasefire agreement and leave themselves to the mercy of china. Pakistan, despite having the numerical disadvantage, has a qualitative edge as its equipment is relatively latest, and has higher proportion of western built and designed items, especially the M-series tanks and the stock of anti-tank missiles.


PAK military force strategy will focus on air ground sea integration, interoperability, and interdependence during a major combat. By parsing capabilities, rather than to subordinate one service or force to the other, which only creates conflict and confusion within ones own military ranks, and subsequently confusion within a war fighting party.  Because we know that the air force, navy and army will never jeopardised their independence and this applies to every war fighting country including India, but also could not be given autonomy in realising their capacity to be decisive in any theatre level operations.

For example:

One thing worth mentioning over here is the 1971 indo-pak war, where PAK armour was most venerable in the battle of longewala, where IAF used HAL Krishak to provide airborne forward air control intelligence (line-of-sight situational awareness of the target) for IAF CAS which was providing escort to Indian armour behind it, needless to say but the IAF CAS took care of the PAK T-59s bogged down in the unfamiliar terrain, this was a decisive moment for PAK army losing. Even thou we had better odds at air supremacy in that war the air force was busy doing their own thing. We sent  armour into bandit territory before gathering any intelligence or with close air support. Even a prop plane like HAL Krishak came very useful for India. Hence UAVs will play a major role in this 21st century net centric war to gather intelligence and data sharing and should not be looked upon as mare distraction for the enemy or from the enemy.      


The objective is to repel India’s net centric mechanised force, which could possibly be based on the similar tactics used by the invading force of USA in Iraq, where Iraq was divided into small squares “kill boxes” 30x30 mile, and further subdivide into smaller boxes, when no friendly troops were present and only enemies, air interdiction was called in to kill that box. When friendly troops were present, close air supports was called, much like a chess board where you eliminate one square at a time occupied by enemy forces, and you’re chess pieces are air and ground equipment for fire and manoeuvre purposes and you’re intelligence is control, and of course all of this requires net centric data sharing at operational and tactical levels of command and control, which is C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance.

In my earlier posts I attacked IAF forward operating air bases and also non military operating air bases which are civilian air ports, pushing IAF to operate from deep inside India, this subsequently restricting their armoured brigades interdependence on IAF CAS, as CAS can only be efficient by expanding air access to the largest area of operation and bringing close air support and air interdiction into a single counter flow. If PAF can restrict IAF to operate from bases in Gujarat and Utter Pradesh and forcing them to manoeuvre  in to a constricted tight Pakistani air space for operations from their own open air space, this could provide PAF with ample time to second guess and anticipate IAF manoeuvres and also from which direction, and confuse IAF better by jamming their line of sight communication links, by having systems installed and operating before IAF attacks.    



Of course PAK ground forces and armour require manoeuvring, not to seize and hold enemy ground at this stage, but to force the Indian ground force to react at the operational and strategic levels, resulting in his movement or concentration of forces, thus making him vulnerable to PAF air attacks, this is where PAFs Saab-2000 AWACs, JF-17 and F-16 should come in for close air support and also air interdiction with precision guided munitions as fixed wing aircrafts are most suited to all-weather day and night operations as oppose to attack helicopters only restricted to night operations due to survivability issues during day light. Also remember that armour escort by scout gunships helicopters was replaced by fixed wing A-10 thunderbolt rather then Apaches AH-64s by the US in the Iraq war. PAFs Saab-2000 AWACs will provide greater detection range then the Indian AWACs, giving greater damage expectancy for weapons degradation that results from a number of other factors if not just incompetence e.g. weather, the fog of war, ECM. And provide better stand off range target location cues using its ground moving target indicator radar at greater distances then Indian AWACs. The argument that 60 degree blind sectors over the nose and tail of Saab-2000 due to its two sided array does not apply to Pakistan, due to PAKs geographical location to India and of course direction of hostilities the nose and tail will be facing north and south boarders and not eastern pak/ indo western boarders in most of its flight regimes,  in that regard we still have a range advantage over Indian air and ground real time surveillance by AWACs.  

The PAK army has at its disposal a vast array of tactical battle field ballistic missiles and a much better and operational inventory of solid fuel missiles compared to Indian stock, one missile effectively able to clear a grid square, 1 square kilometre. This is how PAK army will exert aggression and shock within the Indian boarders. Most of the damage over Iraq was due to tactical battle field missiles and cruise missiles, one thing people should also note that due to the earths rotation (earth rotates towards east), Pakistan has a better response/attack time and range then Indian missiles, as the Coriolis acceleration ( jet stream is always eastwards) and earths rotation eastwards  gives Pakistan ballistics trajectory a “sling shot” advantage making our missiles reach further and faster then the advertised range and of course a better stand-off range for army missile TELs to position further away from the indo-western boarders. The earths rotation has an opposite effect on Indian ballistics trajectory which will be fired towards west, reducing their advertised range and speed, also much less stand off range in the battle theatre. This slight advantage can give the PAK army to use ballistic missiles to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface potential before it can be used effectively against our forces operating in the vicinity. To Destroy infrastructure (roads bridges warehouses) to deny the enemy access to a given area or to prevent his advance in a direction or along an avenue of approach into our own territories. PAK army’s heavy artillery also shares this tactical advantage using the ballistic trajectory for more range and speed as we are all aware of how the heavy artillery was used to decimate Indians in the 1965 indo-pak war in Chumb region of azzad Kashmir. And yes of course you guessed it, the periodic artillery barrages from Pakistan on the Indian LoC, all due to the earth rotation and the coroilis acceleration  giving us better stand off ranges, this only works for ballistic missiles and artillery shells with range greater then 20 Km. But I will refrain from putting small army equipment under the eye of the needle as it constrains pushing the debate forward.


“Cape Canaveral was chosen for rocket launches to take advantage of the Earth's rotation. The linear velocity of the Earth's surface is greatest towards the equator the relatively southerly location of the Cape allows rockets to take advantage of this by launching eastward, in the same direction as the Earth's rotation.”



We all know, the final arbiter in war is the battle field.


This is some thing I picked up while searching, written by a guy called Rich Thomas. Source is provided. Saves me doing all the hard work as I’m not exactly familiar with PAKs army equipment and their capabilities.

Self-propelled (SP) artillery is a key element of mechanized warfare. Compared to towed artillery, it offers two advantages: it offers armoured protection for the crew, and it is much more mobile. The latter advantage is especially important in the modern era of counter-battery radar. Even a trained crew requires several minutes to set up a towed howitzer. A SP gun can move into a location, fire, and then move out quickly. This "shoot-and-scoot" tactic dodges counter-battery fire, allowing the guns to hit without being hit back. As the Pakistani and Indian militaries are less reliant on helicopters and smart bombs for fire support, these artillery systems remain crucial parts of their armies.

Pakistan

The main SP system of Pakistan is the venerable American-made M-109A5. This version packs a 155mm gun, and comes from the most successful SP artillery line in history. It can get off 4 shots quickly, and sustain a rate of 1 shot per minute. Its road speed is 35 mph, and the gun has a maximum range of 30 km (albeit only when using rocket assisted projectiles).

Now entering service and supplementing the M-109 is the more modern Turkish-made T-155. This also packs a 155mm gun, has a road speed of 41 mph, and can hit targets up to 56 km away with special ammunition.

The heavy SP gun of the Pakistani Army is the M-109's big brother, the American M-110A2. This is heavy SP artillery, with a 203mm (8 inch) gun. The gun is out in the open, rather than in a turret, offering both it and the crew less protection during operations. It can get off 3 shots quickly, or 1 every 2 minutes in sustained fire, and has a road speed of 31 mph. The maximum range is 30 km.

India

India's lightest SP gun is the British-made FV433 Abbot. This is based on their FV430 armoured personnel carrier. It has a road speed of 30 mph and a 105mm gun. This gun can sustain a fast firing rate of 6 to 8 rounds quickly, but only has a range of 17.4 km.

They also use the Soviet-made 2S1 Gvozika using their 122mm gun. It has a road speed of 37 mph, a sustained rate of fire of 1 round per minute, and a maximum range of 22 km.

The new entry into India's SP inventory is the KRAB 155mm SP. This is a modern Polish-made system, using NATO-standard 155mm ammunition instead of Russian rounds. It has a road speed of 37 mph, and a very fast firing set up. The gun can get off 3 rounds in 10 seconds, 18 rounds in 3 minutes, or sustain 2 rounds a minute. The maximum range is 40 km.

WINNER: Pakistan!

The Pakistanis have made a bigger, better investment in SP systems over time, and it shows. The Indians have an edge in rate of fire statistics, with the KRAB and FV433 both capable of putting down a very heavy, brief barrage. However, while they are bringing in the KRAB, most of their systems are the 2S1, which is neither fast, hard-hitting, or long ranged. The Pakistanis, on the other hand, have their fleet of SP guns based on the M-109A5, and are supplementing it with the T-155, which can outrange all the other guns under consideration. They also have an 8 inch SP in the M-110A2, which can fling a heavier shell than anything in the Indian arsenal.

Sources: http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/; http://globalsecurity.com; http://indianarmy.nic.in/

http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1...pg2.html?cat=15

[dave1]

Pakistan obviously has better missile offensive capabilities (SRBMs, MRBMs and Baburs) but less air power. I am fantasizing a war involving both PLA and PA against India. We could perhaps screw Indians together once for all.

[Magnus]

Bluffer’s Guide: Indo-Pakistan Border

http://planeman-bluffersguide.blogspot.com...tan-border.html

[M_ZEE32]

Sorry : Page not Found

[safdar]

Bluffer's Guide: Indo-Pakistan Border

http://planeman-bluffersguide.blogspot.com...tan-border.html

That is an excellent analysis. Very thorough, with detailed maps.

One day I’ll be as good as you.:)  

Sorry : Page not Found

You have to click the “planemans’s military analysis” link (in blue). it's worth it trust me.

[blueazure]

http://planeman-bluffersguide.blogspot.com...tan-border.html

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

the analysis was good so i copy pasted the whole articles ( minus the images )

link provided by MAGNUS



The for the sake of analysis, the border can be divided into 4 sectors for analysis, each characterized by different terrain and/or degree of militarization.

Zone A: Northern de-facto Kashmir border


Generally called the Kargil area, this sector was the scene of the Kargil Conflict in 1999. Since then the Indian military presence in this area has quadrupled and the military infrastructure greatly enhanced.

This section of the border itself has no meaningful walls, berms or fences. Instead outposts dotted along hilltops create a virtual line of control which only approximates the ‘official’ ceasefire boundary which is the defacto border between the two countries in the zone.

The Ops are generally very basic, sometimes just a cluster of tents or shacks. They often have low walls or trenches and pill boxes, but there is no standard layout employed by either side. India is reported to be experimenting with more heavily defended Ops with standard layouts, but these remain the rarity rather than the norm.


The most famous Ops are probably Tiger Hill and Point 5353, both near Dras to the west of Kargil (a town on the Indian side). Tiger Hill was occupied by Pakistani forces during the 1999 conflict and the scene of a practically violent clash, with Indian forces managing to retake the position. It now has a helipad.


Point 5353 was also occupied by Pakistan in 1999 and is controversial since it was previously under Indian control. The highest peak in the immediate area, Pakistani forces overlook the Indian positions nearby, including Tiger Hill, and can observe the strategic highway to Kargil, a major Indian supply artery. The scars of 1999 are clearly seen with the large number of artillery sites hastily dug beside the few roads in the area. Several remain active, and threaten Point 5353 with indirect fire – Point 5353 is however relatively well defended against artillery barrage and air strikes are more probable means of destroying the pill boxes there.


Since the 1999 conflict, this zone has been characterized by artillery sites crammed into narrow valleys. Artillery was used extensively and effectively by both sides. Today both sides deploy relatively large amounts of artillery in the zone, and have exchanged bombardment on numerous occasions. Although both countries have substantial self-propelled artillery assets, including MRLS, the main equipment facing-off over the border is towed pieces.


Numerically, in this zone the main weapon employed on the Pakistani side is likely the Type-60 (D-74) 122mm gun, and on the Indian side the M-46 130mm gun. The larger M-46 has a distinct firepower and range advantage but is slightly less mobile. Pakistan also probably deploys US made 155mm guns although it is hard to determine the extent of deployment from Google Earth. India for its part deploys large numbers of the Indian Light Gun, a closer comparison with the Type-60, but these are reportedly being retired. The Indian Light Gun is a variant of the British L118 105mm Light Gun, with the Indian made version differing in the adoption of a shield to protect the crew. Having said that, the gun most associated with the artillery duels is the Indian Bofors FH-77B howitzer.


Both sides employ generally similar sites, with those furthest North/East where the mountains are higher, being most basic. At these extreme heights many positions have just 4 guns, although the ‘full’ set of 6 pieces is also relatively common, particularly on the Indian side.


In general terms, the two sides enjoy relative parity in artillery, and deploy similar quantities to the area.


Pakistan currently has a distinct edge in self-propelled guns with a large force of US made M109 howitzers. These are generally not deployed in this, the most mountainous zone however. It’s counter-intuitive but in this environment towed pieces are more mobile than tracked vehicles, mainly due to narrow roads. India’s only self-propelled gun is the ‘Catapult’; an M-46 130mm gun mounted onto a lengthened Vijayanta MBT chassis and is unsuitable for this area.


The Catapult is unusual in that the gun faces the rear. There are reports that it has been withdrawn from service although it’s certainly in active reserve. India used to operate the British Abbot SPG which used a version of the 105mm Light Gun, but this has been retired. Lastly, in the quest for self-propelled guns India experimented with mounting 195mm Light Guns and D-30 122mm howitzers on the backs of trucks. These conversions do not appear to be in service.


The Pakistani military inventory has benefited greatly from the US’ war on terror; the backbone of Pakistan’s self-propelled artillery is the recently supplied US made M-109A2 and M-109A5 howitzers. There have also been consistent and credible reports that Pakistan ordered around 90 SH-1 155mm truck mounted howitzers from China, and that some have already been delivered. Whereas Pakistani M-109s are equipped with the US Copperhead guided artillery round, which has a range of just 16km, the SH-1 is advertised alongside the NORINCO GP-1 laser guided round with a range of 20km, equivalent to India’s Krasnopol-M rounds which is generally superior to the Copperhead. The SH-1’s 155mm howitzer appears to be based on the highly regarded Canadian/Austrian GHN-45 gun which China operates as the W88, although modified to 52cal. The SH-1 also features pretty much the whole modern artillery setting/correction features which promise to make it far more combat efficient than previous generation guns in Pakistani service. The SH-1 is also advertised as having a range of 53km with the longest ranged rocket-assisted Chinese rounds, but given Pakistan’s recent investment in local production of South Korean extended range ammunition shouldn’t be assumed that the Pakistani order includes that. At any rate such long range ammunition usually pays the penalty of reduced warhead, so even the latest ultra-long ranged artillery is most deadly at more typically ranges of 20-30km.

The truck based SH-1 is generally better suited to this area than the heavier tracked M-109s in Pakistani service, although at 20 tons it’s still a relatively heavy piece of kit. Also, with the M-109s likely deployed in the North facing the Taliban threat to please the US supplier (war on terror etc), the SH-1 seems a more likely candidate for the Kargil region.

Going back to guided ammunitions, in terms of quantity, it is likely however that India has more guided rounds, and fields them more widely.


Indian artillery purchases suffered from the 1980s political fallout from the ‘Bofors scandal’, resulting in a period of relative underinvestment. At the same time Pakistan was rapidly increasing the size and quality of its own artillery, thus closing the gap that had existed before. Despite the bad press from the corruption scandal, the Bofors gun is actually a very good piece of kit and offers mobility advantages over other towed pieces in Pakistani service. Pakistan has recently inducted into service the generally equivalent Turkish made T-155 Panter gun but it has yet to be employed in material quantities.

A quick comparison between the Bofors and Panter is however an interesting exercise.

Until the advent of the Panter, the Bofors was by far the most advanced and capable towed piece on the border. It has large stocks of extended range ammunition, is self-mobile and relatively automated for increased crew efficiency. That situation is changing.


Both are modern 155mm pieces with an auxiliary power unit to allow a degree of self-mobility, about 20kph. In both cases the power pack is located forward of the gun mount. The Panter has a significantly longer barrel (52Cal vs 39Cal) providing greater range. In general all artillery pieces can fire various guided and extended range rounds so quoted ranges should be taken with a grain of salt. If the Panter is employed with HE Base-bleed rounds then stated range is 40km, about 10km further than the 39Cal Bofors with similar ammunitions. This would allow Pakistan to station its guns many km further from the front, and for each howitzer battery to cover a wider sector allowing either fewer deployed batteries or for the same strength, greater engagement envelope overlap.


Pakistan has started license producing South Korean base-bleed shells allowing extended range engagements. Theoretically these could be employed with any of Pakistan’s 155mm artillery, but the M-198 and M-109 systems are most probable in my mind. If the Panter does receive extended range ammunition it is most like the Turkish 155mm M396 ERDP round more commonly associated with the Panter.


On the other hand the Bofors is significantly lighter and generally more compact, and has a built in ammunition crane. The Bofors’ compact nature suggests that it is easier to maneuver, although the Panter has excellent mobility including in reverse also, but a larger turning circle. Panter is significantly heavier, likely requiring a larger truck (‘prime mover’) and reducing mobility on the smaller tracks. Both feature semi-automatic loading allowing relatively high rates of fire and being easier on the crew. Conclusion: There’s not much in it, both are excellent. FH-77B was the first of this generation of howitzer, but it’s still up there in terms of features and combat reliability. Panter has the better gun and likely better range, but pays some mobility/agility costs.
Both sides employ the Soviet designed M-46 130mm gun, although Pakistan’s are the improved Chinese version (Type-59-I). Some Indian M-46s were upgraded in Israel to M-46S standard with a 155mm barrel. This increases the firepower of the weapon and, as new barrels, extends the service life. The upgrade suffered from quality issues and was suspended after just 36 guns were altered, so these are of questionable usefulness. Although the problems were solved, the continuation of the deal is still the stuff of media speculation.

Despite this bad experience, India is increasingly converting to the 155mm standard, and has ordered 145 M777 lightweight 155mm guns to which will be well suited to this border zone, being approximately half the unloaded weight of the older 130mm guns. These are more mobile than the equivalent Pakistani operated M-198 but more crew intensive than the relatively automated Bofors and Panter guns, with the design focusing on light weight rather than automation.

Although figures are hard to come by, many artillery pieces on both sides must be approaching their barrel life. Many are of WWII vintage, but nonetheless remain operationally deployed or in active reserves. In war many may be deployed, but overall operational figures are slightly exaggerated on both sides.

In the 1999 conflict Pakistani artillery had a distinct advantage in weapons locating radars (WLR) with US supplied AN/TPQ-36 FireFinders. India’s various mortar detecting radars proved inadequate for pinpointing Pakistani artillery sites. In essence WLR detect and track in-flight projectiles such as artillery rounds, and using ballistic calculations, determine the coordinates of the weapon which fired it. The coordinates are then supplied to your own artillery for counter-battery fire, or other assets such as strike aircraft. To redress this balance India purchased the US AN/TPQ-37 system, and also developed an indigenous competitor (BEL). As of today both sides are generally equal in this capability:


Where India enjoys a distinct advantage is in artillery spotting UAVs, with the army operating a significant number of Israeli Search-II UAVs. Not all Indian UAVs are employed for this task so I have not listed the full inventory of UAVs, which include more strategic assets. On the Pakistani side, there are several indigenous UAV types in semi-experimental deployment with the army. Of these the main, and most credible, is the Uqab. This is relatively basic and not suited to night operations. Pakistan also purchased a handful of German LUNA UAVs amid some political intrigue. More recently it was reported that the US will supply Pakistan with 12 RQ-7 Shadow UAVs to help the war with the Taliban. When delivered these will also be relevant for artillery spotting and in time may be deployed to the Indian border regions.


The Uqab and Nishant are generally equivalent on paper for artillery spotting, although the Uqab requires a runway to take off whereas the Nishant is launched from a truck. In this zone of the border there are few bits of land flat enough for a practical air strip so Uqabs would likely operate from Skardu some 90+km to the north. This would limit loiter time and probably require ground station hand-over which complicates operations a lot. At the extreme altitudes of this zone the operation of these light UAVs is questionable and they would be susceptible to MAPADs. India’s much higher flying Heron UAVs could be used but these too would not be in their element. I’d expect that whilst both sides deploy UAVs in this zone of the border, their use for artillery spotting is less impactful than further south along the border where the terrain is at lower altitudes.


Whereas Pakistan currently has the edge in self-propelled guns, India has focused on MRLS. The relative merits of rockets versus guns has been hotly debated since WWII and most militaries sit on the fence, seeing a role for both. Rockets generally have a longer range (increasingly challenged!), greater salvo-weight and fear factor, but are slower to reload and easier to detect by the enemy when employed.

Pakistan has a number of Russian BM-21 (/KRL 122) 122mm MRLS systems and is buying the Chinese A-100E system. The KRL-122 uses different truck chassis top the original Soviet version, and can also fire locally produced ‘Yarmuk’ rockets. Range is 20km as for the original system. The A-100E is a quantum leap for Pakistani artillery and its purchase can be seen as a direct response to India’s purchase of the much feared Russian Smerch system. A-100E is generally equivalent to Smerch and has excellent range.


The A-100 has yet to be delivered and like many reported arms purchases may not materialize. A quick comparison with the Smerch is called for however!


The 9A52-2T Smerch uses an Indian Tatra truck chassis with 10 road-wheels rather than the typical Russian Maz chassis (similar to that of the SCUD and S-300 systems) with 8. The resulting vehicle probably has less off-road capability than the larger wheeled Maz or Chinese A-100 chassis. Both system’s extreme range mean that off-road mobility is less of an issue for successful employment. Although it is easy to think up scenarios where these rockets would be used to attack front line positions, their reach makes them more like to be employed against the large military bases up to 50-70km behind the front line, supplementing both armies’ ballistic and cruise missile forces (not discussed in this essay).


The A-100 is in some ways an ‘export copy’ of the Smerch, which China has in service. It is definitely not a pure clone however and is distinct from Smerch in several ways. Apart from the Chinese chassis, the rocket tubes are different with slightly more flared ends and a smaller box near the front. The A-100 mounts 10 tubes in two rows (6 lower, 4 upper), compared to the 12 rockets mounted in a characteristic arch of the Smerch. On paper the 85km A-100 rocket is longer ranged than India’s 70km 9A52-2T Smerch, although the latter is compatible with the 90km rocket of the Russian Smerch-M if India where to buy it. Reports suggest that Smerch has superior warheads. It seems probable that both the Smerch and A-100 will be deployed with regular rockets, and all-in are closely equivalent. The prospects of infantry just got a bit worse on both sides with these new artillery units being inducted to service.


India too uses the BM-21, which have been upgraded to 40km range. Despite the upgrade the system is getting old and the Indian Army is replacing it with the new indigenous Pinaka MBRL (MBRL = MRLS). Like many Indian defence programs the Pinaka was delayed and subject to much speculation. It was however employed in the 1999 Kargil conflict and since declared ‘mature’ and ordered into service. The 214mm Pinaka rocket features trajectory correction for improved accuracy relative to the BM-21.


Light artillery is also deployed in substantial quantities, particularly in this mountainous area.


Although India has significantly more light artillery, many of these are in reserve and like Pakistan not all are deployed to the Indo-Pakistan border. It is widely reported that the 105mm Light Guns and Indian Light Guns are being withdrawn from Indian front line units in favour of 130mm and 155mm guns. Google Earth imagery from 2009 suggests that the 105mm guns remain actively deployed however. On the Pakistani side the equivalent Type-60 122mm gun remains popular. Mortars of all sizes are also deployed. I’ve seen no evidence of India deploying it’s D-30 guns to the border … these are among the few artillery pieces that can be consistently ID’d in Google Earth imagery.


Both sides also still deploy pack howitzers – aka mountain howitzers. These are very small guns which can be disassembled and transported by pack animals or people. The advantage of these is that they can be positioned much higher up than the larger howitzers. To an extent the use of helicopters is reducing this advantage. At any rate most armies prefer 120mm mortars in these situations, although pack howitzers have superior direct fire capabilities. The 1999 conflict reminded us that the use of artillery for direct fire remains relevant in mountains where enemy are on mountain-top positions. On the Pakistani side the main mountain gun is the OTO-Melara M-56 105mm gun. India deploys two types; the ‘Tito gun’ (M-48), and an Indian type which has a striking resemblance to the US WWII vintage M116.


Zone B.

This section of the border is still relatively mountainous, but at a lower altitude and more fertile farmland – correspondingly there is a far greater civilian population and generally better infrastructure. The Line of Control takes a 90 degree turn from a north-south to east-west division. Life for the military garrisons is clearly more comfortable here and military bases have trees and other signs of establishment – stark contrast to the tents and dust filled garrisons and outposts in Zone A.

Artillery remains a major player here with many artillery sites. Relative to Zone A the sites are more substantial and appear more comfortable.


Generally Pakistani artillery sites are more dispersed and less linear than Indian ones.


Zone C.


This zone starts where the de-facto border (cease-fire line of control ) finishes and the India-Pakistan border proper starts. The land is flat and fertile with many villages and towns on both sides. It was in terrain like this that the famous tank battles of the 1965 war were fought. Even today the defences on both sides show that the tank is king here, with very few permanent artillery positions, but many miles of tank berms, tank ditches and Ops. Unlike in Kargil, there is a solid border line demarked by berms, trenches and fences on both sides.


In general the Pakistani anti-tank berms are more fragmented and often in clear disrepair, perhaps dating back to 1965 and before. There are however more recent works to increase the anti-tank berms and Ops along the Pakistani side of the border (the yellow line is the border):


Pakistan fields a relatively large tank force with nearly 1,900 tanks. India however operates about twice that at around 4,300.

The primary tank of the Indian army is the Russian T-90. Initially 310 T-90S ‘Bhishma’ were ordered, with a follow-on order of 330 T-90Ms in 2006 and another for 347 T-90Ms. When deliveries are complete India will have some 987 T-90s in service, although general reports suggest as many as 1,000 T-90s will be built under license. There are reports that Indian T-90s may in future be equipped with more indigenous and ‘western’ equipment, possibly including active-defence.

The T-90 is really just a T-72 version with a different numeral to mitigate the marketing disaster of T-72s in the 1991 Gulf War. In many respects that’s not a bad thing; the T-72 has its fans, not least the Indian Army. Having said that the T-90 is a much improved tank relative to the older T-72M1 in Indian service. The main areas of enhancement is in armour and electronics. The T-90S is equipped with Kontakt-5 explosive-reactive armour (ERA), and the T-90M with the more modern Kaktus ERA. Indian T-90s are equipped to carry the Refleks gun-launched anti-tank missile which is laser guided and has a range of 5km.


India’s other ‘main’ tank is the indigenous Arjun MBT, modeled more closely on the Western pattern with composite armour, seven road wheels, manually loaded gun and heavy (58t) weight. The project underwent some political and technical problems resulting in a very long gestation and relatively small production order of just 124 tanks. The popular perception of this tank, as a failure, is hard to shake, but recent press seems to be more positive (though no less subjective!). Many now regard the Arjun as a mature product and worthy of greater production, ahead of the imported T-90. The Indian army and government generally disagree and the Arjun remains a numerically small player in the region’s massive tank armies.

An unusual feature of the Arjun is the rifled gun, similar to that on the British Chieftain and Challenger MBTs. India has purchased the Israeli LAHAT gun-launched anti-tank missile for the Arjun, making it a very potent adversary at extended ranges. LAHAT is quoted as having a range of 8km when fired from a tank gun but this is somewhat fanciful in a likely tank-on-tank engagement using onboard targeting. In general the LAHAT is probably equivalent to the T-90’s Refleks missile with excellent engagement range of about 5km (note that the longest ranged tank-tank kill ever was by a British Challenger I against an Iraqi tank at 5.1km). Pakistan also operates the Refleks missile, and reportedly also the Ukrainian designed ‘Kombat’ missile, which has similar capabilities.
India also operates large numbers of T-72 series tanks, many of which have been upgraded. Additionally large numbers of Vijayanta and T-55 MBTs remain in service or reserve.


The primary tank in Pakistani service is the Al-Khalid MBT developed jointly with China. The Al-Khalid is approximately equivalent to early model Chinese Type-96. The design is based to a large extent on the Type-85-II which Pakistan also operates in some numbers, and which was heavily influenced on the T-72. So in this regard the Al-Khalid and T-90 both have a degree of T-72 heritage. Both are overall very similar to T-72 family with 125mm smoothbore guns with carrousel autoloaders, approx 46 tons in weight and explosive-reactive armour (ERA). Al-Khalid comes in slightly different flavours (baseline and Al Khalid–I models) but from an external standpoint there’s not much in the variants.

Compared to the T-90S/M it’s hard to favour the Al-Khalid. In many respects they are very similar but the Pakistani tank is almost certainly less well armoured, and its ERA coverage much more limited. Consequently Pakistani’s are placing much hope in the future Al-Khalid-II, which has yet to be seen.

Concurrently to the Al-Khalid program Pakistan also purchased a sizable force of Ukrainian T-80UD tanks. These are the diesel version of the T-80, which was itself the ‘top tier’ tank beside the more common T-72 series. These late model Ukrainian T-80s also feature a welded turret generally similar to the T-84 standard. They are armed with gun-launched Kombat and presumably Reflecks missiles, equaling the Indian army’s T-90s in many respects. In fact I think it can be argued that the T-80UDs are actually the best Pakistani tank, and closet math 1:1 for Indian T-90s.


Pakistan has also completed a major upgrade of the obsolete Chinese Type-59 MBT as the Al-Zarrar, with 125mm gun and ERA.


On paper at least Pakistan is some way behind the Indian tank forces, but the gap is not so large that any tank clash is predetermined. As in 1965 senior leadership on both sides is likely a bigger factor than the equipment.


The widely circulated Pakistani doctrine for any potential conventional war with India is to use armour thrusts into Indian territory, to a depth of about 50km, to preempt a similar move on India’s part. The hope is to concentrate fighting on the Indian side of the border. The viability of this strategy is open to debate but given Pakistan’s relatively large tank force it is credible. These armored thrusts are more likely to occur further south in Zone D….



Zone D.


This is by far the longest section of border in our analysis. As it runs further south much of the border region becomes desert. For the most part the border defences continue uninterrupted the whole length of the border with Ops and berms etc, but also in general the defences are less extensive than in Zone C.


From a Google Earth perspective this section is the least interesting, which is also why I left it to last. In the event of conflict it’d probably see tank warfare.


Pakistan has a series of canals running approximately parallel to the border which would present a problem to any Indian deep advance, and to a lesser extent complicate Pakistani logistics also. Both sides have bridge laying tanks and many of the tanks involved (T-90, T-80…) can ford to pretty good depths, but steep banked canals are still very effective for slowing tank forces and where they are bridged, choke points occur which in this case can be targeted by artillery, ballistic missiles and aircraft.

The above image shows a typical section of border with the marks showing the border Ops. The tracing of the berms on the Indian side is not exhaustive. There are similar berms on the Pakistani side but they are generally less formidable and more patchy. Indian Ops tend to be larger and tree covered whereas Pakistani ones are more sparse. The canal can be seen on the Pakistani side.

[M_ZEE32]

You have to click the “planemans’s military analysis” link (in blue). it's worth it trust me.

Oh God ! sometime we act like a complete suffer ! same is was the case wid me !

[aziqbal]

The naval war would be very interesting, seeing Indian destroyers or frigates being either damaged or sunk would be great!!

Imagine a Indian carrier gets taken out!!! First carrier to be sunk since WWII!!

[ajaj]

I just hope that this time we beat the crap out of the indians clearly and decisively! We should prepare for war which not only keeps indians out of Pakistan but ends with Radio Pakistan Delhi. No surrenders - Until Last man we fight - No cowardice - No Begharati

[Aliph Ahmed]

I just hope that this time we beat the crap out of the indians clearly and decisively! We should prepare for war which not only keeps indians out of Pakistan but ends with Radio Pakistan Delhi. No surrenders - Until Last man we fight - No cowardice - No Begharati

The next war will be a decisive war which will end up Radio Pakistan being aired from Red Fort, New Delhi. Ameen.

But my take is that it will be around 2012-2013 after India stages another fake Mumbai drama which will for sure target western countries to bring them on her side and launches surgical strikes against Pakistan. It will be a war that will be imposed on Pakistan, which Pakistan will fight for her survival and which will result Pakistan capturing Indian terriotory as far as New Delhi. Inshallah.

Looks to me Another Somnat in making..  

[faizan khaliq]

The next war will be a decisive war which will end up Radio Pakistan being aired from Red Fort, New Delhi. Ameen.

But my take is that it will be around 2012-2013 after India stages another fake Mumbai drama which will for sure target western countries to bring them on her side and launches surgical strikes against Pakistan. It will be a war that will be imposed on Pakistan, which Pakistan will fight for her survival and which will result Pakistan capturing Indian terriotory as far as New Delhi. Inshallah.

Looks to me Another Somnat in making..  

har das mile kay baad koi chiragh jalta milay ga is jang key baad.                    goray and Chinese will come to reclaim our lands

[Aliph Ahmed]

har das mile kay baad koi chiragh jalta milay ga is jang key baad.                    goray and Chinese will come to reclaim our lands

Please discuss your knowledge and opinion here:

Link

[sfhussain]

Dont worry, You can be my 4th wife. (if you chose to come on the right path and convert to Islam). ;-)

Kindly keep it professional!

Our area is in the Midst of the Geo-political storm of the century. before the US exit from afghanistan in 2011/2012 - there will be a push to get the situation in the post withdrawal to be of US, Israel and India's liking. Us ia very likely to play the Indian "card' with Israel's help. Thanks to the Turks - now Israel has more than enough on their hands - let see if india does anything stupid.

[GreenBeret]

The war also depends on reserve weapons,ammunition and personnel from both sides. If the war continues for more than 4 weeks, Pakistan has chances of utilizing reserves quickly than India.

Depends on Reserves in  :
1. Tanks/APC's/Artillery guns/Aircrafts
2. Ammunition for 105/125/130/155/203 mm caliber weapons
3. Missiles such as Green Arrow/Anza/AIM-9/PL-9-12/AIM120/C-802-3
4. Fuel and Logistics system
5. Reservist Officer/Soldiers

[faizan khaliq]

Pakistan will create stalemate and slow down the tempo of war through direct and indirect means

[GreenBeret]

Pakistan will create stalemate and slow down the tempo of war through direct and indirect means

Thats would be a wrong strategy because Pakistan cannot win a war of attrition and Pakistan would try to capture as much Indian area as possible for negotiations and these offensives would require lots of resources to capture and then hold.

[faizan khaliq]

Thats would be a wrong strategy because Pakistan cannot win a war of attrition and Pakistan would try to capture as much Indian area as possible for negotiations and these offensives would require lots of resources to capture and then hold.

we have better hand and can keep India on strategic defensive , long war of attrition would Bring Indian progress to a grinding halt and mixed with centrifugal tendencies it would be a losing equation for india and as for as Pakistan is concerned what we have anyway in terms of economy .

[hassan]

we are not going to fire all our weapons in one day?are we playing some arcade game here!Before going full scale war there are a lot of issues and pressure on both sides.it will be really really highly unlikely Pk or India open full scale war.and we should not forget SURPRISE element from Pak armed forces.i can't disclose any info here but believe me we do have and will always have element of surprise.

[sfhussain]

Thats would be a wrong strategy because Pakistan cannot win a war of attrition

I would dispute this statement - it depends on our strategy. hezbollah with 3,000 to 4,000 achieved a lot with israel. Out 60+ year policy of fight for 2 weeks and then look for a ceasefire/negotiations should be buried. i encourage members to rethink their long held beliefs.

[GreenBeret]

I would dispute this statement - it depends on our strategy. hezbollah with 3,000 to 4,000 achieved a lot with israel. Out 60+ year policy of fight for 2 weeks and then look for a ceasefire/negotiations should be buried. i encourage members to rethink their long held beliefs.

You can dispute it, But:

1. Pakistan's Armed Forces strategy is Offensive- Defensive. In simple words, capture enemy territory for negotiations.

2. Pakistan Armed Forces cannot be compared to Hezbollah's strategy at all. The resources and weapons permit PA to fight a war with a different combat doctirne, much effective than that of Hezbollah. The collateral damage and the civilians killed by Israel, i dont think it was worth it.

3. Unfortunately, Pakistan Armed Forces reserves dont permit a long war.

Lets have a reality check. I will list the short comings.

1.Pakistan Armed forces (all three branches) are short by atleast 10,000 officers. The Combat formations like sections, platoons, companies,battalions (minus HQ) are functioning on Multi-tasking of Officers.
In all HQ's of any kind, the officer strength is complete.

2.Many of the formations use obsolete equipment, this leaves little room for reserves. This means an armoured  regiment using 45 tanks if loses 10 , will automatically lose a  ~ squadron strength (squadron is of 12- 15 tanks) maybe for entire war if not replaced, so its over all efficiency will be reduced. Do bear in  mind, old equipment has constant breakdowns also and if replacement comes, it will be older tanks.

Once a unit loses  67% of its strength, its rendered useless. israeli units are rendered useless and called back when losing 50% strength.

The major obsolete equipment which is required in an offense is:
T-59 and T-69 tanks, Towed artillery of different calibres 85mm, 105mm, 122mm etc.

Lets talk about reserves.
There are M-48A5 and T-55 series tanks in reserve and they are also obsolete considering pitching against  T-72 and infantry equipped with ATGM's. There are almost no reserves of Towed artillery, SP artillery, meaningful AAA (35mm or 40mm, reserves have 12.7mm or 20mm).

Imagine, such reserves equipping the forces and mounting a counter attack. The efficiecny of the assault will be decreased many folds to start with.

3. To permit a long war, different kinds of ammunition need to be used. POF is very efficient in making small arms weapons and even tank and artillery shells. Due to the major war going in the west, the war reserves are being used up in that sector especially mortar and artillery rounds.
The fuel issue comes into factor when armoured forces are used in a certain theater.
The combat radius of different types of armoured assets are kept in mind to constitute a strategy. usually its near to ~300 km, which is so far good enough for a 50-70 km thrust into enemy territory.

4.The logistics problem. The Yasoob truck project was a success even if many disagree with it. The requirement was of few hundred trucks and it was completed.
Yet there are many divisional Logistics unit which use 1960's model USA made trucks which breakdown constantly. Again many are not of full strength. The strike corps have the best available units in logistics and combat units too.
The army uses civilian transport too which is arranged by the Station HQ's of cantonments. Civilian transport is useful as it deceives the enemy also.

5.The reserve aircraft for PAF are F-6s. and Navy almost doesnt have any reserve. I am not updated on ammunition used by aircraft and ships, subs.

Before a certain sector is threatened to be run-over or any force(be it naval or army) in a certain area is rendered useless, Pakistan will resort to ballistic missiles or then nukes.which will then have its consequences, so IMO the strategy that PA keeps is good enough.

[ali23]

The logistics problem. The Yasoob truck project was a success even if many disagree with it. The requirement was of few hundred trucks and it was completed.

What happened to it?  I once saw it in pindi (yasoob was written on it in urdu) more than ten years ago and read about in one of the Pakistan Army green books.

[faizan khaliq]

You can dispute it, But:

1. Pakistan's Armed Forces strategy is Offensive- Defensive. In simple words, capture enemy territory for negotiations.

2. Pakistan Armed Forces cannot be compared to Hezbollah's strategy at all. The resources and weapons permit PA to fight a war with a different combat doctirne, much effective than that of Hezbollah. The collateral damage and the civilians killed by Israel, i dont think it was worth it.

3. Unfortunately, Pakistan Armed Forces reserves dont permit a long war.

Lets have a reality check. I will list the short comings.

1.Pakistan Armed forces (all three branches) are short by atleast 10,000 officers. The Combat formations like sections, platoons, companies,battalions (minus HQ) are functioning on Multi-tasking of Officers.
In all HQ's of any kind, the officer strength is complete.

2.Many of the formations use obsolete equipment, this leaves little room for reserves. This means an armoured  regiment using 45 tanks if loses 10 , will automatically lose a  ~ squadron strength (squadron is of 12- 15 tanks) maybe for entire war if not replaced, so its over all efficiency will be reduced. Do bear in  mind, old equipment has constant breakdowns also and if replacement comes, it will be older tanks.

Once a unit loses  67% of its strength, its rendered useless. israeli units are rendered useless and called back when losing 50% strength.

The major obsolete equipment which is required in an offense is:
T-59 and T-69 tanks, Towed artillery of different calibres 85mm, 105mm, 122mm etc.

Lets talk about reserves.
There are M-48A5 and T-55 series tanks in reserve and they are also obsolete considering pitching against  T-72 and infantry equipped with ATGM's. There are almost no reserves of Towed artillery, SP artillery, meaningful AAA (35mm or 40mm, reserves have 12.7mm or 20mm).

Imagine, such reserves equipping the forces and mounting a counter attack. The efficiecny of the assault will be decreased many folds to start with.

3. To permit a long war, different kinds of ammunition need to be used. POF is very efficient in making small arms weapons and even tank and artillery shells. Due to the major war going in the west, the war reserves are being used up in that sector especially mortar and artillery rounds.
The fuel issue comes into factor when armoured forces are used in a certain theater.
The combat radius of different types of armoured assets are kept in mind to constitute a strategy. usually its near to ~300 km, which is so far good enough for a 50-70 km thrust into enemy territory.

4.The logistics problem. The Yasoob truck project was a success even if many disagree with it. The requirement was of few hundred trucks and it was completed.
Yet there are many divisional Logistics unit which use 1960's model USA made trucks which breakdown constantly. Again many are not of full strength. The strike corps have the best available units in logistics and combat units too.
The army uses civilian transport too which is arranged by the Station HQ's of cantonments. Civilian transport is useful as it deceives the enemy also.

5.The reserve aircraft for PAF are F-6s. and Navy almost doesnt have any reserve. I am not updated on ammunition used by aircraft and ships, subs.

Before a certain sector is threatened to be run-over or any force(be it naval or army) in a certain area is rendered useless, Pakistan will resort to ballistic missiles or then nukes.which will then have its consequences, so IMO the strategy that PA keeps is good enough.

1.Absolutely correct analysis  let us view the policy objectives vs Armed forces of Pakistan
a,Our Enemies India US and Israel
lets take former two out for sometime and say India
Policy objective
Containment  of Muslim political power in Subcontinent with ultimate aim of destruction
strength available million plus   regulars  the ratio of Army air force and navy
1:2, 1:4 and 1: 11 respectively figure might vary a little bit
The area grabbing doctrine of offensive defense thing might not hurt India at all
that means offensive defense is a flawed strategy
b.The war stamina equation favors india heavily
2.The solution Present structure of Army and the doctrine does not suit our strategic needs but what is the solution
a.Give up war
we might but our enemies will not so this option is out
b.Nuke the buggers from A to Z
it is an option for ultimate defense but with strings attached Mutual destruction means no victory
3.joint resistance of all the Muslims of subcontinent for Political dominance in south Asia that would be  policy of unification of Muslims of subcontinent and neutralizing the Hindu Zion axis through internal political pressure in India and if necessary support the civil war
4.Let us suppose we mange an all out civil war between hindu,s and Muslims In India will we be able to intervene in presence of such a huge army and world behind them
the answer is definitely'' no''
5.In short our policy objectives or strategic compulsions vs our armed forces structure and economy we have a huge gap
we can not give up so lot of serious thinking is required as what is to be done to win this absolute war and we have no other options other than winning

[GreenBeret]

What happened to it?  I once saw it in pindi (yasoob was written on it in urdu) more than ten years ago and read about in one of the Pakistan Army green books.

I have said that the required number( a few hundreds) of trucks were built and the project was completed. These trucks have been inducted into artillery regiments for towing guns.

[GreenBeret]

1.Absolutely correct analysis  let us view the policy objectives vs Armed forces of Pakistan
a,Our Enemies India US and Israel
lets take former two out for sometime and say India
Policy objective
Containment  of Muslim political power in Subcontinent with ultimate aim of destruction
strength available million plus   regulars  the ratio of Army air force and navy
1:2, 1:4 and 1: 11 respectively figure might vary a little bit
The area grabbing doctrine of offensive defense thing might not hurt India at all
that means offensive defense is a flawed strategy
b.The war stamina equation favors india heavily
2.The solution Present structure of Army and the doctrine does not suit our strategic needs but what is the solution
a.Give up war
we might but our enemies will not so this option is out
b.Nuke the buggers from A to Z
it is an option for ultimate defense but with strings attached Mutual destruction means no victory
3.joint resistance of all the Muslims of subcontinent for Political dominance in south Asia that would be  policy of unification of Muslims of subcontinent and neutralizing the Hindu Zion axis through internal political pressure in India and if necessary support the civil war
4.Let us suppose we mange an all out civil war between hindu,s and Muslims In India will we be able to intervene in presence of such a huge army and world behind them
the answer is definitely'' no''
5.In short our policy objectives or strategic compulsions vs our armed forces structure and economy we have a huge gap
we can not give up so lot of serious thinking is required as what is to be done to win this absolute war and we have no other options other than winning

The doctrine (offensive-defensive) has been formed by the Pakistan Army, not by any analyst. and it has been inducted after an exhilarating military excercise.
Previously I discussed the situation on ground. Lets discuss the doctrine now.

1.The doctrine enables Pakistan to launche an offensive of its own against India choosing the battle ground and sector itself.
The offensive will be an advance along narrow fronts to avoid getting flanked and occupying territory near the border to a depth of ~50 km. Since Indian forces will not reach their maximum strength near the border for about 48–72 hours, Pakistan can have numerical superiority against the Indians.

2.The important factor is of geographic location of Pakistan itself and then the Industrial Machinery of Pakistan.
The country is very narrow at its middle and could be cut into half by an Indian attack.The basic perception is, India will try to cut Sindh from the rest of the country.
Many of Pakistan's major population centers,political and military sensitive targets are located very close to the border with India (especially Kashmir side border). Thus Pakistan cannot afford to lose large territories to an Indian attack.

3. India's offensive capabilities have increased, and a stand and deliver approach doctrine used in the 1965 and 1971 wars can lead to serious Indian penetration of Pakistani territory, whereas the Pakistani army may not be able to maneuver to counter the threat. There is a chance that counterattacking formations would then be destroyed piecemeal by numerically superior Indian forces. Counterattacking requires surprise as well as 3:1 numerical superiority.

4. Ground holding formations of both India and Pakistan can hold their forward defensive positions in less than 24 hours. However, Corps level mechanized forces with armoured forces and large stockpiles of munitions will take between 24 to 72 hours for mobilization after being given their orders. In this regard,  Pakistan can have an edge in the first 24 hours since the Pakistani units have to travel a shorter distance to their forward positions.

5.The enemy will be kept off-balance as it will be using its best forces to throw Pakistan Army out of its territory thus it will be tied down containing the Pakistani offensive into its territory rather than launching an offensive into Pakistani territory.

6.The Pakistani Army hopes this way fighting will be contained on the Indian side of the border so that any collateral or other damage will be suffered by India.

7.The most important factor: when Indian territory of any strategic importance is seized, will give the Pakistani Army a bargaining chip to be used in the aftermath of a ceasefire. The ceasefire can occur by international pressure after 3–4 weeks of fighting.

[sfhussain]

1. Pakistan's Armed Forces strategy is Offensive- Defensive. In simple words, capture enemy territory for negotiations.

This startegy in particular is what I am questioning. In 1948, we fought a war and got Azad kashmir was fought with irregulars from tribal areas using unconventional methods. The India ran to the UN and Plebiscite was negotiated. The british trained officers and establishment went back to fight for 2 weeks and beg for negotiations. Our enemy knows this, with our diplomatic clout in tatters - This is a stupid Strategy. Case in point is Kargill - we got the territory - then the we turned a military victory into a diaster by begging for a ceasefire and negotiations. To date we have not learned from this stupidity.

2. Pakistan Armed Forces cannot be compared to Hezbollah's strategy at all. The resources and weapons permit PA to fight a war with a different combat doctirne, much effective than that of Hezbollah. The collateral damage and the civilians killed by Israel, i dont think it was worth it.

You should also have qualified the following statement "much effective than that of Hezbollah" for 2 weeks only. When fighting an Enemy - Any and all collateral damage is acceptable as long as we nullify the enemy's capacity to wage war. Even Us and Israel cannot sustain a high tech war for more than 2 months. Israel learnt this lesson in Lebnan at the hands of a rag tag bunch of irregulars. Pakistan needs to learn and adapt as opposed to repeating our mistakes.

  

[faizan khaliq]

The doctrine (offensive-defensive) has been formed by the Pakistan Army, not by any analyst. and it has been inducted after an exhilarating military excercise.
Previously I discussed the situation on ground. Lets discuss the doctrine now.

1.The doctrine enables Pakistan to launche an offensive of its own against India choosing the battle ground and sector itself.
The offensive will be an advance along narrow fronts to avoid getting flanked and occupying territory near the border to a depth of ~50 km. Since Indian forces will not reach their maximum strength near the border for about 48–72 hours, Pakistan can have numerical superiority against the Indians.

2.The important factor is of geographic location of Pakistan itself and then the Industrial Machinery of Pakistan.
The country is very narrow at its middle and could be cut into half by an Indian attack.The basic perception is, India will try to cut Sindh from the rest of the country.
Many of Pakistan's major population centers,political and military sensitive targets are located very close to the border with India (especially Kashmir side border). Thus Pakistan cannot afford to lose large territories to an Indian attack.

3. India's offensive capabilities have increased, and a stand and deliver approach doctrine used in the 1965 and 1971 wars can lead to serious Indian penetration of Pakistani territory, whereas the Pakistani army may not be able to maneuver to counter the threat. There is a chance that counterattacking formations would then be destroyed piecemeal by numerically superior Indian forces. Counterattacking requires surprise as well as 3:1 numerical superiority.

4. Ground holding formations of both India and Pakistan can hold their forward defensive positions in less than 24 hours. However, Corps level mechanized forces with armoured forces and large stockpiles of munitions will take between 24 to 72 hours for mobilization after being given their orders. In this regard,  Pakistan can have an edge in the first 24 hours since the Pakistani units have to travel a shorter distance to their forward positions.

5.The enemy will be kept off-balance as it will be using its best forces to throw Pakistan Army out of its territory thus it will be tied down containing the Pakistani offensive into its territory rather than launching an offensive into Pakistani territory.

6.The Pakistani Army hopes this way fighting will be contained on the Indian side of the border so that any collateral or other damage will be suffered by India.

7.The most important factor: when Indian territory of any strategic importance is seized, will give the Pakistani Army a bargaining chip to be used in the aftermath of a ceasefire. The ceasefire can occur by international pressure after 3–4 weeks of fighting.

Basically there is one issue here let us suppose we advance into India by 100 kilometers.Google the map and draw line anywhere it might be a fantastic moral booster for Pakistani,s and bit of shock to Indians.Now there are following options
a.Political leader ship of India displays the lack of forethought and press Indian forces to eliminate the penetration.Happy scenario for Pakistan we do a lot of damage to Indians for few weeks and force them to fight on ground of our own choosing and by the time war ends Indians don,t have any teeth left to go to grand offensive  and a stalemate is achieved
b.Indian forces commander is thorough professional who refuse to submit to stupid demands of civil leadership and  just Mask the penetration knowing fully well that Pakistani offensive ran out of gas  and it won,t go much further and goes about his planned offensive ''sunderji,s brasstach'' where we will stand after already committing our strike corps/reserves before the war.

[sfhussain]

Basically there is one issue here let us suppose we advance into India by 100 kilometers.Google the map and draw line anywhere it might be a fantastic moral booster for Pakistani,s and bit of shock to Indians.Now there are following options
a.Political leader ship of India displays the lack of forethought and press Indian forces to eliminate the penetration.Happy scenario for Pakistan we do a lot of damage to Indians for few weeks and force them to fight on ground of our own choosing and by the time war ends Indians don,t have any teeth left to go to grand offensive  and a stalemate is achieved
b.Indian forces commander is thorough professional who refuse to submit to stupid demands of civil leadership and  just Mask the penetration knowing fully well that Pakistani offensive ran out of gas  and it won,t go much further and goes about his planned offensive ''sunderji,s brasstach'' where we will stand after already committing our strike corps/reserves before the war.

In short, best case is repeat of Kargill. Are we going to be beggars for cease fie and negotiations?? Money?? Repeat our Stupidity! I would say #### can our present strategy and teach Hindu Dogs a real lesson.

[faizan khaliq]

war is a serious business which can not be left on generals alone.It is basically an extension of policy through arms unfortunately their is  a serious flaw  between policy and war.I would say policy is our geopolitical compulsions which will lead us to the war eventually even if we don,t want it and it has to be Pakistani nation at war not Pakistani armed forces alone.national wars fought at grandest scale with an aim of total victory that is where we have to aim and for that we have to plan and restructure our armed forces

[sfhussain]

total victory that is where we have to aim and for that we have to plan and restructure our armed forces

Add as opposed to restructure.

The addition would be a Asymetric Force to resist and inflict massive casualities in the first 2 months of the war. This would be fighting a defensive war and trapping Indian army repeatedly and forcing them to expend their high tech weaponry while saving our conventional forces. This would be similar startegy to hezbollah/TTP have or are doing with exception being stopping the Hindu Dogs at and in the cities.

After sufficient degradation has been inflicted on the enemy - then cut loose the coventional forces on India with massive infiltration of unconventional forces into India.

All of the above would have to be done on a national war footing. even if India is not totally destroyed - the dogs would never again raise their heads in the neighbourhood.

  

[GreenBeret]

This startegy in particular is what I am questioning. In 1948, we fought a war and got Azad kashmir was fought with irregulars from tribal areas using unconventional methods. The India ran to the UN and Plebiscite was negotiated. The british trained officers and establishment went back to fight for 2 weeks and beg for negotiations. Our enemy knows this, with our diplomatic clout in tatters - This is a stupid Strategy. Case in point is Kargill - we got the territory - then the we turned a military victory into a diaster by begging for a ceasefire and negotiations. To date we have not learned from this stupidity.

Kargil was not a full fledge war to start with. It had an objective, cut Indian Road supply route towards Siachen, all the sub-objectives were related to Siachen. PAF wasnt involved and there was no intention to use air support from PAF also.There wasnt any other sector involved and all the enemy's resources could be concentrated in one sector, which eventually happened.
A full fledge war is another story.

You should also have qualified the following statement "much effective than that of Hezbollah" for 2 weeks only. When fighting an Enemy - Any and all collateral damage is acceptable as long as we nullify the enemy's capacity to wage war. Even Us and Israel cannot sustain a high tech war for more than 2 months. Israel learnt this lesson in Lebnan at the hands of a rag tag bunch of irregulars. Pakistan needs to learn and adapt as opposed to repeating our mistakes.

  

Its for you to understand that PA is not a rag tag bunch of irregulars like Hezbollah, thus both cannot be compared.

[GreenBeret]

Basically there is one issue here let us suppose we advance into India by 100 kilometers.Google the map and draw line anywhere it might be a fantastic moral booster for Pakistani,s and bit of shock to Indians.Now there are following options
a.Political leader ship of India displays the lack of forethought and press Indian forces to eliminate the penetration.Happy scenario for Pakistan we do a lot of damage to Indians for few weeks and force them to fight on ground of our own choosing and by the time war ends Indians don,t have any teeth left to go to grand offensive  and a stalemate is achieved
b.Indian forces commander is thorough professional who refuse to submit to stupid demands of civil leadership and  just Mask the penetration knowing fully well that Pakistani offensive ran out of gas  and it won,t go much further and goes about his planned offensive ''sunderji,s brasstach'' where we will stand after already committing our strike corps/reserves before the war.

A Morale booster is what a soldier needs to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. Maybe you should attend a "Barra Khana" of some Battalion or listen to the words of a commander after some excercise etc

India will be more than welcome to use its Strike Corps against dug-in Pakistani Army, whose command knows they should not lose this trump card which will be a major factor in achieving victory over India. Mechanized forces can be switched around for counter attacks or flanking the attacking Indian forces where as the accompanying Infantry division will hold the area, inviting more Indian Forces in the region.
Pakistani Offensive cannot run out of gas quickly because I have already explained how Offenses are planned keeping such factors in mind and the combat radius of our armoured units.